Chapter 6

Culture or the *koine* of Europe

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"The idea of culture," Paul Valéry wrote in the 1920's, "is for us in a very ancient relation with the idea of Europe." Culture is the "common language of Europe," asserted Fernand Braudel, the historian of the Mediterranean. "If it had to be done again, I would start with culture," Jean Monnet allegedly said. "Europe will be cultural, or it will not be!" the message bursts forth from more than one European bureaucrat in the peroration of a speech on European agricultural, economic or monetary policy. Just as numerous, however, are those who do not cease to broadcast the opposing message, such as Julien Benda in 1946: "Europe, or more precisely a consciousness of Europe beyond the diversity of its parts, never existed, as there exists a consciousness of the United States beyond the diversity of its […] states."

Europe, the idea of Europe, of a European consciousness, or of a European cultural identity, does not exist. The culture of Europe is essential, according to some; it is but an empty phrase, according to others. Let us surf between these clichés as we discuss Europe and culture in the context of Europe's new frontiers.

Europe and Culture

Europe and culture: the two words are often associated, but both remain ill-defined. Which Europe? Which culture? From a vantage point outside of Europe—for instance in the "Travel Section" of "The New York Times," or as expressed in the phrase "Travel to Europe," once common to French North Africa prior to decolonization, Europe being a nickname for the center of the colonial power—one could glean a vague impression of what the word Europe refers to. But which Europe have we in mind today? The Six, the Nine, the Twelve, the Fifteen, the Twenty, the Twenty-Five, since May 2004? The European Union? The Council of Europe? The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe? The extension of Europe to the four candidates from central and eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania in 2007, later Turkey), a population that will approach 500 million by 2007?

At the time of the Cold War, Europe could be defined as the part of the world whose probability of obliteration was highest in the event of a nuclear conflict, but this description is no longer valid, and the perplexing task of marking out Europe in geographical terms still looms before us, as demonstrated by the present controversy on Turkey's plea to join Europe. Aside form economic, social and demographic issues, "concerns about Turkey's cultural and religious differences with the rest of Europe are the strongest currents underlying European resistance to its membership."[1]

Hence our temptation to speak of Europe in terms of culture. The frontiers of Europe would not be natural but cultural. "It is a spiritual accomplishment, a model society, a worldview; Europe is a civilization," stated Lionel Jospin, then France's Prime Minister. Europe's spiritual geography results from a series of founding historical and ideological oppositions: the West and the East, then Christianity and Islam, then Latin Christianity and the Byzantine world, then, internal to Europe, the Catholic world and the Protestant world. Europe, said Stendhal, Ernst Robert Curtius, and more recently Remi Brague, is Christianity, Latinity or Romanism.[2] But today, what is a cultural definition of Europe worth in a largely de-Christianized continent, as the long-drawn-out argument about the preamble of the European constitution recently illustrated?[3]

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[1] "During a parliamentary debate in France in October 2004, Philippe Pemezec, a member of the rightist Union for a Popular Movement, argued that accepting Turkey in the union would empty Europe 'of all its cultural and historic references' and 'cut us off from the Greco-Roman roots and Judeo-Christian heritage that make up the richness of our identity.' All of that is shorthand for an abiding European fear that Islam threatens the foundations of European culture. Mr. Pemezec said that Turkey's strong secular tradition since the fall of the Ottoman Empire had been maintained only because of the Turkish military's dominant role in political affairs and that Islamic influences in the country might increase as the military withdraws from politics as required for union membership. 'Paradoxically, the closer Turkey comes to entering Europe, the more it is threatened by Islamic radicals,' Mr. Pemezec said." *The New York Times*, 22 October 2004.

[2] E.R. Curtius, *La Littérature européenne et le Moyen Âge latin* (1948), trad., Paris, PUF, 1956; Rémi Brague, *Europe, la voie romaine*, (Paris, Critérion, 1992).

[3] The influence of the Catholic Church and Christian tradition in the new Union of 25, long discussed during the negotiation on the future European Constitution between the defenders of a European identity based on Christian values and the champions of a secularized universalism, was again under fire after the incoming European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso, decided to maintain the attributions of Italy's nominee for Justice Commissioner Rocco Buttiglione, who called homosexuality a sin and said marriage was intended "to allow women to have children and to have protection of a male."

