Chapter 3
EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Transatlantic Approaches and Future Trajectories

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Introduction

Crisis management, particularly its civilian aspects, has been a growth area for the EU’s international engagement. The U.S. also increasingly invests in its civilian crisis management capabilities. In light of converging strategic interests and geographical areas of engagement, current and future engagement is likely to take place in similar theatres that range from the Balkans to sub-Saharan Africa and Afghanistan.

The case for transatlantic—understood in this context as EU-US rather than NATO—cooperation is strong. In a number of instances it has already begun. U.S. personnel participate in the EU’s crisis missions EULEX Kosovo and EUSEC RD CONGO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). EU-U.S. security cooperation in crisis management thus occupies a firm place on the political agenda.

Developing further ideas and strategies for EU-U.S. cooperation is welcome for a number of reasons. These include the need to address common security threats; the EU’s profile as a security actor and the implications for the transatlantic partnership; but also the need to pool resources in lean economic times and concurrent global power shifts that could challenge the transatlantic monopoly on the provision of security. Increasing cooperation in conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction thus represents a small but important piece of the larger framework of transatlantic relations.

Nonetheless, despite the frequent emphasis on the complementarity of transatlantic efforts, U.S. and EU approaches to crisis management differ in important respects. They are also at different stages of institutional development. Talk of increasing EU-U.S. cooperation thus risks creating unrealistic expectations that could in turn negatively affect EU-U.S. security cooperation in the future. A stocktaking of EU and U.S. capabilities and approaches to crisis management is, therefore, in order.

This chapter outlines a number of points that ought to be taken into consideration when thinking through the potential of future EU-U.S. cooperation in conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict reconstruction. They include respective institutional frameworks; values and strategic objectives for crisis management; experience with crisis management in practice, including the recruiting, staffing and training of mission personnel; the broader political framework in which crisis missions are embedded; and the institutional limitations facing EU-U.S. cooperation in terms of their exclusive focus on the civilian aspects of conflict prevention and crisis management. Based on this analysis the chapter closes with a number of policy recommendations for future cooperation.
Emerging Transatlantic Structures: An Overview

This section outlines the respective institutional set-ups in the EU and the U.S., as well as the current transatlantic framework for the institutionalization of EU-U.S. cooperation. Despite the concurrent focus on the development of civilian crisis management instruments there are important differences in EU and U.S. institutional frameworks and overall approaches towards conflict prevention and crisis management. The current framework for cooperation needs to evolve further if institutionalized cooperation is to be able to address the challenges discussed in the remainder of this paper. Given that EU-U.S. cooperation to date focuses on civilian crisis management, the following sections in this chapter limit their discussion of the institutional set-up of crisis management in the EU and the U.S. to their civilian aspects.

The EU

Whereas conflict prevention formed part of the EU’s emerging foreign policy posture after the end of the Cold War, it was not until the 1998 Franco-British summit at St. Malo that the question of a European defense policy, and the development of military and eventually also civilian crisis management instruments, arose in earnest. Over the past decade the EU has gained significant experience in crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction, to which the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) provides a strategic roadmap. The EU pursues conflict prevention and crisis management policies through its Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which is an integral part of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Finally, the European External Action Service (EEAS), which combines Council, Commission and member state personnel, is to help bring coherence to EU foreign relations and to represent the EU externally.

Brussels-based institutions and political leadership form an increasingly important part in the planning, oversight and overall decision-making of EU crisis management. The EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, a post currently occupied by Catherine Ashton, oversees all CSDP institutions and agencies. Double-hatted as Vice-President of the Commission, the post thus combines the EU’s financial, political and crisis management instruments. Institutional changes as a result of the Lisbon Treaty notwithstanding, however, decision-making in EU CSDP remains intergovernmental. CSDP structures crucially depend on EU member states for the launch of civilian and military missions, strategic oversight, and the contribution of personnel to individual European crisis missions.\(^1\) The Political and Security Committee (PSC), which consists of member states representatives at the ambassadorial level and is chaired by EEAS official Olof Skoog, represents a key decision-making forum that provides strategic oversight and guidance of existing missions.

Since the launch of the first operation in 2003 the EU has conducted 28 missions, the majority of them civilian.\(^2\) The civilian aspect of CSDP, which had not been part of the rationale to develop CSDP in the first place (rather, the original intention was to develop and strengthen European military capabilities) not only broke new ground in terms of EU foreign and security policy. It has also become the major growth area for CSDP. Activities undertaken range from police and justice

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reform to border management, integrated rule of law and security sector reform operations throughout the globe. Financial resources available include the CFSP budget and member state contribution of mission personnel. The planning and management of missions is carried out through the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in the Council.

