Chapter Three

Challenges of Democracy in Turkey: Europeanization, Modernization and Securitization Revisited

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Turkey’s experience with democracy is longer than most of the neighboring countries of the European Union (EU), longer even than some EU member states. Turkey, which introduced a multiparty system and democracy in 1946, is also a founding member state of the Council of Europe (CoE) (1951), an organization that serves as the guardian of democracy and human rights; the OECD (1961), a forum for countries describing themselves as committed to democracy and the market economy; and the OSCE (1975), an organization of countries declaring their commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Although democracy in Turkey was in the past interrupted by military intervention (1960), the “half coup” (1971), the military takeover (1980), and the “postmodern coup d’état” (1997), it has achieved significant progress, particularly in the early 2000s, in areas such as the abolition of the death penalty, the fight against torture, the reform of prisons and detention centers, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of association and reunion, freedom of religion, the functioning of the judiciary, civil-military relations, economic, cultural and social rights, and the fight against corruption. The credible EU membership perspective attained at the 1999 Helsinki Summit served to accelerate the reform processes that were already underway in Turkey.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey has been presented as a role model due to the freedoms enjoyed by its population in comparison to the majority of the Muslim world, its economic growth (seventeenth largest economy of the world), and its ability to combine Islam and democracy. Moreover, in 2004, Turkey joined the West as a pioneering country in the promotion of democracy in the Broader Middle East and North Africa region (BMENA). Turkey as one of the Democracy Assis-
tance Dialogue (DAD) countries along with Italy and Yemen, hosted several events to promote democracy, focusing on empowering women and increasing women’s role in social, economic and political life in the region. During the Arab Spring, Turkey was one of the countries supporting the democratic transformation of the MENA region.

Yet, in recent years, the democratization process in Turkey—like in some EU member states and neighboring countries—has become part of a reverse wave. This chapter examines democratization process in Turkey for the 2001–2015 period, with particular focus on three concepts—Europeanization, modernization and securitization—that are interlinked in the Turkish case.

This study first attempts to identify the role of the EU in Turkey’s transformation, with particular focus on the country’s Europeanization—that is, the influence of the EU or the domestic impact of the EU on Turkey’s policies, and political and administrative structures—as a candidate state. A further discussion of this Europeanization is opened with reference to securitization, with the intention being to explain how the de-securitization of the issues facilitated through the Europeanization process led to further democratization. The paper then evaluates the directions of democratic change in the country, with particular focus on the new Islamic middle class that has emerged over the last twenty years under the modernization part. Within this context, it draws upon modernization theory to assess the argument that establishes a correlation between economic development and democracy. Finally, it evaluates developments both internal and external according to the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School, as well as the impact of securitization on the democratization process in Turkey.

Europeanization

Europeanization has gained popularity in European studies since the 1990s, gaining widespread currency among scholars as a term that refers to a variety of changes within European politics and international relations. Featherstone describes Europeanization “as a process of structural change affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests”;¹ while Radaelli defines Europeanization in general terms “as processes of a

construction, diffusion, and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourses, identities, political structures, and public policies.”

In this chapter, Europeanization refers to the European Union’s domestic impact on its member states, candidate countries and associated countries, but before analyzing the impacts of Europeanization on Turkey’s democratization process, the effects of Europeanization on the EU candidate states is analyzed in this section.

In the case of the candidate states, certain policies and institutions of the EU can lead to policy or institutional misfits, where the EU requirements for accession clash with domestic policies. This leads to Europeanization only if it is acted upon by the domestic actors and if the process is mediated by domestic institutions. Mediating conditions can be categorized as those identified by rational choice institutionalism (RCI) and those identified by sociological institutionalism (SI).

RCI assumes it to be rational that actors who seek to maximize their power and welfare behave according to the logic of consequences. Accordingly, European integration and the misfit outcome changes the domestic opportunity structure for domestic actors, which in turn leads to a differential empowerment of domestic actors if the favored actors are able to exploit the new resources that are made available to them. In RCI, the three active mechanisms in accession Europeanization are conditionality, domestic empowerment and lesson-drawing. The main variables in the conditionality model are external rewards and sanctions, as well as a cost-benefit analysis of rule adoption by the applicant government. The model expects logic of consequences to operate in the adoption of rules in the non-member state under the conditions of external incentives offered by the EU as a reward for membership. From the perspective of the external incentive model developed by

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6. Ibid., p. 5.
Schimelfennig and Sedelmeier, the reward for EU membership may exert strong pressure for change, altering the cost-benefit calculations of domestic actors. The second mechanism of accession of Europeanization is domestic empowerment, in which the EU can alter domestic opportunity structures by providing incentives to societal actors, which can in turn lead to a change in the cost-benefit calculations of the government of the candidate state. The final mechanism in accession Europeanization is lesson-drawing, with both the government and societal actors able to draw lessons from the EU to better tackle any problems they may face.

SI assumes that actors behave in accordance with logic of appropriateness—a perspective that sees human activity as being driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behavior, organized into institutions. Accordingly, rules are followed because they are seen as natural, expected, rightful and legitimate. Actors are guided by a collective understanding of what constitutes proper, that is, socially acceptable behavior within a given rule structure. These collective understandings and inter-subjective meanings influence the ways in which actors define their goals and what they perceive as rational actions. Actors that are motivated by internalized identities, norms and values seek conformity with social norms, and rationality is socially constructed. In this framework, Europeanization is considered to be a provision of new norms defining legitimate and rational behavior domestic actors strive to comply.

