

Chapter 11

The Strategic Implications of Enlargement

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The successive enlargement of the European Union is itself the EU's most successful foreign policy venture.¹ In the 1980s enlargement to Greece, Spain and Portugal helped to consolidate democracy and bolster stability and security for the West as a whole. In the early 1990s the accession of Austria, Sweden and Finland anchored these non-aligned countries firmly into the international mainstream while providing a bridge to transition countries in central and eastern Europe. At the end of the 1990s the creation of the Stability Pact for southeastern Europe in the wake of the Kosovo conflict—with its mix of quick start infrastructure projects, stabilization and association agreements, and the perspective of eventual EU and NATO membership—helped to create conditions that promised to transform historic animosities and set the region on the road to Europe. In 2004 the enlargement of the European Union to 10 new countries has projected stability far across the European continent. This process will continue in 2007 and beyond with the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, and with the perspective of membership for Turkey and other nations.

These are historic achievements. But they come with a question: will the EU's wider borders be accompanied by wider EU strategic horizons, or will EU nations be so preoccupied with “digesting” the consequences of enlargement that they punch below their potential on the world stage? Relatively wide differences in economic performance

¹ I am indebted to members of a study group on the strategic implications of enlargement, sponsored by the Center for Transatlantic Relations, whose contributions appear in Esther Brimmer, ed., *The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement* (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2005), as well as to CTR Fellow Peter Jones on the transformation of the Broader Middle East. Other good sources on the issue include the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Istanbul paper #1, *Democracy and Human Development in the broader Middle East*; and Istanbul paper #2, *Developing a new Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region*, available at www.gmfus.org

and political perspective between member states within the larger EU pose serious questions for economic convergence and overall political and economic cohesion among EU members.

Moreover, the most recent enlargement has given the EU borders with Belarus and Ukraine, and extended its frontier with Russia. With the accession of Romania the EU will share a border with Moldova and reach the Black Sea. The accession of Cyprus and Malta has brought a number of Mediterranean countries closer to EU territory. Turkish accession will take the EU to the Middle East and the Caucasus. How will these new dimensions affect European approaches to a range of critical issues?

There are three parts to this question. The first is how the EU will approach its eastern neighbors. The second is how the EU will approach its southern neighbors. The third is how this larger EU will act on the world stage—how it will approach a range of global issues ranging far beyond Europe's frontiers. Each of these elements, in turn, contains a further subtheme—how will the EU and the U.S. engage each other?

Europe's East

Turkey

The EU has exerted tremendous influence over Turkey's reform process.² Since the EU recognized Turkey as a candidate for membership at Helsinki in December 1999, successive governments have introduced reforms more far-reaching than any since Atatürk. A series of constitutional and legal changes have enabled Turkish citizens to enjoy a wider range of fundamental rights and freedoms. Freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of religion, freedom from abuse by the security forces, greater civilian control of the military, the reform of the judiciary, and the use of languages other than Turkish in broadcasting and education are among the areas where striking progress has been made. Turkey has advanced more fitfully, however; in meeting the economic criteria for EU membership—mainly requiring the state to pursue sound fiscal and monetary poli-

² See Michael Leigh, "The EU and its New Neighborhood;" and Henri Barkey and Anne-Marie leGloannec, "The EU and Turkey," in Brimmer, *op. cit.*

cies, reduce its role in economic life, dismantle monopolies and promote privatisation, and create the foundations for a competitive market economy.

The pull of the EU has also led to better relations between Turkey and neighboring countries. The reduction in tensions with Greece, following mutual assistance after earthquakes in the two countries in 1999, the apparent strategic decision in Ankara to support UN efforts to solve the Cyprus problem, crowned by the favourable referendum vote in the northern part of the island in 2004, and even tentative steps to begin a dialogue with Armenia, all owe something to Ankara's wish to project an image of a country dedicated to good neighborly relations, in the context of its EU membership bid.