Many CSDP missions are embedded in a broader political framework, such as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) or the EU accession framework in the case of the Balkans; whereas others emphasize EU cooperation and support of UN as well as cooperation with U.S./NATO structures in sub-Saharan Africa and Afghanistan, respectively. A small number of missions, finally, represent standalone EU initiatives and/or highlight the EU’s overall value-added to crisis management, such as the Monitoring Missions in Aceh, Indonesia in 2005 and Georgia in 2008.

The U.S.

In contrast to the EU, where the development of civilian capabilities has received significant attention over the past decade, the increasing engagement with civilian capabilities in the U.S. arose out of the demand for civilian contributions on the part of the military as a result of the experience in Afghanistan and Iraq. Institutional developments take place in a political context where the military, rather than diplomatic or development actors, represents the predominant institution in terms of international engagement, public support, and financial clout. The debate over civilian capabilities in Washington, therefore, has a different constituency, and has reflects different strategic and operational priorities than those held by Brussels and EU member states.

Operational requirements in the field and the emergence of ‘comprehensive’ and ‘whole of government’ approaches as a guiding paradigm have sparked a debate over civilian capabilities and their place in the foreign policy toolbox. There is mounting evidence of an elite consensus across government agencies that civilian capabilities constitute an important instrument in U.S. foreign policy. This is evident from the emphasis on ‘smart power’ and the need to elevate diplomacy and development alongside defense; the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) that seeks to redefine development and diplomacy to strengthen U.S. ‘civilian power;’ and the frequent emphasis on the part of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on the importance of civilian capabilities to complement military engagement.3

Beyond formulating strategic goals and objectives in civil-military relations, the U.S. has also taken steps to develop civilian capabilities within the State Department. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has deployed civilian police advisors in a number of post-conflict and crisis settings. Furthermore, the creation of the office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in 2004—which has been elevated to the level of Bureau as a result of the QDDR—was to strengthen internal coordination.

S/CRS holds a key role in coordinating civilian reconstruction tasks and capabilities through its close partnership with USAID and its emphasis on planning and technical expertise that goes beyond a traditional State Department/diplomatic profile. S/CRS is to act as a ‘force multiplier’ rather than as a separate effort and is, essentially, a consultative arrangement that can support the efforts by regional bureaus in specific conflict prevention or crisis settings. Tasks include early warning, planning, lessons learnt and best practices,

but also crisis response strategy and integrated resource management. The 2008 Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act further provided the authority to develop the Civilian Response Corps (CRC).

The CRC represents a further step towards making available the necessary personnel for post-conflict reconstruction activities. The active (250 personnel) and standby (2000 personnel) components include personnel from eight departments and agencies with appropriate civilian expertise; and the third consisting of personnel from the private sector as well as state and local government with expertise not available in the federal government. By the end of 2010 the ranks of the CRC numbered around 1200.

Initial experiences with S/CRS revealed challenges in creating buy-in on the part of the broader State Department bureaucracy. In addition, Congressional backing was severely limited, and it was not until 2009 that the S/CRS received directly appropriated funding. Financial allocations increased from $45 million in FY 2009 and $323 million in FY 2010, most of which was allocated for the CRC. This has further delayed the S/CRS assuming greater responsibility in post-conflict reconstruction.

The QDDR and the broader context of an emphasis on ‘smart power’ and a ‘whole of government’ approach suggest a cementing of views in favor of civilian capabilities as part of the broader U.S. foreign policy toolbox. The elevation of S/CRS to a bureau through the QDDR also suggests recognition of the value added of S/CRS but also greater buy-in on the part of the administration and State Department structures. At the same time, the results of the 2010 mid-term elections and ongoing budget disputes suggest that the cross-government support that has emerged over the past five years in favor of S/CRS and ‘civilian power’ more generally will not result in added, but rather in reduced, financial contributions. This will limit the scope and range of U.S. contributions to civilian reconstruction—and suggests that the U.S., in light of the current economic and political climate and the resulting funding decisions, is unlikely to build up a large civilian capability.