From a SI perspective, Europeanization entails a process of social learning as another way of stimulating rule-adopter behavior in non-member states. According to this variant, domestic actors are socialized into European norms and logic of appropriateness through a process of persuasion and social learning. The EU may either convince the government of the appropriateness of its rules, or may persuade societal groups

8. Ibid., pp. 5-6.
11. Ibid., p. 493.
and organizations to lobby their government for rule adoption. In such a situation, domestic actors redefine their interests and identities accordingly. In other words, political elites learn from the EU, internalize its norms and develop new identities. In this regard, successful Europeanization depends on the existence of an important mediating factor: the existence of norm entrepreneurs, that is, actors from the candidate country and/or the EU. These agents of change, or norm entrepreneurs, mobilize at the domestic level to pressure policy-makers to initiate change by increasing the costs of certain strategic options, while using moral arguments and strategic constructions in order to persuade actors to redefine their interests and identities, engaging them in processes of social learning. The mechanisms by which these norm entrepreneurs try to induce change are persuasion and argument, but rather than aiming to maximize their subjective desires, their intention is to fulfill social expectations. From this perspective, Europeanization can be understood to be the emergence of new rules, norms and practices to which the member states are exposed, and which they have to incorporate into their own domestic practices and structures. A government will adopt EU rules if it can be convinced of their appropriateness.

In brief, Europeanization, in the case of candidate countries, brings adaptation pressure for change under the EU anchor in almost all policy areas. The credibility of the EU perspective, the clarity of the EU model and the clear delineation of the timing of EU rewards in response to the candidate country’s fulfillment of EU criteria facilitate a successful adoption of EU norms, legislation and policies. The EU acts as a legitimization device empowering those groups able to internalize and act on line with EU norms and values.

The outcomes of Europeanization distinguished by Börzel and Risse as “three degrees of domestic change” are absorption, accommodation and transformation. The degree of domestic change is low in absorption, in that the member states incorporate European policies into their

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16. Ibid., p. 66.
17. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, op. Cit., p. 18.
18. Özer and Nas, op. cit., pp. 1, 2.
domestic structures without substantially modifying existing policies and institutions. The degree of domestic change is modest in accommodation, since member states accommodate Europeanization pressure by adapting existing processes, policies and institutions without changing their essential features and the underlying collective understandings attached to them. Finally, the degree of domestic change is high in transformation, since member states replace existing policies, processes and institutions with new, substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their essential features and/or underlying collective understandings are fundamentally changed.  

Europeanization from a RCI perspective is largely conceived as a political opportunity, offering some actors additional resources to exert influence while severely constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals. In this approach, actors engage in strategic interactions using available resources to maximize their utilities on the basis of given, fixed and ordered preferences. They follow an instrumental rationality by weighing up the costs and benefits of different strategy options, while taking into account the (anticipated) behavior of other actors. According to RCI logic, we can conceptualize the adaptation pressures or the degrees of misfit emanating from Europeanization as providing new opportunities for some actors and severely constraining the freedom of movement of other actors. In the following section, the impact of Europeanization on Turkey’s democratization process is analyzed.

**Impact of Europeanization on Democratization in Turkey (1999–2015)**

Turkey’s relationship with the European Community (EC) dates back to 1959 when it applied for association with the EEC. This relationship continued with an association agreement—the Ankara Agreement—signed in 1963, and an Additional Protocol signed in 1970. Yet, the

A complicated relationship between Turkey and the EC was interrupted during the 1970s when Turkey froze unilaterally the Ankara Treaty in 1978, invoking the self-protection clause. Following the Turkish military coup d’état in 1980, European Parliament suspended the Association Agreement in 1982.23

In the second half of the 1980s democracy was restored in Turkey, and the country re-applied for EC membership in 1987. Following the 1985 Southern European countries enlargement, in 1989 the EC suggested Turkey operationalize the Association Agreement rather than taking the track of a direct application for membership, citing economic, social and political reasons. As foreseen in the 1963 Ankara Agreement, the Customs Union decision was taken by the Turkey-EU Association Council in 1995.24

Turkey’s bid for EC membership was further complicated by the application for membership of a number of Central and Eastern European countries. The 1993 Copenhagen Summit acknowledging the membership of these states, but not Turkey, was an important watershed in the evolution of the EU’s approach to enlargement. At this summit, the EU set out economic and political criteria that raised the bar for membership25 that required candidate states to meet a number of political criteria, including the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; as well as some economic criteria, including the maintenance of a functioning market economy, and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.26

The Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 declared the candidacies of the CEECs, Malta and the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus, but not Turkey, merely confirming at the highest level “Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the European Union” and its intention to draw up a strategy “to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field.” Turkey reacted negatively to the results of the European Council, considering that it had been subjected to discriminatory treatment when compared to the

24. Ibid. p. 19.
25. Ibid., p. 17.
other applicant countries. This led Ankara to state that it would not participate in the European Conference, and that it was suspending political dialogue with the Union and therefore no longer wished to discuss with it such issues as the relations between Greece and Turkey, the Cyprus issue or human rights. According to Ankara, EU-Turkey relations would henceforth be based on existing texts (the Association Agreement, Additional Protocol and Customs Union).\(^{27}\) At the Cardiff Summit in 1998 it was announced that a progress report would be prepared annually for Turkey, and the enlargement process was revised during the Vienna Summit in December 1998, when the decision was taken to strengthen relations between Turkey and the EU.\(^ {28}\)

The EU declared Turkey as a candidate country at the Helsinki Summit of December 1999. This made the membership ideal an attainable objective for Turkey, marking a turning point in Turkey-EU relations in general and Turkey’s democratization process in particular, since it stimulated Turkish political and legal reforms. Accordingly, the Europeanization of Turkey intensified after the Helsinki Summit. The Turkish government had already adopted a major package of constitutional changes in order to satisfy the European Parliament’s demands for democratic development in Turkey prior to its vote on the Customs Union in December 1995;\(^ {29}\) and while the EU had already bolstered Turkey’s Europeanization process within the premise of the Association Agreement, it had not been as effective as the candidate Europeanization that emerged following the Helsinki Summit.