In short, Turkey's EU candidacy has been a powerful catalyst for change. There is a growing consensus in favor of liberal democracy and there has been considerable convergence with European standards. There is now better protection of human rights in Turkey. The role of the military in public life has been reduced. Turkish authorities have been willing to enter into dialogue and cooperation with the EU on a range of subjects traditionally considered taboo. Turkey has collaborated in monitoring progress and, on the whole, has accepted EU advice on areas where further efforts are needed. The challenge now is to maintain the momentum of this process and to support reformers in Turkey whose vision is of a modern, western-oriented, secular nation, taking its place in the mainstream of European political and economic life.

Popular European rejection of the constitutional treaty, punctuated by the dramatic double "no" in France and the Netherlands, however, also reflects widespread European unease with the possible consequences of enlargement.

Turkey's accession path to Europe could potentially be derailed, however, by growing unease among EU publics with the implications of actual Turkish membership in the EU. Popular rejection of the EU constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands was due in part to concerns about Turkish membership.

If the EU now shifts from its current "yes-if" approach to Turkey (yes to accession but only if Turkey meets key conditions) to a new

position of "privileged partnership"—but not membership—for Turkey, there will be dramatic consequences not only for Turkish-EU relations, but also for US-EU relations.

The U.S. has long championed Turkish aspirations for EU membership, due to Washington's desire to anchor Turkey firmly into the West, and as the Broader Middle East and the Black Sea have become greater U.S. strategic priorities. On the other hand, Turkish membership in the EU would also change U.S.-Turkish relations.³ Active U.S. lobbying has been deeply resented in Brussels and throughout the EU. A reversal in the EU position would ensure that the Turkish issue will remain contentious in U.S.-EU relations.

Generating a New Vision for a Wider Europe

Today the debate about "redefining Europe" revolves around Turkey. But the Turkey debate is but the touchstone of what is likely to be another decade-long process of "redefinition" that will also force the EU and the Euro-Atlantic community to address more forthrightly the challenges and opportunities offered by Wider Europe.

The dual enlargement of the EU and NATO to central and eastern Europe has helped to stabilize and secure large parts of the continent, but—together with tremendously important changes underway among populations from Ukraine to Georgia—now presents the West with a new agenda to anchor democracy and project security even further to the continent's east, to areas where peace and stability are not yet fully ensured.⁴ This means redoubling our focus on Ukraine's relationship to the West, facilitating democratic change in Belarus, and engaging particularly with the states stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian as we seek to strengthen our efforts to fight terrorism and transform the Broader Middle East. This is an area of turbulence and potential instability requiring the same degree of commitment that "core Europe" and the United States demonstrated in integrating central Europe and quelling violence in the Balkans. It must encompass a

³ F. Stephen Larrabee, "The US-EU-Turkish Triangle," *Internationale Politik*. Transatlantic Edition, Winter 2004, v5, #4, pp. 27-34.

⁴ See Daniel S. Hamilton, "Transforming Wider Europe: Ten Lessons from Transatlantic-Nordic-Baltic Cooperation," in *Danish Yearbook of International Affairs 2005* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005)

democratic Turkey fully integrated into all key western institutions. It means tending to the problems of southeastern Europe, particularly since issues of final status for Kosovo loom. And it means facing up to the challenges posed by a Russia marked by more repressive rule at home and continuing “zero-sum” security mentality when it comes to dealing with its smaller neighbors.

Unfortunately, this dynamic region faces a West that is distracted, divided, complacent, or uncertain as to why it should engage as an active partner for change. Many Western leaders have issued rhetorical support for a Wider Europe that is more democratic, more secure, and more of a partner for the West. But the concept remains relatively undefined, its mechanisms undeveloped, and support for it uncertain. Many have yet to decide whether Western engagement should be foremost about mollifying non-members or advancing a truly transformative approach to the region that would align—and eventually integrate—these nations into the European and Euro-Atlantic community.

Why should the West advance a transformative agenda with Wider Europe? The answer begins by appreciating the transformative power of the transatlantic partnership. For half a century European-American partnership protected the western half of the continent from threats from its eastern half, while transforming relations among western nations themselves and working to overcome the divisions of the continent. The West then joined in solidarity with those on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain who shattered that divide with their stubborn insistence that they would “return to Europe.”

Following the Cold War the transatlantic partnership seized the dynamic opportunity offered by a continent without walls and began to work toward a Europe whole, free and at peace with itself. The result has been the successive advance of democracy, security, human rights and free markets through most of the Euro-Atlantic region.