Still, when it comes to EU-U.S. cooperation, the approach towards civilian reconstruction adopted on the part of the U.S. through S/CRS resonates with that of the EU. U.S. expertise differs from that of the EU in a number of aspects, but this could allow for a productive division of labor and synergy in areas where both engage. Strengthening and further institutionalizing cooperation would lead to more frequent joint engagement—and as a result also more effective cooperation in pursuit of shared policy goals. Institutionally, S/CRS emphasizes international partnerships with a view to establishing a community of practice to deepen cooperation between its main international partners, including the EU. EU-U.S. cooperation is circumscribed by an existing and slowly evolving institutional framework that is analyzed in the next section.

**EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management: Towards a Workable Framework**

Within the framework of increasing U.S. capabilities and also increasing interest in this particular policy field, EU-U.S. cooperation has steadily evolved. Along with an increasing focus on stabilization and reconstruction
on the part of the U.S. administration as of 2004 came increasing emphasis on dialogue with the UN, NATO but also the EU Council Secretariat and the Commission. The exact parameters of EU-U.S. cooperation were only slowly arrived at. This was mainly on account of differences over whether or not to highlight the EU’s civilian contributions or acknowledge the civil-military foundations of EU crisis management. It was not until December 2007 that the two sides agreed on a Work Plan for U.S.-EU Technical Dialogue and Increased Cooperation in Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention. Intended to create a relationship to develop and improve respective EU and U.S. approaches, the Work Plan identified several areas for cooperation that have since been put into practice. Following the 2008 signature of a security agreement on the exchange of classified information, the two sides exchange country watch lists and can jointly consider a range of options, including the coordination of responses. A second area of cooperation concerns an exchange of best practices, lessons learned and planning exercises as a means to progress towards further cooperation.

While the 2007 Work Plan constitutes a solid basis for cooperation, there was a clear sense that more could be done to improve coordination and cooperation. A review of achievements highlighted several areas of further exploration in U.S.-EU cooperation in crisis management. The ongoing EU-U.S. dialogue was generally judged productive, and ongoing crisis management missions continued to provide real-world opportunities for operational coordination. At the same time, there was a clearly perceived need for more strategic dialogue in the pre-conflict state—specifically collaboration on conflict prevention and mission planning. Further suggestions for cooperation included to exchange civilian crisis management planners; explore interoperability of planning and assessment tools; initiate a dialogue on crisis prevention; and observe and participate in pre-deployment training programs. The Belgian EU Presidency during the second half of 2010 subsequently undertook work towards a Framework Agreement on EU-U.S. cooperation in crisis management. Signature of the May 31, 2011 Framework Agreement on U.S. participation in EU crisis management operations formalizes U.S. contributions to EU missions, the parameters of which had previously been negotiated on a case by case basis.

This arrangement is to foster burden sharing in crisis management operations. It could over time also contribute to the establishment of mutual best practices and lessons learned in EU-U.S. cooperation—even if the EU-U.S. agreement covers the participation of U.S. staff in CSDP missions only, rather than constituting a reciprocal relationship. Building the capacity of third parties, including the African Union and United Nations constitutes an additional focal area for transatlantic cooperation. An emphasis on other multilateral actors is important also because it highlights that discussions over EU-U.S. cooperation do not take place in an institutional vacuum.

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8 Derived from conversations with U.S., EU member state and EU officials, 2010.

The Strategic and Operational Limits of Cooperation

The developments sketched out in the previous section point towards an increasing willingness and an increasing ability to cooperate — both in terms of diminishing political reservations as well as operational capacities and experiences. At the same time, there remain limitations to EU-U.S. cooperation in crisis management in the framework of S/CRS and elsewhere. These relate to the scope of possible conflict intervention activities, as well as the size of a potential joint mission and its envisioned political and operational impact. The restriction of cooperation to the domain of civilian crisis management presents the first limitation for EU-U.S. cooperation; the institutional limitations inherent in the EU-NATO relationship, another. Taken together, they suggest that in the contemporary political and economic climate EU-U.S. cooperation will be small in scale and limited to conflict prevention and long-term, structural peacebuilding.

Civil-Military Cooperation: the Missing Dimension

Depending on the stage of the conflict cycle in which EU-U.S. cooperation is to take place, an exclusive focus on the civilian aspects of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction can have significant implications not just for the geographic reach, the visibility, but also the success of any individual or joint EU-U.S. intervention. Particularly in the post-conflict phase, where close coordination with the military is required but a civilian lead is essential for the transition to civilian oversight, operating exclusively on civilian activities without a political and/or operational link to military structures has negative implications for effective coordination. Afghanistan could count as an example for a conflict setting where civilian contributions have tended to be subsumed by military efforts and efforts at coordinating civilian activities have only slowly evolved. Drawing on EU experience in crisis management, the example of Bosnia, where the EU concurrently conducted a civilian and a military CSDP operation, shows the difficulty in asserting civilian lead in light of the military’s organizational culture but also in case overlapping mandates that do not specify a clear delineation of lead responsibility.