Between 1999 and 2005, with credible conditionality, Turkey accelerated its efforts to join the EU, and adopted various democratization packages to meet the Copenhagen criteria based on the hope that the EU would open accession negotiations.\(^ {30}\) This democratic transformation reached a peak with constitutional amendments and harmonization packages, with the EU’s influence on constitutional changes in Turkey being felt most strongly between 2001 and 2004. The table below shows the constitutional amendments and major changes taken first by the tripartite coalition Democratic Left Party (DSP), Motherland Party


\(^{29}\) Müftüler Baç, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 19.

\(^{30}\) Müftüler Baç, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 20.
Turkey’s Europeanization was greatly motivated by the EU, as the prospects of EU membership provided powerful stimulus for constitutional reforms, as well as the harmonization packages. The prospect of full membership provided much-needed external stimulus for the legitimization of the reform process, and the credible EU accession perspective empowered pro-reformist domestic actors—*norm entrepreneurs*—who were actively involved in the bottom-up Europeanization process in Turkey. At the end of 2001, support for EU membership among the Turkish public exceeded 70 percent, although these reforms were not


### Table 1. Reform Packages 2001–2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Major Changes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 October 2001</td>
<td>1st Constitutional Package</td>
<td>34 amendments to the 1982 Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2001</td>
<td>New Civil Code</td>
<td>Gender equality in marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February/March 2002</td>
<td>2nd Constitutional Package</td>
<td>Constitutional amendments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 August 2002</td>
<td>3rd Constitutional Package</td>
<td>Abolition of the death penalty/revised anti-terror law, permission to broadcast in languages other than Turkish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December 2002</td>
<td>4th Constitutional Package</td>
<td>Operationalize previous reforms/revise penal code for torture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 December 2002</td>
<td>5th Constitutional package</td>
<td>Retrial of all cases decided in State Security Courts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2003</td>
<td>6th Constitutional package</td>
<td>Adoption of Protocol 6 of the ECHR, convert all death sentences to life imprisonment/ repeal Article 8 of Anti-Terror Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2003</td>
<td>7th Constitutional Package</td>
<td>Revision of the National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 2004</td>
<td>8th Constitutional package</td>
<td>Ten amendments to the Constitution, freedom of press, and priority given to supranational treaties over domestic law, abolition of State Security Courts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 2004</td>
<td>9th Constitutional Package</td>
<td>Changes to Article 46 of the Penal Code, revision of Higher Education Board and the Censure Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-26 September 2004</td>
<td>New Turkish Penal Code</td>
<td>Revision of laws on violence against women and children/changes to penalties for various offences and redefinition of offences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

simply an outcome of Turkey’s desire to join the EU. The Europeanization process in Turkey tends to be interpreted as one of democratization, and from this perspective, the reform process in Turkey’s Europeanization corresponded also to the demands of society for a more democratic and liberal political system.

Turkey tried to adopt the basic principles and norms of liberal democracy for the sake of its inclusion in the European order. Interestingly, as the Europeanization process stimulated democratic change in Turkey, the anti-European reactionary conservatives gained strength. As stated by Baç, opposition to the Europeanization process was organized politically around the religious vote in the 1950s with the Democratic Party; in the 1960s to a certain extent with the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), and in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s with the Nationalist Salvation (Milli Selamet Partisi), Welfare (Refah), Virtue (Fazilet) and Felicity (Saadet) parties.32 The Justice and Development Party (AKP), with roots in the Islamist movement, came to power in 2002 with a more reformist stance than the more traditional Islamist party and appeared to be more receptive of the EU’s demands for domestic change, transforming itself into one of the staunchest defenders of democratic rights and liberties, and an enthusiastic supporter of Turkey’s entry into the

Table 2. Rates of Support for Turkey’s EU Membership among the Turkish Public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table created by the author based on Euro-barometer Standard Survey data.

EU. The EU reforms also overlapped with the agenda of the AKP, which instrumentalized the promotion of EU accession to widen its support base towards the center and to anchor its political reforms aimed at curbing the influence of the Kemalists and the military. EU conditionality helped the AKP gain and hold political power.

Keyman claims that “the AKP represents the socially conservative periphery that has demanded a share of power of the center,” adding that this inclusion itself manifested greater democratization within the system. Moreover, the AKP’s first term (2002–2007) brought Turkey closer to democratic consolidation as a result of the government implemented reforms in such areas as civil-military relations and the recognition Kurdish cultural rights.

In December 2004, the European Council stated that with these reforms, Turkey had sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations with the EU on October 3, 2005. Since then, however, the speed of reforms has slowed in parallel to the increasingly dim perspective of membership after the EU’s Turco-sceptic leaders offered Turkey a “special relationship,” based on “privileged partnership” rather than “full EU membership,” vetoing the opening of several chapters in Turkey’s EU accession talks.

The accession of Cyprus emerged as another obstacle during the accession negotiations, vetoing half a dozen chapters, including those related to the Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, Energy, and Education and Culture in Turkey’s 2009 accession negotiations. A further eight chapters were frozen by the EU itself due to Turkey’s non-implementation of the Additional Protocol extending the EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement to Cyprus, and no chapters have been opened since June 2010. Out of 35 chapters, 14 have been opened and 17 remain

36. Ünver Noi, op. cit., p. 79.
blocked, and Turkey froze its relations with the EU for the duration of the Cypriot Presidency in 2012.