Europe, culturally speaking, would not exist. It is identified neither with an idiom nor with a race, in the sense that philologists gave to the word in the 19th century. How, objected Benda, does one propose a definition of Europe by its cultural unity when Europe is made of the irreducible peculiarities of national identities that asserted themselves and affronted each other in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries? After half a century of European Community, the mutual assimilation of the national identities in Europe seems unlikely as well as undesirable. The same for the dissolution of these national identities in an emerging European identity—unless, whisper the defeatists and sovereigntists, all the national identities are destined to blend in a global identity, or non-identity, dependent only on the idiom and culture, mass-culture, of the United States. Ironically, what remains to this day undeniably European is the nation-state, the historical construction of national identities, of national differences, and their resistance to globalization.

A national identity requires a whole binding symbolic apparatus, whose elements include: a long and continuous history; exemplary heroes; an idiom, illustrated with a literature; emblematic monuments; folklore; sites and landscapes; a mentality; an anthem and a flag; a currency; plus a cuisine and costumes. In want as it is of such an indispensable apparatus, Europe now looks at itself as a new and transnational entity and finds itself as lacking as the often artificial nations that decolonization produced in Africa, notwithstanding natural and ethnic frontiers. A unified Europe is missing the inherited patrimony, the collective identity that fosters attachment to a territory or to a shared ideal. The absence of a European identity became cruelly obvious on the bills of the euro that started circulating in January 2002: in order to harm no one, they expose fictions, not real places but abstract architectural styles. Will its Constitution ever give Europe an identity, as it did in West Germany after 1945? In order to believe that, one has to forget that Germany had a past that its Constitution aimed at warding off. Such is not the case with Europe.

From European Civilization to European Cultural Identity

The term culture is as opaque as Europe. In Romance languages in the 19th century, as well as in Latin, the word only applied, in the metaphorical sense, to a quality of the mind, not to specific goods. Since the Renaissance, it referred to the condition of the "*honnête*

homme," or the gentleman, the man of breeding, to the *cultura animi* or *cultura mentis* of those who kept the company of books. The set epithet was "*esprit cultivé*," cultivated mind, that of one who "has reaped the fruit of reading the good books." Culture was individual and personal, whereas civilization was societal or even universal—a people are more or less civilized.

Two influences determined the evolution of the word culture from the quality of the cultivated individual to the attribute of a cultural community. On the one hand, German usage of the word *Kultur*, since the beginning of the 19th century, placed it in opposition to civilization. Whereas the notion of civilization was infused with the ideals of Classicism and the Enlightenment, a philosophical, universalistic and progressive conception of humankind, *Kultur* relied on a relativist, historicist and romantic worldview. It was collective, deep-rooted, authentic and popular, while civilization was seen as acquired, artificial, or even refined and aristocratic, as good manners. *Kultur* was identified with the spirit, the *Geist* of a community, specifically the nation, rooted in its traditions, its folklore, its legends; it refers to a substance that imbues all the vital manifestations of a people. *Kultur* is differential: unifying a group, it separates it from others.

The second influence was that of the English, or rather American, language. Anthropologists and later sociologists, in search of a less romantic and more pragmatic definition, defined culture as the set of values and representations shared by a society, its ways of thinking and living. Thus defined, the term distances itself both from the idea of progress implied by civilization, and that of a collective soul entailed by *Kultur*.

As a result, culture now drifts between the humanist definition of the values that shape the ideals of all cultured men, and the sociological definition of the traditions specific to a community—hence frequent misunderstandings. When one says culture in French, does one mean the democratization of the culture of the mind, that individual process of discovery formerly reserved for the elite (this was still the meaning of the word when André Malraux invented the Ministry of Cultural Affairs in 1959), or does one think of the management of cultures as a plural, at present less national than regional, local, "societal" in general, whichever community be united by a way of life, as in the French new coinages *culture jeune* or *culture gay*?