These experiences raise questions as to the delineation between military, police and other security functions — particularly in the latter phases of intervention that relies not so much on military but on forces that include police, border/customs, and judicial specialists. The question of civil-military relations — understood both in the sense of space for civilian actors; but also the space for those tasked with civilian control to determine the political and operational course of action, and concurrently for the civilian crisis missions to gain operational space in a post-conflict scenario — is a function both of political priorities, appropriate planning, but also size of bureaucracy and available (and appropriately trained) staff.

Managing, Sidestepping or Confronting EU-NATO Relations?

The scope but also the future potential for EU-U.S. cooperation also raises the question of when this cooperation touches on NATO and the military contributions to crisis management. The EU’s emphasis on the civil-military nature of its crisis management instrument has conflicted with the U.S. emphasis on the EU’s civilian contributions in the past—thereby creating or perhaps reinforcing a de facto transatlantic division of labor. This delayed formal agreement cooperation between the EU-U.S. prior to 2007.\(^\text{13}\)

At present, the political constellations have shifted—the ‘NATO first’ mentality is no longer as prevalent among U.S. policy makers, although remnants thereof continue to exist, but remains a question of political influence. The EU has come to be regarded as a potential partner for NATO as well, particularly through its financial instruments. NATO’s intention, voiced at the 2010 Lisbon summit, to develop its own civilian capabilities present has added potential for overlap but also friction in transatlantic cooperation. The 2010 Strategic Concept explicitly states NATO’s aim to ‘form an appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability (...) to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities.’ The document also mentions training civilian specialists, as well as the enhancement of ‘integrated civilian-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum.’\(^\text{14}\)

This poses the question of overlap between EU and NATO competences, and their potential effect on EU-U.S. cooperation in crisis management. NATO enlarging its toolbox could potentially compete with EU capabilities, but also with the current scope of EU-U.S. cooperation. It is too soon to draw conclusions, but the acquisition of civilian capabilities by NATO could have several effects, including relegating EU-U.S. cooperation to geographically uncontested areas, and restricting EU-U.S. cooperation to civilian aspects of crisis management on a permanent basis.

The End Goal of Crisis Management

Discussions over the institutional and operational limitations of EU-U.S. cooperation also raise the question of what goal both sides wish to pursue when it comes to crisis management. Two potential models include crisis management in the true sense of the term—that is, timely intervention at the onset of a crisis or just after its conclusion to help the transition to a post-conflict, institution-building stage; or a long-term structural approach of conflict prevention that engages in third countries over a longer period of time in pursuit of concurrent operational and political goals.

The paradigm in which crisis response takes place, therefore, ought to be considered and specified to frame current or future EU-U.S. co-operation. If the capability for immediate crisis response constitutes a potential goal for EU-U.S. cooperation, there should be a discussion over the direction in which such crisis response is to evolve—with a view to reaching a consensus over end goals, as well as the balance between conflict prevention and crisis response component. What sort of cooperation both sides are able to engage in will also determine the modus of response—and the effectiveness of EU-U.S. cooperation in international security.

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The emphasis on civilian missions, also in view of the size and function of respective EU and U.S. missions launched, suggests that EU-U.S. cooperation will be limited to small missions whose mandates are conservatively prescribed. EULEX Kosovo, with 1900 international staff foreseen, represents the largest integrated rule of law mission conducted by the EU—but its size is the exception rather than the rule. The size of other civilian missions have ranged from 10 (EUJUST Themis in Georgia) to 540 (EUPM in Bosnia). These missions may thus play an important part in supporting larger peace-building efforts on the part of the international community, but they normally do not constitute a large-scale contribution to post-crisis intervention. Similarly, on the U.S. side, the S/CRS focuses on short-term interventions. Given these precedents it is likely that future EU-U.S. cooperation will follow similar patterns of mission size and activities. This means that, in order to achieve mission objectives and to maximize overall policy impact, both partners have to engage not only in a strategic dialogue on the desired end state of crisis intervention in general, but also of the broader policy framework for impacting the political direction of the specific crisis intervention.

Staffing Matters

The definition of the operational and strategic goals of crisis management has implications for the skills required of civilian staff—as well as the numbers of staff that needs to be made available in order to carry out ongoing and future cooperation. Both the EU, and of late also the U.S., have gone to great lengths to identify, train and eventually also deploy civilian experts for individual crisis missions. Both sides have also found this a challenging endeavor, albeit for different reasons.