Both internal and external developments have had a considerable impact on Turkey’s democratization process, and have lessened the effectiveness of the EU’s transformative power on Turkey owing to the lost ground in mutual trust; the decrease in enthusiasm in Turkey; and the fading attractiveness of the EU. The deceleration of accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey led to Turkish skepticism and has created an anti-EU backlash in the country. While support for the EU stood at 62 percent in 2004, it dropped to below 50 percent in 2009 and declined to its lowest level of 30 percent in 2012. In the same period, negative perceptions of the EU among the public has risen from 12 to 35 percent, which some have interpreted as “the adaptation process itself producing reverse reactions in perceptions.” At the same time, as argued in a report by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), the increasing self-confidence and expectations of Turkish society has sharpened its judgments about other societies while looking from a much more egalitarian perspective. Moreover, the decreasing public support for EU membership makes it more difficult to mobilize the public in favor of implementing EU demands for reforms and the complicated tasks of norm entrepreneurs.

Since the AKP extended its power in the government by increasing its electoral support in its second term when the prospect for membership becoming less credible in the post-2005 period, the EU lost relevance for domestic institutional change. As Taspinar said, “the more power Erdogan won at the polls, the less interested he appeared in taking further reforms in human rights and freedom of expression.” The long-term hold onto power by one political party has been described as dominant-power system and politics, and has the potential to hinder further democratization. This has in part been verified in Turkey’s case, particularly during the third term of the AKP government. The fading

39. Ibid., p. 40.
support for EU membership in the Turkish public has further undermined the potential of using EU accession as a legitimization device.

Nevertheless, the adoption and implementation of domestic reforms continued in some areas after 2005. The Ankara criteria replaced the Copenhagen criteria. Turkish elites preferred “Europeanization à la carte”\(^\text{42}\) in other words, picking and choosing from the EU policies to satisfy their constituencies and consolidate their political power.\(^\text{43}\) Europeanization met greater resistance in some particular areas falling under the category of personal freedoms that did not fit in with the AKP’s moral understanding along with issues that are likely to be securitized.

**Modernization Theory**

The second theory to be analyzed in terms of its impact on Turkey’s democratization process is modernization theory. Before analyzing the directions of change in terms of democracy with a special focus on new Islamic middle class that has emerged over the last twenty years, the economic development and democracy relations based on modernization is analyzed in this section.

The roots of modernization theory, explaining the relationship between the sociology of religion and the development of the modern capitalist ethic, can be traced back to Max Weber’s *Die Protestantische Ethik Und Der Geist Des Kapitalismus* (1905). Weber argues that Protestantism constitutes an excellent breeding ground for capitalism, but argues at the same time that Protestant asceticism becomes a threat to itself.\(^\text{44}\) Accordingly, industrious labor and consumption leads to an abundance that induces people to secularize their worldview; and modernization leads thus to such specific changes as industrialization, rationalization, secularization, and bureaucratization.\(^\text{45}\)

The abundance resulting from these changes, particularly the secularizing influence of wealth, leads to less resistance to world temptations. Weber supports his argument by citing John Wesley, the founding

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\(^{42}\) Börzel and Soyaltin, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

\(^{43}\) Ibid, p. 16.


father of Methodism: “I fear, wherever riches have increased, the essence of religion has decreased in the same proportion…”46 This argument is supported also by John Calvin and Pieter de la Court, who claim that ordinary people only remain religious if they are poor.47 According to this understanding, as capitalist culture develops, society becomes secularized.

The correlation between economic development and democracy was also highlighted by Seymour Martin Lipset, the famous scholar of Modernization Theory, in 1959. According to his general argument, “democracy is related to the state of economic development,” increasing education, and the middle class, reducing inequality, and tempering the tendency of the lower class to political extremism. For Lipset, “economic development leads to positive social changes that tend to produce democracy, leading to a shift from tradition to secular-rational values.”48 His argument was reinforced by Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman in 1985, who argued that in the 1960s “the level of economic development has a pronounced effect on political democracy, even when other noneconomic factors are considered … GNP is the dominant explanatory variable.”49

According to sociologists Inglehart and Welzel, modernization increases the likelihood of the emergence of increasingly liberal and democratic political systems, since high levels of economic development tend to make people more tolerant and trusting, resulting in more emphasis on self-expression and more participation in decision-making.50 Once the middle class becomes sufficiently large and articulate, it presses for liberal democracy, while industrialization leads to a shift from traditional to secular-rational values. Economic development is, indeed, linked strongly to pervasive shifts in the beliefs and motivations of people, and these shifts in turn change the role of religion, job motivation, human fertility rates, gender roles and sexual norms.51

47. Rustow, op. cit., p. 5
51. Ibid., p. 39.
Modernization theorists underestimated the challenges faced by non-Western countries on the route to modernization.\textsuperscript{52} Diamond argues that a different path to modernization may be the increasing trend towards the hybrid regimes like those found in Latin America, where elections are held, but none of the usual constitutional checks and balances exist.\textsuperscript{53} Examples can also be found among the Islamic states of countries that “develop their own models of modernity, ones that value the role of reason and are pluralist, but also religious.”\textsuperscript{54}

Inglehart and Welzel (2005) emphasize that even though socio-economic development tends to drive systematic changes in people’s value and belief systems, the impact of cultural traditions does not simply disappear. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) suggest that industrialization is linked with one main process of cultural change, being the rise of secularization and bureaucratization, while the growth of postindustrial societies gives rise to another main process of cultural change that follows a different direction, being a growing emphasis on such values of self-expression as civil and political freedom or individual autonomy.\textsuperscript{55}

In the following section, the impact of modernization particularly the correlation between economic development and democracy is analyzed on Turkey’s democratization process.