This ambiguity is further amplified by two other expressions, mass culture and cultural identity. Europe, according to the philosophy of the Enlightenment, was identified first with a civilization, or even with civilization *tout court*, with "the rights of man." Then, under the influence of romanticism and anthropology, it became identified with a plurality of cultures, either organic or functional. Finally, the term lost all relation with tradition, in any sense of the word. "Mass culture" contradicts "culture" in the humanist, romantic and anthropological sense—*cultura*, *Kultur* and Culture, as it depends neither on good books, nor on a national soul, nor even on transmitted values and behaviors. Hence it fuels an anxiety linked to the forgetting of the past and the loss of collective memory. This fear of alienation started in the U.S. as early as the 1950's: mass culture, as any culture in the functional sense, indeed promotes social integration, but it purges regional and ethnic cultural diversity. Europe, at the end of the 1960's, experienced its own anxiety: it did not yet apprehend a cultural leveling or annihilation of its specificities, but became concerned with a division of culture into degrees of legitimacy, high and low.

As a reaction to that anxiety, the notion of cultural identity caught on during the 1970s and 1980s. Imported from social psychology, where it was used to evaluate the affective participation of an individual in the values of his/her community, its lack would characterize a people uprooted. Thus conceived, "cultural identity" was popularized by the anti-colonial resistance to imperialism and against Western ethnocentrism. Emerging states appropriated the term in order to strengthen the integrative potential of new national identities, but ethnic minorities also re-appropriated it in order to survive within these new national entities. Cultural identity thus became a solidly anti-Western, or anti-American, catchphrase of the UNESCO.

It was not long before the former colonial powers took up the slogan as their own, and Europe reclaimed it in order to protect its own alleged identity, increasingly challenged by globalization. Cultural identity provided the keyword in the project of the European Cultural Charter, elaborated by the Council of Europe in 1978 in Athens. While in the U.S. the deliberation on cultural identity was taking the form of multiculturalism as a requirement for the coexistence of diverse communities within the national territory, in Europe, where multicultural immigration was, at the time, as pronounced, if not more pronounced, the

debate instead focused primarily on the preservation of a dominant, majority identity. The vogue of books on memory in France in the 1980's, as well as the inflation of European colloquia and anthologies on cultural identity in the early 1990's, can be explained in this context.

This preoccupation led to the principle of cultural exception, summarized plainly by Jacques Delors, then the President of the European Commission, before the GATT negotiations of 1993: "*La culture n'est pas une marchandise comme les autres*" or "Culture is not a commodity like the others." Every European politician asks today, "How should Europe open up to globalization without diluting its identity?" France, represented by the European Commission, succeeded in promoting this principle in order to maintain the right to impose quotas against the invasion of American sitcoms on television, as well as the right to grant national and European subsidies for television and film. Even though this position was not shared by the rest of Europe, the Commission did not submit a proposal for the liberalization in the sector of audiovisual industries. But nothing was settled, and at the OMC negotiations of 1999, the European Commission, having deemed cultural exception too defensive and protectionist, substituted it with cultural diversity, which allowed it to oppose the spirit of free trade to its letter, that is, the de facto monopoly of Hollywood. Cultural diversity, in tune with U.S. multiculturalism and identity politics, is the present doctrine of the European Union on culture. Even though it has thus far survived the EU's shift to qualified majority vote from unanimous vote, as adopted by the Treaty of Nice in December 2000 (applicable to future negotiations on international trade), this doctrine is nonetheless challenged by the EU—as evidenced by the controversy initiated by the European Commissioner for Competition about the imposed price of books in France, Germany, the UK, and about continental copyright. The Constitutional Treaty would, if adopted, remove the unanimity condition for decisions in the field of culture. Sooner or later, member states will have to renounce their national competency for education and culture.

Europe Between Cultural Unity and Diversity

The Treaty of Rome that instituted the European Community said nothing about culture. It was only the Treaty of Maastricht, in 1992, which gave the community a competency in cultural cooperation.

"Increased awareness by Europeans about their common cultural heritage has led the Member States to confer on the Community a specific competence in the field of cultural affairs. By including provisions for cultural policies in the Treaty on European Union, the Member States demonstrated their resolve to mark a new stage in the process of European integration, to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions, and to establish a citizenship common to nationals of their countries," volunteers the web site of the European Commission.[4]

Article 3 of the amended Treaty establishing the European Community now states among its objectives, "a contribution to education and training of quality and to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States," ("*épanouissement des cultures des États membres*") cultures being spelled in the plural also in the French version of the Treaty, thus underlining their multiplicity in each Member State. Article 151 circumscribes the objectives for Community cultural action in its first paragraph: "The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore." The draft Constitutional Treaty retains this wording, then adds that one of the objectives of the Union shall be to "ensure that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced" (Article 3.3).

