

Forward Resilience: Protecting Society in an Interconnected World Working Paper Series

Forward Resilience and Enhanced Cooperation: Bringing Theory to Practice

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Introduction

The notion of ‘resilience’ is gaining currency in Euro-Atlantic security policy discussions. The concept suggests the importance of enhancing societies’ abilities to resist and withstand severe shocks to the essential arteries that provide societal security. Inside NATO, considerable work has begun on baseline requirements in several areas of importance to fulfill the ambitions of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, mandating that allies, ‘by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, [...] maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.’ A growing chorus of scholars and analysts believe that a resilience focus can help improve compliance with Article 3, with some arguing that resilience must be added as a fourth pillar of NATO strategy, alongside deterrence, crisis management and cooperative security.¹ Resilience not only builds ‘bounce back’ capacity in allies and partners, it may also have a deterrent effect: strengthened resilience raises thresholds for the effects of attacks and intrusions by antagonists and may contribute to deterrence. The concept was introduced in the July 2016 Warsaw Summit declaration, setting the future direction for strategic priorities.

But is resilience enough? Resilience can be conceived too narrowly, as something done ‘at home’ without consideration of allies, partners and neighbors’ deeply interconnected capacities for resilience building. The recently introduced notion of ‘forward resilience’ may provide more operational traction.² The ‘forward’ element suggests anticipating shocks by building geographical buffer zones in nations that are already closely interlinked with NATO nations through various cross-border flows. The so-called near abroad extends quite far when societies are highly dependent on developments in other jurisdictions. By assisting these neighbors, nations also strengthen their

¹ Frank D. Kramer, Hans Binnendijk, and Daniel S. Hamilton, *NATO’s New Strategy: Stability Generation*. Washington, D.C: Center for Transatlantic Relations/Atlantic Council, 2015.

² Hans Binnendijk, Daniel S. Hamilton and Charles Barry, *Alliance Revitalized: NATO For A New Era - Report of the Washington NATO Project*. Washington, D.C: Center for Transatlantic Relations on behalf of the Washington NATO Project, 2016.

own resilience in the face of asymmetric threats such as terrorism or global epidemics like Ebola. The forward dimension also helps planners by focusing on early alert. Forward-looking analyses of potential threats and risks as well as the capacity to recognize and act upon early indicators of unwanted developments help to strengthen resilience. Finally, the forward element helps to think about design issues on how to engineer effective ‘bounce back’ capacities well in advance so as to deter attacks on our societies’ weak links.

This chapter addresses a critical precondition for forward resilience as a *shared endeavor*: the capacity to cooperate across boundaries. Seemingly elementary, the capacity to cooperate lies at the heart of all attempts to work out solutions together across sovereign boundaries. Even among allies and partners, effective cooperation can seem in short supply. The Hurricane Katrina international assistance failure,³ NATO intransigence in Ukraine,⁴ and eurozone crisis management⁵ offer just a few examples. The capacity to cooperate can be defined as the ability to align interests, adopt shared perspectives, and deploy resources swiftly and with a minimum of transaction costs. These factors are the baseline requirement for building resilience in advance of asymmetrical threats, but also in the face of realized threats: actual attacks, failures, or disasters in the Euro-Atlantic community.

To make this case, we return to the essential scholarly literature on cooperation to extract lessons for enhancing the capacity to cooperate, accepting shared resilience and moving towards building forward resilience. First we examine how cooperation contributes to resilience before turning to factors that enhance one's capacity to cooperate. We then inventory the current ‘state of play’ in terms of the Euro-Atlantic community’s fulfillment of these requirements. We conclude by outlining several key steps necessary to improve the overarching capacity to cooperate.

Cooperation and Resilience

Cooperation seems to be an inherent good, and few observers question its benefits. But what are its benefits in relation to *resilience*? We define resilience as a capacity of a social system (in this case, a nation-state) to proactively adapt to and recover from disturbances that are perceived within the system to fall outside the range of normal and expected disturbances.⁶ *Forward resilience* suggests a collective ability to not just bounce back from a major crisis, but the capacity to react and adapt before a disturbance generates into a crisis. Anticipatory actions in the face of various potential contingencies are part of the forward resilience approach. A high capacity to cooperate can help to achieve forward resilience in three ways:

- ✓ **Fewer coordination costs.** Countries with a high capacity to cooperate have lower transactions costs when engaging with others. They are what the literature calls ‘meta-level’ facilitators,

³ Mark Rhinard and Bengt Sundelius, "The Limits of Self-Reliance: International Cooperation as a Source of Resilience." in L. Comfort, A. Boin, & C. Demchak (eds.), *Designing Resilience*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2010.