**Modernization in Turkey and its Impacts on Democratization 1999–2015**

The modernization of Turkey began with the establishment of the Republic as the primary goal of Atatürk, who wanted a modernized and secular Turkey that could compete with other countries at the highest level of contemporary civilization. The 1920s was a period of revolutionary reform in the constitutional and cultural spheres, embracing the


abolition of the Caliphate and the secularization of the legal system, although in the economic sphere, policies were far more conservative.\textsuperscript{56}

The political reforms under the Westernization and modernization drive in the early years of the Republic, from 1923 to 1938, were adopted in order to make a break with the Ottoman past and to create a modern European state. Yet not everybody in Turkey shared that ideal, since Turkey’s European aspirations was considered a project of the elite. As a consequence, the Turkish modernization process turned into a struggle between the Europe-oriented state elite and the conservative elements of Turkish society. The state in Turkish modernity assumed the capacity of transforming society from above, and planned import-substituting industrialization as the most appropriate path to development. National development based on rapid modernization and industrialization and the top down transformation of the society into a modern, industrial and civilized one was the ideology behind this state-centric Turkish modernization.\textsuperscript{57}

The development of a strong private sector and a business elite, which led to a shift from former import-substitution policies to export-oriented growth and free-market economies, contributed also to Turkey’s democratic consolidation in the 1980s. These developments also led to an expansion of communication networks such as the Internet, fax machines, television satellite dishes, cables and direct telephone lines, accompanied by a significant increase in the number of students studying abroad and in international travel. These changes have played an important role in opening Turkish citizens to international influence and the liberalization of the political system.\textsuperscript{58}

Turkey’s journey towards Richard Rosecrance’s idea of a “trading state”\textsuperscript{59} began under the leadership of Turgut Özal in the 1980s,\textsuperscript{60} bringing capitalism to Turkey and liberalizing the Turkish economy,


\textsuperscript{57} Keyman and Gümüşçü, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{58} Toprak, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 289.


\textsuperscript{60} In the 1980s, Rosecrance argued that a “new trading world” was emerging, one that replacing a world characterized by a military-political and territorial system. Kemal Kirisci, “The Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State,” \textit{New Perspectives on Turkey}, no. 40, 2009, pp. 29-57.
which in turn led to the growth of a new business elite and Turkey’s trade relations with the outside world.\textsuperscript{61} While this process was interrupted in the 1990s, it was reignited by the AKP with the growth of a tradition of conservative, traditional, rural and religious voters in Turkey that had reservations—to say the least—about the process of Europeanization.\textsuperscript{62} This process not only led to a change in Turkey’s national interests, determined in terms of national security with the addition of economic considerations, such as the need to trade, to expand export markets, and to attract and export foreign direct investment, but also managed to create its own middle class.\textsuperscript{63} Since the AKP came to power in 2002, the Islamic portion of society has managed to create its own Muslim bourgeoisie in Anatolia. The urbanization of the prospering middle class has led to radical changes in the lifestyles of the majority of citizens, leading to new political demands and contributing to the AKP rise to power.

Turkey’s economy enjoyed remarkable success in the 2002–2006 period, with growth averaging 7.2 percent. Since then, however, growth has slowed, dropping to 4.2 percent in 2013 and further to 2.9 percent in 2014. Per capita income increased to 10,500 USD in 2011 from 3,500 USD recorded in 2002, although the global crisis affected also Turkey as a result of the declining external demand and falling international capital flows. Growth rates in 2008 and 2009 were below the remarkable performance achieved between 2002 and 2007, however Turkey achieved a growth rate of 9.2 and 8.5 percent in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Turkey became the 17\textsuperscript{th} largest economy in the world in 2012 with a GDP of around 800 billion USD.\textsuperscript{64}

However, contrary to arguments of modernization theory, rather than creating secularization (as an outcome of modernization) that diminishes the religious congregation, this modernization has on the one hand expanded the congregation, and on the other, has altered the meaning of religiosity in Turkey. A research into the political and sociological evolution of Turkey conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) revealed the perceptions, expectations, and demands of the rising Islamic middle class, and their influ-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{61} Ibid. p. 33; Taşpinar, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 128.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Müftüler Baç, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 28.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} Kirisci, \emph{op. cit.}, p. 33.
\end{itemize}
ence in determining the policies of the AKP. The research indicated that the group that defined themselves as religious corresponded to the conservative middle class that supported the AKP, and had strengthened after the AKP came to power.65

The report identified a general positive perception about democracy, although what was understood by democracy also varied. For the majority of the participants, democracy implied the election of administrators by the majority, the decisions’ being taken by the majority and the compliance of minorities with the norms of the majority. They noted that their freedoms had been restricted before, but come to feel freer during the term of the AKP government. The definition of freedom changes against attitudes not falling in line with Islam, and the freedom of others is recognized as legitimate, so long as the sensitivities of the Islamic segment of society are observed. This was particularly evident on the issue of the prohibition on the sale and advertising of alcohol.66

Every participant believed that a prime minister or a party leader must make decisions after consulting the people around him, in that consultation has an important place in Islam, being sunna; although some participants added that a strong leader must exert his authority in cases of indecisiveness. This view was supported by the analogy of home life one of the participant of survey: “If I am the leader of the family, I can then exert my authority without contradicting what I have said before.”67 This “atavistic approach” manifests itself in references to the Ottoman state related to various issues. For instance, one of the participants said:

If there is no democracy, then there would be pressure, a social pressure. This would prohibit individuals from expressing their views, leading them into illegal organizations and activities. For this reason, democracy is a must; although one thing must be added: the Ottoman model can be acceptable. We like the Ottomans—