The domains of action are then specified by the Treaty: 1. Improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples; 2. Conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance; 3. Non-commercial cultural exchanges; 4. Artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector; 5. Cooperation with third countries and the competent international organizations in the sphere of culture, in particular the Council of Europe.

Finally, "the Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote the diversity of its cultures." Culture should be taken into consideration in all Community policies, because it con-

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[4] http://europa.eu.int/comm/culture/eac/index_en.html

tributes to European citizenship, to personal and human improvement by education, to economic and social cohesion between the Member States, to the rise of employment in Europe, to the elimination of exclusion, to the enrichment of the quality of life, etc.

In concrete terms, however, the budget for culture and the audiovisual represents only 0.1% of the total budget of the European Union, and it is essentially devoted to subsidizing the audiovisual and film sector. Apart from that, the program "Culture 2000," established for the period of 2000-2004, and extended for two years to 2006, "grants support for cultural co-operation projects in all artistic and cultural sectors (performing arts, visual and plastic arts, literature, heritage, cultural history, etc.). The objectives of the programme are the promotion of a common cultural area characterized by both cultural diversity and a common cultural heritage. Culture 2000 looks to encourage creativity and mobility, public access to culture, the dissemination of art and culture, inter-cultural dialogue and knowledge of the history of the peoples of Europe. The programme also views culture as playing a role in social integration and socio-economic development." This sundry list bears witness to Europe's difficulty in reconciling the diverse national cultures of culture. But if there is no consensus among the member states on a politics of culture, the marginalization of literature in their composite vision of culture is nonetheless striking, and especially distressing.[5]

The Future of Literary Culture

It is from this vantage point that I find it instructive to consult the list of the 55 cultural projects (out of 410 applications) that the Commission funded in 2000, in anticipation of the Culture 2000 program. "Improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples" was little rewarded in comparison to other fields of action, namely the preservation of the

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[5] See in particular: "Designed to "contribute to bringing the peoples of Europe together," the European City of Culture project was launched, at the initiative of Melina Mercouri, by the Council of Ministers on 13 June 1985. It has become ever more popular with the citizens of Europe and has seen its cultural and socio-economic influence grow through the many visitors it has attracted. […] in 1990, the Ministers of Culture created the European Cultural Month, an event similar to the European City of Culture, but lasting for a shorter time and intended mainly for the central and eastern European countries."

cultural heritage, cultural exchanges and creation, which received the most support. For literature itself, long the core of culture, Culture 2000 does little. And for all that which does not correspond to its tacit intention of furthering culture through administration—*animation* in French—or social aid, it does nothing. Only 4 or 5 out of the 55 funded projects had to do with books:

- The Cities of Asylum Network, an initiative of the International Parliament of Writers, based in France, with German, Austrian, Spanish and Italian partners, planned to create a network of asylum cities to welcome censored writers from all countries, to supply aid for creation and publication, to foster a reflection on democracy and creation.

- The prize for tactile book for youth, an initiative of the French Association "*Les Doigts qui rêvent*" [The fingers that dream], intended to help underprivileged children and youngsters with learning to read problems resulting form eye troubles, by regrouping professionals in the field of tactile book, improving innovative fabrication techniques, and awarding the Tactus prize.

- Young translators on the Internet for the Millennium, an initiative of the British Council, planned an innovative and creative union between translation, writing and the Internet. Young translators (under 30) were invited to translate young authors (under 30); a Web site was created to test the potential for publication; the project was implemented by schools, universities and colleges.

- Pain, a thematic multicultural and interdisciplinary study assembling Spanish, French, German, British academics, aimed at "a thorough examination of pain by the study of its diverse manifestations in literary and artistic works. […] The action proposes to focus on illnesses that trigger physical, but also moral, pain." This was the only specifically literary project, cultural in the conventional meaning of the word, yet its selection was hardly incidental, given that it plans to create a "series of cultural events that would help the sick to reintegrate society."