⁴ John Mearsheimer, "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014.

⁵ Martin Feldstein, "The Failure of the Euro," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2012.

⁶ A. Boin, L. Comfort and C. Demchak, eds., *Designing Resilience for Extreme Events*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2010, p. 9.

because they smooth interactive processes.⁷ There is less friction at key points in the incident management timeline: from collectively identifying an emerging threat to taking preventative steps, and from moving resources (see below) to communicating with the public. Much of this involves the presence of simple but formal protocols, which in turn generate informal modalities that smooth coordination. In general, a high degree of cooperation capacity translates into fewer transactions costs that impede both shared sense-making and collective action-taking.

- ✓ **Quicker distribution of assistance.** On the operational side, resiliency requires swift distribution of assistance, material or otherwise, to resolve a potential disturbance before it happens, or to regroup after it strikes. That system may not have the capacities required to recognize an emerging problem, and if a disturbance emerges, it may not have all the resources required to bounce back quickly. Cooperation can potentially improve the movement and distribution of resources to where they are needed, when they are needed.⁸ The distribution of material supplies is not the only type activity that effective cooperation can facilitate. Also important is the distribution of ‘intellectual’ assistance, meaning information and intelligence that can help a social system make sense of an impending development.⁹
- ✓ **Building of social capital.** On the social side, a powerful effect of cooperation capacity on resilience is generalized reciprocity and social capital creation generated through repeated interactions. Whether we speak of the cybernetic effects of cross-border transactions (Deutsch’s ‘security communities’ theory) or Putnam’s arguments that cooperation begets cooperation, we know that cooperation facilitates shared expectations, trust-building, and common norm-creation over time.¹⁰ From an academic perspective, the building of social capital reduces ‘defections’ in cooperation over time. From a practical perspective, forward resilience is enhanced when a general ‘we’ feeling drives actions to enhance preparedness and to reduce risk in sync with the larger community. In the classic choice among exit, voice or loyalty, cooperation breeds sentiments toward loyalty.

How to Cooperate: Enhancing the ‘Capacity to Cooperate’

Research shows effective cooperation is predicated on three elements: shared interests, shared institutions, and shared ideas.

Shared Interests

⁷ P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, "Bargaining costs, influence costs, and the organization of economic activity," in James E. Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

⁸ One way to think about resource distribution is in terms of logistical supply chains. During major crises, the ability to find, move, and distribute critical supplies is placed at a premium. Supply chains, however, are often among the first set of casualties when a disturbance emerges. Indeed, their breakdown can become part of a “cascading crisis” as initial suffering cannot be abated. See U. Rosenthal, R. A. Boin and L.K. Comfort, "The Changing World of Crisis and Crisis Management," in U. Rosenthal, R. A. Boin and L. K. Comfort, eds, *Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas and Opportunities*. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 2001, pp. 5-27.

⁹ Rhinard and Sundelius, op. cit.

¹⁰ See Jordan Boslego, "Engineering social trust: what can communities and institutions do?" *Harvard International Review*, Spring 2005.

The simplest propositions found in the international relations literature is that cooperation takes place only when all partners perceive they can achieve gains. The assumption holds that states are the main actors in international affairs, they act on the basis of national interests to maximize their own utility, and the international system is characterized by anarchy. In essence, states jealously guard their own position and cooperate only when they perceive that benefits outweigh costs. The Prisoners' Dilemma shows that cooperation is desirable, but there are myriad disincentives to working together.

Several implications follow. First, actors are predisposed to cooperation when benefits are clear and calculable.¹¹ Without clear material incentives, it will be difficult to justify to political superiors or domestic publics why actors should cooperate with their foreign counterparts. An organization that acts strategically to increase its net benefit is thus more likely to display a high capacity to cooperate, however counterintuitive this may appear. Moreover, actors are more likely to cooperate effectively when they see a balanced distribution of gains, e.g. that others will not benefit dramatically more than they will.