Today the challenge is to extend that vision to include the countries of Wider Europe, extending from eastern Europe and the Mediterranean to Eurasia. Working together to achieve this vision is an opportunity for Europeans and Americans, after some bitter spats, to renew a sense of common cause. Successful reforms in countries such as Ukraine and Georgia would reverberate throughout the societies of the former Soviet space, offering compelling evidence that

freedom, democracy, respect of human rights and the rule of law is not some quixotic dream. Success in this region would bring us one step closer to a Europe that is truly whole, free, and at peace with itself, and would facilitate efforts by the United States and Europe to advance our second major transformative project—modernization of the Broader Middle East.⁵ The display of coordinated U.S.-EU support for free elections in Ukraine was perhaps the most recent dramatic example of what can be achieved by transatlantic entente.

The West is perhaps at the same point in its relations with Wider Europe as it was with the nations of central and eastern Europe more than a decade ago, when the notion of Euro-Atlantic integration was considered excessively ambitious, potentially threatening, or simply unrealistic. That experience, while ultimately successful, tells us that anchoring the countries of Wider Europe to the West will be neither quick nor easy. It cautions us about trying to predict the exact course or nature of the process. But it also offers some useful lessons along the way.

Candidates for accession must realize that closer association with the West begins at home. Western countries will deepen their links with neighboring nations to the extent they see that leaders and their people are making tough choices for democratic, free market reforms—not as a favor to others, but as a benefit to themselves.

Closer integration into western structures is also likely to be accelerated to the extent a nation “acts like a member” even before it becomes a member. Countries seeking closer association with the West need to articulate clearly and consistently to Western partners how their closer association would benefit the entire Euro-Atlantic community—and then they need to act accordingly.

Even though the burden of change rests primarily with nations that seek reform, it is critically important that Western leaders be clear that the door to Western institutions remains open to those new

⁵ For views on this approach see F. Stephen Larrabee, *NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era* (Washington, DC: RAND, 2004); various contributions to Ronald D. Asmus, Konstantin Dimitrov and Joerg Forbrig, eds., *A New Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region*,” also the remarks by the Lithuanian Ambassador to the U.S. Vygaudas Uackas, “What Lessons can Ukraine Draw from the Experience of Democratic Development in the Baltic States?” September 13/14, Washington, DC.

democracies that are willing and able to walk through them. Such a vision should be underpinned with concrete manifestations of support and outreach. Trying to determine Europe's "finality" today could mean shutting the door on nascent democracies. Why risk that for some rather abstract need for "finality?"

The EU and its key partners should engage partner nations on a broad front. This means going beyond monetary assistance alone. In earlier phases of enlargement, both the EU and the U.S. offered aspiring members a range of inducements credible enough to secure strategic leverage over the course of reform and practical enough to guide those reforms in ways conducive to Euro-Atlantic integration. Such leverage is likely to be limited without the prospect of admission to Euro-Atlantic institutions, even if that prospect appears to be on the distant horizon. The credibility of an "Open Door" policy depends on the willingness and ability of the West to provide intermediate mechanisms and transitional vehicles—as was done with the U.S.-Baltic Charter and the Northern European Initiative, the EU's Stabilization and Association Agreements, the Northern Dimension and the joint U.S.-EU Stability Pact for southeastern Europe—to help guide and support reformist nations along what could be a long and winding road. A "wider agenda with Wider Europe" could build on these experiences by developing intensified cooperation on a variety of issues beyond traditional foreign policy topics.

Efforts to establish a closer Euro-Atlantic association must be advanced with an awareness of their impact on Russia and neighboring countries. Success in Ukraine, Georgia and other states would be powerful evidence that democracy, free markets, respect for human rights and the rule of law can take root on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine's successful transition toward a full fledged democracy and rule of law would resonate profoundly throughout Russian society—a particularly important message now, given Moscow's rapid retreat from freedom and democracy. Strong Western support for Ukrainian and Georgian reforms is critical not only for the sake of their own success but also for the future of democracy and the rule of law in Russia.