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65. Mahçupyan, op. cit., p. 45.
66. Mahçupyan, op. cit., pp. 46, 47. In 2003, new laws banned all forms of advertising and promotion of alcoholic beverages, including promotions, sponsored activities, festivals and free giveaways. It also included limiting retail sales hours from 6 am to 10 pm, and banning student dormitories, health institutions, sports clubs, all sorts of education institutions and gas stations from selling alcohol. Applications for new licenses required a business permit from the local municipality and a tourism document from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.
67. Ibid., p. 50.
why? It is a monarchy that allowed people to live the way they wanted, although it still was a monarchy …68

The participants were ready give up their personal freedoms when the question was asked using the term “relinquishing one’s freedom for the sake of social order” rather than “interference of the state in individual lives.” There was a common understanding that sacrifice was one of the rules of society. Although democracy was viewed essentially as majoritarianism and the functions of state are expressed as introducing measures, frameworks, and limits on freedoms, balance is sought in the end, affirming “a relinquishment of freedoms is acceptable only to some extent.”69

The perception of the Islamic middle class on the Gezi Park-related anti-government demonstrations paralleled the government one. The AKP government style and that of the Prime Minister was generally supported. In response to the claims of excessive police violence, the participants stated that the police had been better trained in recent years and had reduced violence in police stations. Another justification for their support of the government’s approach to the Gezi Park protests was that the protestors were supporters of illegal organizations. Despite these views, it was emphasized that the Gezi Park protests were not managed well, although some of the participants viewed the Gezi Park protests as a plot by “external forces” aimed at hindering progress in Turkey.70

The most important finding of the report was that the “new middle class” that has flourished over the last 20–30 years has become stuck between the desire to change and adapt and/or to protect identity and moral values.71 Some Turkish scholars have described them as “a blend of Islamic traditionalism and European Union norms,”72 although it is too early to reach a concrete conclusion on this issue, since the evolution of this class, which emerged only 20 years ago, is continuing.

68. Ibid., pp. 50, 53.
69. Ibid., pp. 55, 7.
70. Ibid., p. 67.
71. Ibid. P. 73.
That said, in the current situation, we can say that the support for democracy among the Islamic segment of society is based on pragmatic and vital reasons, rather than being based on principles. Democracy is considered desirable, but not absolutely necessary for their inclusion in social life and for their adaptation to the modern world. From this perspective, it would seem less likely that they could be convinced to push for further democratization, particularly in the more sensitive fields that do not fit the moral understanding of this class and their representatives in government, or in the fields that are accepted by this class as a threat to national security or a threat to the government that represents them. The reflection of economic development and the emergence of the Islamic middle class on the democratization process in Turkey showed the limits of the democratization process, which can be explained with Huntington’s argument that “The relationship between economic development and democracy is complex and probably varies in time and space.”

Securitization

The third theory to be analyzed to identify its impacts on Turkey’s democratization process is the securitization theory of the Copenhagen school. Before analyzing its impacts on the democratization process in Turkey for the 1999–2015 period, securitization theory is analyzed here in general terms.

According to securitization theory, security emerges only in communication between subjects, being both a social and inter-subjective construction. It rejects the traditionalist’s case for restricting security to one sector that of state centric and identifies with the military powers of nation states. “It offers a constructivist operational method for distinguishing the process of securitization from that of politicization for understanding who can securitize what, and under what conditions.”

Waever, drawing upon language theory, regards security as a speech act. He argues that “something is a security problem when the elites declare

73. Mahçupyan, op. cit., p.19.
The elite must establish that there is a threat potentially existential and possible with relative advantages of security handling compared to non-securitized handling. Discourse presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does not itself create securitization, but it is a securitizing act, and, the issue can only become securitized if and when the audience accepts it as such. If no signs of such acceptance exist, the object is not actually being securitized.

Securitization focuses on the transformation of certain issues into matters of security by an actor, and enables the use of extraordinary measures in the name of security. A securitization act has three components: securitizing agent/actor, referent object and audience. The securitizing agents are political leaders, bureaucrats, governments, lobbyists, and pressure groups that have the authority for security-speak. They make securitizing statements that trigger the perception that referent objects are under threat. In this regard, there should be a referent object that is being threatened and that needs to be protected. Successful securitization is not decided by the securitizer, but by the audience of the security speech act. In this regard, there should be an audience that is a target of the securitization act, and that needs to be persuaded and needs to accept that the issue as a threat to security. According to securitization theory, anyone can succeed in promoting something as a security problem through speech acts. If a subject is securitized, then it becomes possible to legitimize extraordinary measures to resolve the perceived problem, since the security speech-act calls for exceptionality by offering to handle the issue through extraordinary means, which may include breaking the normal political rules of the game, such as applying limitations on inviolable rights.

Perception also plays an important role in the acceptance of an issue as a threat. The perceived image of the issue as an existential threat from which the referent object must be protected is one of the benefits of con-

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Securitization in Turkey and its Impacts on Democratization

Securitization is not a new concept for Turkey, being a country that had a highly securitized inward-looking foreign and security policy during the 1990s. Fear of loss of territory has long been one of the major aspects of Turkish security culture owing to the Treaty of Sevrés, that facilitated the partitioning of the territories of the Ottoman Empire among the European powers after World War I. Although the Treaty of Sevrés was rejected by Turkish national movement, and Lousanne Treaty that defines borders of modern Turkish Republic signed, this fear continued.