Second, actors are more likely to cooperate if they see cooperation as a long-term endeavor. Game theory reminds us that single interaction games, in which 'players' cooperate only once, do not usually result in cooperative outcomes; instead, defection or free riding takes place. By contrast, when those players know that cooperation will be iterative, i.e. ongoing, partners typically cooperate with positive outcomes for all involved.¹² Players can be punished for defecting and rewarded for cooperating over time. Providing assurances that cooperation will continue 'in the shadow of the future' is a key prerequisite to cooperation in the short term.

These 'rational calculations,' while useful to keep in mind in principle, are nonetheless subjectively constructed in reality. Elites frame what is in the 'national interest' and cost-benefit calculations are usually highly politicized. In this regard, several factors stand out in helping to forge the perception of shared interests:

- ***Shared threat perceptions.*** Few factors matter more in forging a shared interest than the perception of a common enemy 'out there.' International security studies are clear on this point, and while some scholars critique the idea of threat construction, it clearly matters in 'real life'.¹³ This places emphasis on (a) leveraging political attention following security breaches (terrorist attacks, cyber breakdowns) to focus on a coherent response and future planning, and (b) advancing analysis via universities and think tanks to identify relevant threats, and to understand how they affect a community of nations.
- ***Clear cost-benefit analysis.*** Nations must see, and be persuaded by, clear arguments regarding the importance of common action towards asymmetric threats. Despite the political bias that accompanies such analyses, efforts should be made to provide dispassionate data and 'hard

¹¹ R. Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books, 1984; K.A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," *World Politics* 38(1), 1985, pp. 1–24.

¹² Oye, *Ibid.*

¹³ B. Buzan and L. Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

facts' regarding the extent to which nations 'win' by investing in advance planning and capability building.¹⁴

- ***Leading from the front.*** Elite-level diplomatic declarations set a conducive framework for cooperation.¹⁵ Political declarations (communiqués) can be criticized as symbolic texts promising 'greater cooperation' with little substance attached. Yet they signal to lower level officials that *some* degree of appreciation at high levels of the prospect of cooperation. The same statements suggest that cooperation will be a long-term effort and thus serve to encourage repeated cooperation 'games'. Declarations raise the material incentives to work together – and thus build a more general capacity to cooperate amongst agencies and organization.

The Current Status of Shared Interests in the Euro-Atlantic Community

The end of bipolarity clearly helped to fragment interests within NATO. As has been well-documented, there are doubts regarding how allies interpret their own interests in relation to the Alliance. Namely, there are very different common understandings of the meanings of Articles 3 and 5 in the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 5, for instance, is an essential interest to smaller European allies. The U.S. government, however, seems to be shifting attention away from Article 5 (solidarity in the event of an armed attack) towards Article 3 (self-help) as it relates to burden-sharing and capacity-building in each member of the alliance. Recent events suggest the rise of new threats, including terrorism on European soil, an antagonistic Russia, and mass migration, which may have a cohering effect on interests (and which may serve to counter-balance the U.S. pivot to Asia). Yet here too a single, transcendental threat remains absent. Different allies prioritize different threats, and this can generate tension. However, of equal importance are divisions among European allies – not only about threat prioritization but also about committing limited defense resources.

As attention to Article 3 grows in Euro-Atlantic policy circles, can it sustain focus and staying power? Much depends on how the Article is defined, interpreted and, as we argue below, embedded as a shared idea. Article 3 is most relevant to considerations of national resilience as a means toward preparing for aggression as well as the basis for building deterrence against attacks.

Shared Institutions

Cooperation involves actors pursuing their own interests through collaborative means. But cooperation takes place within some form of institutions: sets of rules, procedures, and principles that structure behavior and shape interests.¹⁶ Those institutions leave their own imprint on cooperation efforts and can facilitate or impair the capacity of actors to work together. The literature reminds us that institutions matter in four main ways:

¹⁴ For an example, see R. Bossong and M. Rhinard, "European internal security as a public good," *European Security*, 2012, pp. 1–19.