In 2003 only one multi-annual project was supported in the sub-field of Literature, Books and Reading, on children's literature: "*Réseau européen des centres et instituts en littérature de jeunesse*," in order to develop a website and organize workshops. In 2002, two projects related to literature were supported, with these objectives:

- To create a window on contemporary European writing in a way which makes the work easily available to readers and will encourage interchange between the different literary cultures (creation of interlinked websites featuring work by contemporary writers, in addition to biographical and critical materials and the translation of this work into several European languages).

- To promote exchange between readers, poets, translators and writers; make good poetry from a large number of European countries available for a large public; stimulate translation of poetry; offer an international directory and information on poetry.

One-year projects since 2000 deal almost exclusively with translation, often linked up with the new media. One of the three major themes of Culture 2000 is "Tradition and innovation: linking the past and the future," but over the years very little has been funded on that front.

These examples underscore that the European Commission understands culture in the third millennium as cultural administration (*animation* in French) and social assistance; its conception of culture is applied, utilitarian, and instrumental. The mid-term evaluation of the Culture 2000 Program carried out in 2003 stated that the socio-economic impact of the program had been restricted. The Commission now proposes "developing European citizenship" as a main priority for EU action, by "fostering European culture and diversity." The decision of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the Culture 2007 Program for 2007-2013 (14/7/04), focusing on "the development of a European identity from the grass roots," insists that the number of objectives should be reduced to three: the transnational mobility of people working in the cultural sector; the transnational circulation of works of art; intercultural dialogue. Support will go to projects, organizations, and activities that favor intercultural cooperation. There is less insistence on socio-economic added value, which

led to a dispersal of the financial resources available and reduced the effectiveness and legibility of the program. The stated ambition is "a common search for shared values and interpretations," which should "play a fundamental role, particularly in integrating new Europeans from a range of cultures."

Nonetheless, the program is not changing dramatically, and such is in Europe (or at least in Brussels) today the meaning of culture as a "common language." In the face of this obliteration of literature from the new European economy of culture, two reactions can be observed.

The first is that of the "widowers of Europe," as I will call those nostalgic of the humanist significance of culture. Their whining is familiar. According to Hilton Kramer and Roger Kimball, *The Future of the European Past*[6] is in jeopardy in the U.S. as well as in Europe. Let us listen to them for a minute: Europe meant Christianity, but 9 out of 10 Frenchmen or women do not go to mass even once a year; Europe meant the "Grand Tour" of festivals and museums, but the European spirit exhausted itself in the democratization and "museification" that have transformed the living past into a lifeless commodity. It meant French being spoken in Berlin and Vienna, Lisbon and Cairo, New York and Rio de Janeiro, but French is no longer spoken anywhere but in France, and the erosion of culture, when viewed from Paris, is all the more dramatic in that it is seen as carrying the literature along with the language.

The death of Europe has been a cliché since Romanticism. "Europe is the past," wrote Dostoevsky. Paul Morand, returning in 1948 from Venice, where he had seen "the fireworks thrown by a moribund Europe," exclaimed: "I am left Europe's widower." In the U.S., where the European past is suspected of racism and sexism, and threatened by historical revisionism, the institutions that were formerly guardians of cultural traditions, so goes the prosopopeia, have to adapt to recent identity politics, and the priority of European traditions is in danger in schools, museums, theaters. The crisis of identity confidence is also rampant in Europe, in the face of the breakdowns of integration, the growth of ethnic and religious fanaticisms hostile to the universalistic

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[6] Hilton Kramer and Roger Kimball ed., *The Future of the European Past*, Chicago, Ivan R. Dee, 1997.

tradition of the rights of man, the degradation of education systems, while the ubiquity of American popular culture at its most industrial is the most obvious symptom of globalization.

As high culture is besieged by popular culture and elevated to "lifestyle" status, the question of culture in the singular has been forever disqualified, replaced by "cultures" in the plural, in its prosaic sense of collective behaviors. There is no longer any incentive to ponder the past in a DSL-connected world where new technologies render history a bore. Temporal shock increases with the frequency of silicon chips: the rhythm of reading is incompatible with the acceleration of digital existence.

Finally, the democratization of culture has trivialized literary culture. In France, the Ministry of Culture, backed up by the Direction of Culture in Brussels, has become a superintendent of collective entertainment. Just as the "*Fête de la musique*," invented by Jacques Lang in France, gives place to an annual night of noise, the "major operation of the European Union" since 1985, termed "European Cities of Culture," makes "thousands of cultural actors of the European Union and of associated European countries collaborate around a living spectacle, theater, heritage, urban culture, street arts, and new forms of artistic expression using new technologies." In short, culture in Europe is carnival.