The states of Wider Europe must also be encouraged to mutually support each other's aspirations, rather than holding each other back in a zero-sum competition for Western favors. Here, again, one can

point to earlier successes, including mutual support among the Visegrad nations, regional cooperation under the Northern European Initiative, the support network created by the Vilnius 10, and cooperative regional mechanisms created by the Stability Pact for southeastern Europe. The looming danger now is that those who oppose Turkey's membership in the EU will use Ukraine's aspirations to block those of Turkey, arguing that Ukraine is clearly "European" and should jump the queue. Turkish and Ukrainian leaders would be well advised to join forces, rather than allow to be pitted against one another in some sort of Wider European "beauty contest."

It is critical that efforts at Euro-Atlantic integration be accompanied by active attempts by the parties themselves, as well as by outside nations, to resolve regional tensions and conflicts. Wider Europe's four so-called "frozen conflicts"—in Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan are not really "frozen." They are festering wounds that absorb energy and drain resources from countries that are already weak and poor. They inhibit the process of state building as well as the development of democratic societies. They generate corruption and organized crime. They foster the proliferation of arms and a climate of intimidation. They are a major source of instability within these countries and in the broader region. They severely undermine the prospects of the involved countries for Euro-Atlantic integration, while giving Moscow a major incentive to keep these conflicts "frozen."

Finally, even as we apply these lessons to Wider Europe we cannot forget their continuing relevance in southeastern Europe, because failure of integration strategies there will reduce the prospects for their success elsewhere. Crisis is brewing again in Kosovo, for instance, and the international community is again united in its complacency. Reform is painfully slow in the western Balkans, the region is beset by organized crime and corruption, and it is not yet clear that "Europeanization" can repeat its earlier successes. The prospect of renewed violence remains real.

Kosovo status negotiations loom in 2005. Although there are many models for Kosovo's future, the likely result will be a largely independent Kosovo perhaps with some elements of national policies, such as human rights issues, under broader EU or international auspices for some indeterminate time.

However the status negotiations turn out, however, it is clear is that the overarching framework not only for Kosovo but for the Western Balkans and Balkans overall is the European Union as well as the collective security framework of the Partnership for Peace and NATO. The EU has taken over the military mission in Macedonia and the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from SFOR. These efforts are important tests of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Other problems loom. Albania has scarcely succeeded in moving beyond the initial stages of reform. Serbia and Montenegro face problems of governance and constitutional order that hamper progress towards eventual EU membership. Above all, reconciliation throughout the western Balkans is held back by the continued impunity of indicted war criminals. Only when the key outstanding cases are at last addressed will the credibility of the vision of parallel progress towards EU membership receive a major boost.

Europe's South

The second important area demanding a strategic approach by EU nations and their partners is the Broader Middle East and North Africa—the region of the world where unsettled relationships, religious and territorial conflicts, impoverished societies, fragile and intolerant regimes and deadly combinations of technology and terror brew and bubble on top of one vast energy field upon which Western prosperity depends.

Choices made here could determine the shape of the 21st century—whether weapons of mass destruction will be unleashed upon mass populations; whether the oil and gas fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia can become reliable sources of energy; whether catastrophic terrorism can be prevented; whether Russia's borderlands can become stable and secure democracies; whether Israel and its neighbors can live together in peace; whether millions of people can be lifted from pervasive poverty and hopelessness; whether the frontiers of freedom advance or retreat; and whether the great religions of the world can work together.

The Broader Middle East has become the central arena for transatlantic relations in this new century. The main threat to European and

American security is no longer an invasion across central Europe but rather destruction of our societies or irretrievable damage to our interests generated by turmoil in this region.

Unfortunately, Europeans and Americans have rarely seen eye to eye on the Middle East. From the U.S. Navy's wars against the Barbary states in the early 19th century to the cease-fire imposed by President Eisenhower on the French-British-Israeli invasion of Suez in 1956, America and Europe have often worked at cross-purposes in the region. Transatlantic cooperation in the 1991 Gulf War was the exception, not the rule.

Curiously, these disagreements rested on a common bargain: Europeans and Americans tacitly agreed not to push very hard for regional reforms as long as other interests, such as support against communism or stable energy flows, were advanced. This bargain was undone on September 11, 2001, when terrorists from Egypt and Saudi Arabia destroyed the World Trade Center and attacked the Pentagon. By November 2003 President Bush was speaking about ending "sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East."