During the 1990s, the focus on national security shifted from external to internal threats. The terrorist activities of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) a decade ago, identified as “a few terrorists,” intensify in the 1990s. Securitization of separatism (the Kurdish issue) came to the agenda as a threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey. Bilgin explains this situation, “During the post-Cold War period that coincided with Turkey’s struggle with the PKK and its application to join

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82. Wæver, op. cit., p. 54.
84. Akgül Acikmese, op. cit., p. 308.
85. Ibid., p. 308.
the EU, that sub-text of fear of loss of territory was turned into text in Turkey’s security discourse."\textsuperscript{86} In this regard, an atmosphere of “more security, less democracy” manifested itself in the implementation of exceptional suspensions of several democratic rights in Turkey.\textsuperscript{87}

In the first half of the 2000s, however, Turkey’s new outward-looking foreign policy deepened its relations with its neighbors, and made it a “model and order setter”\textsuperscript{88} in the wider world. The economic boom and political success in combining democracy with Islam, and the freedoms enjoyed by the Turkish people due to the ongoing democratization process, had a considerable impact on the public perception. Moreover, changes in attitudes, along with the comments of the political elite, the AKP government, civil society and the media also changed the formerly inward-looking security policy, all having acted as agents in the move towards the de-securitization of the Kurdish issue. The EU accession prospect, in other words, the EU’s conditionality, facilitated a process of de-securitization in Turkey, with its impact being noted with particular focus on the mainstream discourse of threats articulated as the “Kurdish issue” and “political Islam.”\textsuperscript{89}

However, this did not last too long. The unfavorable internal and external environment that emerged was more of a hindrance than an aid to the transformation. Moreover, the AKP’s emerging moral agenda initiated to satisfy its supporters, including the Muslim middle class, paid little regard to the demands of the secularists, who perceived the agenda as an infringement of their personal freedoms. This led to polarization in society based in particular on the AKPs focus on its own constituencies and Europeanization \textit{a la carte}—or pick and choose democracy.\textsuperscript{90} This led to criticisms that the more power the AKP won at the polls, the less democratization featured on the agenda, resulting even in backward steps in this regard.


\textsuperscript{87} Akgül Acikmese, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 312.


\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., p. 303.

\textsuperscript{90} Börzel and Soyaltin, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 16
All opposition acts were perceived as attempts at a coup d’état, aimed at destroying the AKP government. This led to discourses that portrayed any kind of opposition as a threat to the existence and success of the AKP in its New Turkey aspirations. This situation gained momentum after the corruption allegations of December 2013, which were seen as a political contest between Erdogan’s circle within the AKP and their former long-term ally, the Gülen Movement. The government accused the Gülen Movement of exerting undue influence in state institutions, the police and the judiciary, and attempting to bring down the government.91

In order to eliminate the obstacles in the way of the drive for a New Turkey, legislative amendments were made. Arrangements were made to reappoint and/or remove from their positions judges, prosecutors, police, etc. that were considered as having a role in the organization defined as the “parallel state.”92 The military coup in Egypt had a significant impact on these developments, and discourse started to reflect a more populist conservative nationalism.

Furthermore, revealing some national secrets regarding the AKP’s Syria policy by a prosecutor considered to be affiliated with Gülen Movement (later revealed also by some opposition journalists) brought the issue of transparency and accountability in democracies to the agenda. According to arguments that can be traced back to Immanuel Kant, public accountability allows democracies to implement efficient and successful foreign policies. Kant’s argument on the institutions of consent has been utilized to extend the logic of accountability in democracies to foreign and security policy issues. According to Kant’s argument, extortion occurs when states exaggerate or oversell foreign threats to society, whether through incomplete information or outright deception.93

Mill suggests that democracies are defined by the transmission of information to and among the public, through which informed citizens’ consent is built. Civil society institutions or organizations promoting transparency, and a free press allows for open debate about the public

benefits and costs of competing policies. The AKP’s argument, rather, parallels that of Gabriel Almond and de Tocqueville, who claim that a democracy’s lack of secrecy inhibits effectiveness by making potential enemies aware of vulnerabilities and weaknesses. The AKP accused the people who leaked information to the media of being traitors and of harming security. The secrecy dilemma, tensions between national security secrecy and government public accountability in democracies were discussed at even greater depth after security leaks in the United States by Chelsea Manning, Julian Assange and Edward Snowden sparked public debate about the issue, and the Turkish government used it to justify its argument even further.

The liberal theory of democratic foreign policy synthesizes the benefits of public accountability with the capacity for executive secrecy, rather than simply trading secrecy for accountability. Here, debates have been raised about the limits of transparency in democracies, related specifically to national security issues. Through applied measures, the government impedes the ability or likelihood of the media holding government authorities to account or scrutinizing their activities.

The government also labeled any kind of opposition as a coup d’État attempt orchestrated by foreign forces or an “interest lobby.” All acts of opposition were stigmatized as an act against the success of “New Turkey” in discourse and in the speeches of political leaders. The political elite repeated this discourse constantly, stating that Turkey was under threat, so as to legitimize extraordinary measures to resolve the problems. The audience, particularly the supporters of the AKP, accepted this as a security threat and was ready to sacrifice freedoms for the greater good. Securitization followed by undemocratic restrictions were put in place to contain the threat. For instance, the homeland security bill came to the agenda after the wave of demonstrations against the government (Gezi Park protests) in May-June 2013 and after the Kurdish protests against government policies towards Kobani

94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., p. 24.
(Kobani demonstrations). Although the opposition parties warned that the bill would turn Turkey into a police state, the homeland security bill passed in Parliament, enhancing the powers of the police to search and detain and to use firearms, and increasing penalties against protestors. The bill breached the separation of powers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the state, bestowing governors with authority previously reserved for prosecutors and judges.99 The potential effects of the ongoing Syrian conflict that gave the Kurds in Syria a territorial advantage in their fight against ISIS made the situation more complicated, seeming to have a securitization effect on the discourses of securitizing agents and their extraordinary measures.