Recruiting Practices and Respective EU-U.S. Staff Profiles

For the U.S., funding delays to date have curtailed the size of the CRC. This limits U.S. ability to engage in crisis response, and implies a continued reliance on contractors particularly for large-scale civilian missions. In the case of the EU, on the other hand, the demand for staffing CSDP missions far exceeds the availability of appropriate staff. Unlike in the U.S., making staff available also relies on member state contributions—and in many instances, such as in the case of EUPOL Afghanistan, member states have been reluctant to equip individual EU missions with the appropriate staff. Furthermore, the tasks to be undertaken in civilian crisis management have become increasingly complex as the EU expands the profile of missions to be undertaken, and thus require increasingly staff with specialized professional skills and profiles.

There is also a transatlantic difference in how staff is identified, recruited and trained: the U.S. draws on personnel from individual federal agencies and departments including the treasury, commerce as well as USAID; the EU relies on staff on secondment for member states’ interior and justice (and in some cases also defense) ministries. The need to internally coordinate domestic bureaucratic politics further complicates the staffing of international missions.

For joint EU-U.S. operation, the question of what kind of staff is to undertake certain tasks matters. Whereas the EU sends national police and justice experts, the U.S. relies on staff from a number of federal agencies, not all of which have extensive international experience or deploying abroad. In addition, the U.S. also uses private firms for implementation that recruit, train and deploy staff under U.S. Government direction. The focus of staffing for post-conflict reconstruction is, therefore,
slightly different and not easily reconciled—and has implications for the kind of expertise the U.S. can contribute to EU missions.

Training Matters

The difference in recruiting patterns and available skills raises the issue of training—but also the recognition that EU and U.S. personnel will not necessarily be able to effectively work together in every instance except for where tasks are compatible with respective staffing practices and available expertise. The need for effective training applies not only to U.S.-EU joint endeavors but also to each actor individually. In the EU, training standards in respective member states vary considerably. Member states also maintain their national approaches to training, which can lead to duplication and makes the establishment of a ‘European’ training standard difficult. To be fair, efforts to streamline training practices have taken place although the EU remains some ways away from developing a common approach to training—and not all member states contribute equally to the EU’s civilian missions. On the U.S. side, staff training has been taking more seriously. But, like in the EU, making available mission personnel who are not deployed on a regular basis, and who need to be released from their regular work duties, entails its own set of difficulties. As for EU-U.S. cooperation in providing training, joint training is advancing with the U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP) and the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Germany increasingly working together.

Conclusion: Limitations and Enablers for EU-U.S. Cooperation in Crisis Management

This chapter has attempted to sketch the state of play of EU-U.S. cooperation in crisis management, compare respective approaches and states of institutional development, and highlight possible points of divergence but also convergence. It has argued that, in order for the EU and the U.S. to maximize future security cooperation, a number of factors are important.

First, there is a need for a strategic discussion about where cooperation ought to be headed. This means that work on the technical and operational aspects of EU-U.S. cooperation in crisis missions needs to be complemented by strategic engagement on the part of respective EU and U.S. political leadership. Such an engagement is necessary to define the parameters of cooperation but also to set strategic, political and operational priorities in international crisis management.

Second, while the inter-institutional competition that has marked EU-NATO relations for most of the first decade of CSDP has given way to pragmatism, there remains a risk of duplication of efforts. This reinforces the need for a strategic discussion over transatlantic security needs and the best way to meet them.

Third, in order to make civilian reconstruction efforts visible and credible, policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic must make an effort to recruit, train and deploy appropriately trained staff to missions that are carefully planned and have a mandate suited to the conflict in which they are to intervene so as to make an impact in the field. Only by demonstrating the added value of civilian instruments will future EU-U.S. cooperation in the field be possible—and sustainable.

Fourth and finally, the threat emanating from weak or failing states will continue to face the international community for some time to come. Assisting other countries in establishing the rule of law as part of a broader approach towards conflict prevention and crisis management will thus remain a policy goal that the transatlantic policy community will have to meet in the future. There is simply no other option than to proceed to optimize respective instruments and cooperation. The effects of the financial crisis are already being felt in national budgets, and this will inevitably affect how much money can be spent on crisis response and long-term engagement in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Work toward increasing cooperation and enhancing capacity along the lines suggested in this chapter would make security cooperation more effective.