Can the U.S. and Europe work together with indigenous forces to transform this vast and turbulent region? The answer is likely to come from five interconnected challenges.

The first challenge is to help post-Saddam Iraq build a unified, stable and prosperous democracy. Despite the bitter transatlantic acrimony over the U.S.-led invasion, the Iraqi elections there have opened the way for greater transatlantic cooperation. The U.S. needs support from its allies, and its allies have a strong interest in ensuring that a democratic Iraq succeeds. Progress for the region as a whole will depend in large measure on progress in setting Iraq on a course to stabilization and advancing the cause of Arab-Israeli peace. Failure in either area would be as much a failure for Europe as for America. There is no alternative to partnership on this issue.

Afghanistan remains a key test of transatlantic cooperation. NATO and the U.S. are now working to merge their separate missions there, but tough hurdles remain: extending stability beyond Kabul and weaning Afghanistan off of its severe dependence on the global drug trade.

Iran poses an even tougher test. Fortunately, the U.S. and Europe are now presenting a common message to the Iranian regime: give up your nuclear ambitions and your support for terrorism in exchange for a beneficial package that will help the Iranian people, or face comprehensive, multilateral sanctions that will cripple your economy. Unfortunately, Iranian leaders may not be listening. The West must then face up to the need to take the issue to the Security Council, and be prepared to act on its position.

There are promising developments in the Middle East peace process. The parties themselves remain the key to progress, of course, but transatlantic cooperation is essential to keep the process on track and to sustain Israeli-Palestinian peace should it emerge.

It is also essential that the difficult issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace not be allowed to block progress on the vast historic challenge of supporting economic and political reforms across the vast region stretching from Morocco to Afghanistan, which has for too long known too little of either. Such reforms cannot be imposed from without, of course, they must be driven from within Arab societies. Concepts of democracy, women's rights and related themes are not alien to the Middle East. The Charter of Madinah, signed by the Prophet Muhammad 500 years before the Magna Carta, contains ideas that are in tune with what we now regard as democratic pluralism. The 2005 Arab Human Development Report, issued by Arab thinkers themselves, points to lack of freedom, economic openness, educational opportunity and women's empowerment as key obstacles throughout the region.

The peaceful transformation of the broader Middle East is perhaps the greatest challenge of our generation. Restoring hope to that vast region and integrating its diverse peoples into a more peaceful and prosperous world is just as important at the dawn of the 21st century as was the challenge of rebuilding and reintegrating Europe in the middle of the last century. The circumstances are very different, but the historic opportunity is very similar. Few challenges are likely to loom larger for the transatlantic community in the years ahead.

What of larger Europe's response? EU enlargement appears to have at least three specific consequences for the EU's approach to this region. The first, as underscored by intra-European differences over Iraq, is that the EU 25 will have to contend with a wider spectrum of foreign policy

priorities among its members than did the EU 15, making it more difficult to achieve internal consensus. The second is that the extension of EU boundaries to Cyprus and Malta further deepens EU interactions with this region, and further enlargement raises the prospect of the EU as a quasi Middle Eastern actor. The third is that the extension of EU boundaries to the Black Sea underscores strategic connections between “wider Europe” and the Broader Middle East, from energy flows and movements of people to “festering” or “frozen” conflicts.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), known as the Barcelona process, is not equipped to resolve political crises or conflict in this region, since it is essentially an economic instrument of EU foreign policy.⁶ However, in light of a succession of Arab Development Reports in which Arab experts themselves point to the lack of democracy, education, and the empowerment of women as core problems of the Arab world, there is new pressure on the EU to invigorate what most observers believe to be a rather flaccid “Barcelona” process. New U.S. and G8 initiatives in the region, including the Forum for the Future, have added pressure on the EU to act.