¹⁵ K.J. Holsti and T. A. Levy, "Bilateral Institutions and Transgovernmental Relations Between Canada and the United States," *International Organization*, 28, Autumn 1974, pp. 875–901; M.A. Pollack, *The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

¹⁶ S. J. Bulmer, "New institutionalism and the governance of the Single European Market," *Journal of European Public Policy*, 5(3), 1998, pp. 365–386. D.C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

First, institutions can be designed in ways that facilitate cooperation through the functions they perform. For realists, institutions mitigate the effects of international anarchy and make cooperation possible: they can ensure information about the motivations of other and thus build confidence in agreements and lessen the likelihood of defection. Institutions, described as international regimes in this approach,¹⁷ reduce transaction costs that may prevent actors, organizations, and states from cooperating in the first instance. Liberals, of course, see institutions more expansively by serving as neutral third parties (i.e. secretariats) which provide policy-relevant information (such as implementation considerations) that may not be available to the various partners and which help with agenda momentum.

Second, institutions create expectations. Even when actors' interests diverge, regularized interaction leads to a sense of collegiality amongst participants. Collegiality is not just a feel-good trait: it may "permit the development of flexible bargaining behavior in which concessions need not be required issue by issue during each period."¹⁸ This trait can be particularly helpful during times in which organizations have to respond quickly (and to overcome cooperation obstacles from their own central governments) to work with international partners. Familiar patterns of interaction, communication, and bargaining represent the types of institutions that should facilitate cooperation under duress.

Third, institutions nurture elite networks and advocacy coalitions, thus facilitating more than generic cooperation. "One of the important but seldom-noted roles of international organizations in world politics is to provide the arena for sub-units of government to turn potential or tacit coalitions into explicit coalitions characterized by direct communication amongst partners."¹⁹

Finally, institutions enforce decisions. High-level political agreements offer broad frameworks for working together (see above), those declarations must be put into operation. International organizations provide the framework for working together, and contain both informal (naming and shaming) and formal (compliance proceedings) mechanisms for enhancing follow-through.²⁰ Whether technical incompatibilities between national systems – cyber security, for instance – can be ironed out has an important bearing on whether cooperation takes place under times of stress.

Several specific dimensions of institutional design must be considered if we are to enhance cooperation capacity:

- ***Institutions must be 'thick'***. There is no institutional shortcut to cooperation. Effective cooperation requires intense, ongoing and rule-bound interaction over long periods of time if interests are to converge and transaction costs (in a crisis) are to be lowered.

¹⁷ R. O. Keohane, "The demand for international regimes," *International Organization*, 36(2), 1982, pp. 325–355.

¹⁸ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Transgovernmental Relations and International Institutions," *World Politics*, 27(1), October 1974, p. 46.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 51; see also Holsti and Levy, op. cit.; P. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization*, 46(1), 1992, pp. 1–35.

²⁰ J. Tallberg, "Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union," *International Organization*, 56(3), 2001, p. 609.

- ***Institutions must be ‘fit for purpose’.*** A slightly paradoxical element follows from the last: while institutions must be rule-rich, in order to shape interests and interaction effectively, they must be capable of ‘delivering’. Many of today’s international cooperation platforms are not designed to handle certain kinds of crises, and the preparatory steps they require. The ability to draw in critical information and intelligence, to horizon-scan effectively, to respond in improvised ways when necessary, and to remain legitimate in the eyes of elites and the public is difficult— but necessary.²¹
- ***Institutions must facilitate practical implementation.*** Nations are famously reluctant to delegate power to ‘outsiders’ to enforce compliance; only in the EU has this been done with legal, binding effect—and only with some ‘sovereignty safeguards’ in the Area of Justice, Freedom and Security. Moreover, effective implementation is often lost in the political ‘glow’ that accompanies high-flying declarations. The relative lack of implementation effort regarding ‘host nation’ support is worth noting as an obstacle to effective cooperation here. But there are other ways for institutions like NATO and the EU to enhance compliance: through systematic surveillance of implementation progress; by providing resources to assist with implementation; and by ‘naming and shaming’.²²

The Current Status of Shared Institutions in the Euro-Atlantic Community

Europe and the United States do not lack for institutional frameworks: transatlantic cooperation takes place amidst a veritable alphabet soup of mechanisms and institutions. Many observers focus first on NATO, which remains an essential transatlantic security institution and is busier than managing crises in Libya, Afghanistan and Ukraine – and is now tackling cyber security and (mis)information campaigns as it approaches a strategic rethink. But some areas of cooperation, including law enforcement, domestic intelligence, civil security and disaster response are well beyond NATO's area of competence, and are better handled in other venues. NATO could – and should – complement such efforts, for instance by helping (as it has already done) with security for mass public events, dealing with the consequences of various natural disasters, or coping with a catastrophic terrorist event, particularly one involving agents of mass destruction.