Turkey’s problems with regards to democracy and human rights preceded the AKP era, being a consequence of Turkey’s conceptions of security. The security-first orientation of the state has long affected the observance of civil liberties and pluralism in the country, with secessionist Kurdish demands since the 1980s having a significant impact on the democratic and peaceful management of those demands by successive governments. Ethno-secessionist movements have been marked by hatred, numerous killings committed by all sides and by authoritarian practices,100 and so the democratization process in Turkey can thus be referred to as de-securitization, since political reforms could only be possible through refraining from security speech acts and the passing of legislation on sensitive issues.101 The conditions of EU membership were an important catalyst in Turkey’s de-securitization, and the role of the EU in this regard was inevitable.102

The Democratic Opening Process (known also as the Kurdish Opening) that was initiated by the AKP in July 2009 paved the way for the de-securitization of Kurdish issue for a while, and also for resolving the issue in a democratic and peaceful way through the granting of several rights to Kurds, which led to negotiations and a truce in 2013. Yet external and internal developments and the securitization of the issue pre-

99. World Report, op. cit..
vented the continuation of the process, and saw even a reversal of some democratic achievements. In brief, securitization aggravated the problems of democratization that had emerged since 2005 due to the slowdown of reforms and the reversal of already adopted reforms caused by the lack of internalization of norms and rules, as well as deficiencies in practice.

**Conclusion**

The Europeanization in Turkey that took place according to RCI logic led to domestic change, and provided political actors with new opportunities and constraints to pursue their goals. Yet this process entered a reverse cycle due to the absence or limited existence of the conditions to bring about any domestic change for further democratization. Moreover, de-securitization within the domestic policy context has lost ground. This led to the emergence of distrust and intolerance in the society in which democracy is unlikely to survive. Furthermore, the expected positive role of the Islamic middle class in Turkey’s modernization and of course democratization process came to its limits owing to cultural factors playing a significant role on socio-economic development and its social and political consequences. The formation of the middle class, the tendency for secularization and the establishment of democratic mechanisms have occurred differently from the West, and so have yielded different results. From an SI perspective of Europeanization, this can be interpreted as the EU not leading to domestic change, especially within the Islamic middle class, through socialization and a collective learning process, resulting in norm internalization on issues that contradict particularly their religiously sensitive issues.

103. The suicide bombing by members of the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) in the border town of Suruç on July 20, 2015, which killed 32 socialist youth activists of mostly ethnic Kurdish origin and wounded dozens more, and the subsequent terrorist attacks by the PKK and ISIL led Turkey to rethink its approach to both groups. The failure to establish a coalition government and the resulting early election promoted the securitization of the “Kurdish issue” followed by the suspension of Democratic Opening Process, and the declaration of a state of emergency in the southern provinces in response to the PKK’s insurgency. Aylin Unver Noi, “Turkey’s Fight with ISIL and PKK: A Return to the 1990s?” Huffington Post, 2015 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/aylin-unver-noi/turkeys-fight-with-isil-a_b_8008904.html
These changes in Turkey also altered its standing as an international role model, based on the economic development and freedom enjoyed by the people in the region during the first half of the AKP government’s term in office. The challenges to democracy Turkey faces today also impacted upon both its foreign policy approach and economic growth, hindering its soft power. Turkey, since 2002, has been a blatant example of dominant-power politics, but the results of the June 2015 parliamentary election saw this picture change when the AKP lost its parliamentary majority, bringing an end to the single-party government. After the election, the political parties failed to form a new government, but a second election in November later that year resulted in the AKP regaining its majority in Parliament. Many argued that the securitization of the Kurdish issue had helped the AKP to have this outcome; yet the emerging picture of escalating terrorism blurs the hopes for a more democratic Turkey. Future developments will show us whether Turkey will have a chance to opt for either a liberal democracy or whether it will continue with its illiberal preferences.

The ongoing accession negotiations with the EU may still stimulate Turkey’s return to democratization. Revival of the EU-Turkey relations following the refugee crisis indicated us the necessity for cooperation between Turkey and the EU. The EU’s conditional positive incentives, normative pressure and persuasion will be much more effective than a suspension of relations, which did not help the democratization process in Turkey. An egalitarian approach helps both sides eliminate their differences and find commonalities, and Turkey, as a “trading state”\(^\text{107}\) can benefit from advanced relations with the EU. The heyday of the Turkish economy has been left behind, and she has turned from an emerging market into a country that is faced with financial vulnerabilities. An upgraded customs union in which Turkey can benefit from free trade agreements with third countries may become a positive incentive that is more egalitarian than previous approaches, and has the potential to change the public’s perception of the EU positively, and finally create the potential to stimulate political will towards a more democratic Turkey. We should not ignore that Turkey’s Europeanization process had a significant impact on the de-securitization of certain issues, as well as the democratization process in Turkey, once a credible EU membership perspective was attained and continued in the 1999–2007 period. Turkey’s economy enjoyed remarkable success in the 2002–2006 period,

\(^{107}\) Richard Rosecrance, *op. cit.*
with growth averaging 7.2 percent, and this coincided with Turkey’s reform process and Turkey’s increased soft power.

As former Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan said at the B20-World Bank Group meeting on *Towards a Global Steering Mechanism* held on April 17, 2015 at the IFC, “The rule of law and high quality democracy is at the essence of a predictable business environment.”108 A return to the democratization process is vital for the economic well-being of Turkey. Continuing the accession negotiations with a credible membership perspective and positive incentives by providing political actors with new opportunities may still have the potential to bring about liberal democratic tendencies rather than illiberal ones in Turkey; 109 and in turn, the transformation of Turkey may also have a positive impact on the EU’s transformative power, which has lost ground in recent years.


109. Merkel’s visit to Turkey to discuss the Syrian refugee flows to Europe and visa liberalization talks are important steps.