The Barcelona Process has always had the proper rhetorical intention—promoting democratic reform through parallel political, economical and socio-cultural means. But it has been given little priority in Brussels, is process-heavy and, compared with the vast sums expended, shown few significant advances. An outside observer may be forgiven for asking whether the deeper rationale for Barcelona was to buy off southern societies as a way of keeping as many of them as possible on the southern bank of the Mediterranean, rather than to force changes in their societies. Economic reforms have been sluggish and rarely encouraged political reforms. Barcelona has failed to address either security or human rights issues, and has done little to advance interregional cooperation.

A broad debate is needed on reform within the Broader Middle East. We in the West should not be embarrassed to openly state that we have an interest in such reform. It is evident that instability in that region affects us, and we have a right to say so and to try to mitigate

⁶ See the EuroMesCo report *Barcelona Plus: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Community of Democratic States* (2005)

that instability. Done right, the role of extra-regional powers will be essential facilitators in this process. While the primary force for change must come from within, the EU, the US, and other members of the G8 need to move beyond vacuous good intentions.

Unfortunately, all sides have yet to take a truly honest approach to reform. The Arab world tends to live in a state of denial about both the scale of its need for reform, and the ineffectiveness of its present efforts. The result is failure to evolve, and the failure of moderation breeds extremism. For its part, the West has wrapped itself in vague generalities, which avoid the very real commitments Western nations themselves would need to make, and thus provide little real basis for progress.

Larger Europe in the Wider World

Finally, a larger EU and its main partner, the United States, must engage in a more forthright debate on how they may work together better on a range of issues beyond European shores. Multilateralism has been a sore point of transatlantic debate with the Bush Administration. Now Americans and Europeans appear ready to engage seriously to make multilateralism work. The EU's Security Strategy repositions the EU in the post-911, post-Saddam, post-enlargement world, and gives Europeans a vehicle with which to engage the U.S. in a strategic dialogue. President Bush has—at least rhetorically—embraced “effective multilateralism” as a way to reconcile America's unilateral temptations with the cooperative imperative imposed by global challenges.

How can the larger EU and its primary partner, the United States, advance more “effective multilateralism?” The first step is to realize that multilateralism often works when the transatlantic partnership works. America's relationship with Europe enables each of us to achieve goals together than neither of us could alone. This still makes the transatlantic relationship distinctive: when we agree, we are the core of any effective global coalition; when we disagree, we often stop such coalitions from being effective.

A second step is greater shared understanding of the benefits and responsibilities implied by multilateral efforts. Those—particularly but not only in the United States—who see international norms and

mechanisms at best as ineffective and at worst as an unacceptable constraint on national freedom of action should heed the costs of unilateral action in terms of less legitimacy, greater burdens, and ultimately the ability to achieve one's goals. Those—particularly but not only in Europe—who believe that robust international norms and regimes are needed to tackle global challenges must focus equally on the effective enforcement of such regimes, and be more forthright about the necessity to act when these regimes fail.

Third, the U.S. and the EU need to advance together the view that sovereignty means responsibilities, not just rights. How should we act when one precept of international law, such as non-interference in a nation's affairs, collides with another, such as respect for human rights? Western intervention in Kosovo did not violate the principle of non-interference as much as demonstrate its inadequacy. How do we prevent future Kosovos, future Rwandas, future Sudans? Kofi Annan has been clear that the sovereignty of states cannot be used as a shield for gross violations of human rights. But how can international institutions originally created to keep the peace *between* nations be adapted to secure peace *within* nations? A first step is to accept that sovereignty implies the responsibility to protect one's citizens, not just the right to rule with impunity, and if a nation fails in this basic responsibility, this duty shifts to the international community.

Finally, it is important that we recognize that in the UN today, the protection of human rights is often entrusted to the leading violators of those rights. Even though free societies now comprise more than half the UN's membership, they rarely act cohesively in international institutions. The U.S. and EU nations should lead the emerging UN Democracy Caucus to promote Kofi Annan's own ultimate vision for the United Nations: a Community of Democracies.

The continuing enlargement of the European Union promises to stabilize large swaths of Europe, bringing us all closer to the vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace with itself. It is a historic project Americans and other non-Europeans support and want to succeed. But enlargement also brings other consequences for the EU with it, and also imposes equivalent responsibility on a larger EU to confront dangerous challenges of a new century. Europeans and their major partners are more likely to deal effectively with these consequences and challenges if we do so together.