But we should turn also to the EU, which represents the densest form of institutional cooperation – even across the Atlantic. Not only does cooperation run broad and deep – a critical consideration when designing resilience-enhancing initiatives across the policy spectrum – but the two sides are also enmeshed in security interdependencies. Add to this the fact that the EU is increasingly the institution that European governments use to coordinate their own security policies and action, and it is hard to deny that the EU will be America’s essential partner in many of the areas beyond NATO’s traditional purview and capacities.

The contrast between the highest institutional fora for NATO and for U.S.-EU exchanges is striking. EU-U.S. summits are infrequent and cumbersome. They are not embedded in any

²¹ M. Rhinard, “The Legitimacy of Transboundary Crisis Management in the European Union”. Conference paper presented to the ECPR SGEU Conference, Trento, Italy, June 2015.

²² C. Knill and D. Lehmkuhl, "How Europe Matters: Different Mechanisms of Europeanization," *European Integration Online Papers*, 3(7), 1999.

organized preparatory machinery, whereby committee work and the resultant policy recommendations are elevated to the political level for final determination. Suggestions to strengthen the processes underpinning this potentially important Euro-Atlantic forum²³ have not yet been met. Compare this to regular NATO summits, which by and large are well prepared and result in guidelines to be implemented by allies and by the secretariat. As many policy areas increasingly overlap between the two multilateral organizations, many have advocated improved cooperation between them. One way to highlight this point would be to merge the NATO summit and the EU-US summit into one set of high level meetings. An initial step toward such a linking of venues was taken in the July 2016 Warsaw Summit.

Shared Ideas

Many factors that condition the ‘capacity to cooperate’ reflect non-material explanations for political outcomes.²⁴ Managing severe disturbances depends on perceptions: first, whether actors perceive a crisis as emerging, and second, how they frame a problem and act upon it.²⁵ Whether partners share ‘mental maps’ is a key determinant of cooperation capacity.

The first place to look for ideational lubricants to cooperation is in the epistemological bonds between networks. Networks share belief systems that can have a strong effect on cooperation before and after major disturbances. Whereas opposing beliefs may inhibit cooperation, common belief systems have a strong ‘binding’ effect on those that subscribe to them.²⁶ Similar findings are found in the ‘epistemic communities’ approach. Such a community is a “professional group that believes in the same cause-and-effect relationships, truth-tests to accept them, and shares common values; its members share a common understanding of a problem and its solutions.”²⁷ A community links professionals within particular issue areas, especially issue areas characterized by uncertainty and complexity. Networks, in general, facilitate cooperation through the ‘creation of collective meaning’²⁸—a type of shared sense-making²⁹ in which members diffuse a way of viewing policy problems and the ways to address them. Since these networks generate consensus on ‘cause and effect’ relations in the problem being tackled, cooperation tends to be smooth and consensual. When the community imparts its own perspective to decision-makers in different states, that

²³ See D. S. Hamilton and M. Rhinard, "Towards a Transatlantic Solidarity Clause," in P. Pawlak, ed., *The EU-US Security and Justice Agenda in Action*. Paris: EU-ISS Chaillot Papers, 2011.

²⁴ J. Goldstein and R. O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993; P.A. Hall, *The Political Power of Economic Ideas*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989.

²⁵ R. A. Boin, P. 't Hart, E.K. Stern and B. Sundelius, *The Politics of Crisis Management: Understanding Public Leadership When it Matters Most*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

²⁶ P. Sabatier and H. Jenkins-Smith, eds., *Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

²⁷ A wide variety of studies have identified epistemic communities at work in the international policy environment. For an overview see Haas, op. cit., p. 55.

²⁸ E. Adler and P.M. Haas, "Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program," *International Organization*, 46(1), 1992, pp. 367–390.