The second, alternative reaction is that of those whom I would call "moderantists" (there are no gung-ho's, no utopians of the culture of Europe). Without enthusiasm, they concede that the word culture is no longer used in the singular, and that the culture of the mind—*cultura animis* or *cultura mentis*—retired in favor of community cultures. They are resigned to the erosion of literary culture, but they argue that this observation can be given several meanings: literacy is declining, vulgarization cancels art, the past withdraws to a distance, national identities crumble away. But, they say, each of these propositions can be separately challenged, or at least tempered.

Is literacy really on the decline? The share of historical knowledge in school curricula has probably been abridged; the multiplication of knowledge taught probably leads to its simplification; the democratic reaction against academic elitism probably gives rise to an evasion in the face of difficulty. But, on average, do more young Europeans not

know much more today when they leave high school than they did a couple of decades ago?

European culture should be built from the ground up, a fine example being the Erasmus Program and the Euopean Credit Transfer System (ECTS), which now allow European students to hit the road and spend a year away from their home universities, as they used to do during the Middle Ages but on a broader demographic basis. A recent mainstream French film, *L'Auberge espagnole* [The Potluck], by Cédric Klapisch, tracking the life of a group of Erasmus students in Barcelona, proves the success of the program in that it has become a cliché of entertainment culture.

Derrida's Other Cape offers a fine example of this reasonably anti-Eurocentric and wisely pro-European discourse. After summarizing Valéry's dignified vision of the European mind, he situates himself in "the beyond of this modern tradition" and delineates a "counter-program opposed to this archeo-teleological program of all European discourse on Europe." The romantic concept of the nation ruled for too long. "The distinctive feature of a culture," Derrida recaps, "is that it is not identical to itself. [...] There is neither culture nor cultural identity without this difference with oneself." It is a matter of recognizing the other within the same, the foreign within the self.

This vision of Europe as an emerging post-national democracy was endorsed by Jürgen Habermas at the beginning of the 1990's, in order to prevent the return of nationalisms in Europe after the fall of communism. Even if a unified public sphere does not yet exist in Europe, Habermas perceives its premise in the mobility of Europeans and the intensification of their contacts[7]. "In the future," he foresaw in 1991, "diverse national cultures could converge towards a common political culture," while the other cultural formations, such as the arts, philosophy and literature, would remain national for a long time. The unified European political culture should be founded on the idea of the universal rights of man, while the cultures, religions and traditions of "specific ways of life" should be protected in their diversity, insofar as they would not be contrary to the democratic principles of the public sphere. Habermas speculates on a double culture or double truth of

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[7] Jürgen Habermas, *Citoyenneté et identité nationale. Réflexions sur l'avenir de l'Europe*.

Europe, unified in the political realm—Europe, we might want to remember, is "the only political organization where the death penalty no longer exists"—but plural and diverse in the Community space.

Habermas now describes this double cultural truth or way of life as a postmodern variant of the religious freedom of the moderns: "On the model of liberty of religion, cultural rights should be understood as subjective rights, giving all citizens equal access to cultural environments, to interpersonal relations and to traditions, in as much as these are essential to the development of their personal identities. Cultural rights do not simply mean 'more difference' and more autonomy. […] a well thought multiculturalism is not a one-way street for groups that each has a unique identity to assert. The egalitarian coexistence of different forms of life ought not to entail segmentation. It requires the integration of citizens—and the recognition of their cultural belongings—in the framework of a shared political culture."[8]

Less sour and more generous, this alternative discourse on Europe sounds more attractive. Even so, it has its problems. Is it not artificial to divide public and community spheres, as though the principles and values of a "specific way of life" do not rub off on the public and political jurisdiction? And is it not yet again a means of imposing upon everyone a specifically Western political culture, with its universalistic claims inseparable from its values? Lastly, is it not a manner, an ultimate stratagem, of consigning the other cultural formations—the arts, philosophy and literature—at the level of attributes of the "specific way of life" that saw them occur?

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[7] Jürgen Habermas, *Citoyenneté et identité nationale. Réflexions sur l'avenir de l'Europe.*