²⁹ R.A. Boin, et.al, 2005, op. cit.

perspective "may, in turn, influence the interests and behavior of other states, thereby increasing the likelihood of convergent state behavior and international policy coordination."³⁰

A second set of ideational factors that influence cooperation concerns the presence of trust. This notoriously slippery concept is a central precondition for the presence of 'security communities' in the international relations literature. Adler and Barnett, inspired by the earlier writings of Karl Deutsch, argue that states within a security community are much more likely to cooperate and assist, rather than wage war upon, one another.³¹ The determining factor for this state of affairs is the presence of trust generated by increasing transactions: at a certain point, military conflict becomes unthinkable. Management scholars also find trust to be a key antecedent for cooperation. Ring and Van de Ven defined trust as an individual's confidence in the good will of the others in a given group and belief that the others will make efforts consistent with the group's goal. A belief that others will faithfully apply those efforts to achieve group goals may result in *informal* cooperation; a belief that a formal hierarchy is in place to reward cooperative may produce *formal* cooperation.³²

But how, precisely, can shared ideas be used to build an enhanced 'capacity to cooperate'? Three points from the above discussion stand out:

- ***Build and promote strategic concepts.*** Shared ideas exist at different depths of cognitive adoption with some superficially adopted and others driving deep-seated mindsets.³³ Moving from the former to the latter is an imprecise exercise, but can be facilitated in initial stages by developing internally coherent, operationally useful concepts that appear to fit with nations' interests (see above). Here, 'forward resilience' could prove useful in starting this process.
- ***Embed the concept in policy networks.*** The discussion of advocacy coalition frameworks and epistemic communities above highlighted the cohering effect of norms within networks. However, different concepts often co-exist within communities, separated by those that are deep-seated and those that are purely strategic. Achieving the former requires examination, debate, and reflection of new concepts, which over time can become increasingly embedded.
- ***Trust.*** The presence of trust is not easily engineered, and can only be gained over time and through positive experience. Here the time frame is counted not in years but in decades. Until 1814, Denmark and Sweden were hereditary enemies and fought numerous wars over territory and clashing interests in the North. After 1905, the notion of solving differences by military force eventually became inconceivable to either party. The evolution of this fundamental trust across nations need to be better understood by scholars and by practitioners with an interest in developing workable approaches for 'forward resilience' based on an acceptance that resilience is shared.

³⁰ Haas, op. cit., p. 4.

³¹ E. Adler, E. And M.N. Barnett (eds) *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

³² P.S. Ring and A.H. Van de Ven, "Developmental processes in cooperative interorganizational relationships", *Academy of Management Review*, 19(90–118), 1994. See also M Argyle, *Cooperation: the basis of sociability*, London: Routledge, 1991.

³³ J.K. Jacobsen, J.K., "Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy" *World Politics*, 47, pp.283–310, 1995.

The current status of shared ideas among security policy elites of the Euro-Atlantic Community

That community is networked through a wide variety of groupings, not least the think-tank-rich environment in Washington, DC. A proliferation of reports, texts and institutionalized journals serve as ‘transmission belts’ for the affirmation of classic ideas and the introduction of new ones. However, several questions remain regarding the presence—or more precisely, the staying power—of shared ideas. One is the extent to which ‘outliers’ can be brought into the conceptual fold. Not only are some NATO members not committed believers in some prevalent ideas (resilience?), aggressively pedaled counter-narratives are on the rise in the East and South.

There is not yet an established strategic culture or an epistemic community underpinning actions among security professionals in the Euro-Atlantic community. Not only do divisions exist across the Atlantic, perhaps more importantly they exist among European allies and partners. Moreover, within these nations considerable differences in strategic outlooks and even value preferences have been documented during recent years. As noted years ago by EU scholars, multiple-level dynamics are operating in the security and defense areas that often overtake traditional single-level and inter-governmental deliberations.

Ways ‘Forward’ To Resilience

This chapter has examined what a high ‘capacity to cooperate’ looks like, how it contributes to shared resilience and moving toward forward resilience, and how it can be achieved. Specifically, we have looked at the importance of shared interests, shared institutions, and shared ideas – all key building blocks of cooperation as set out in scholarly research. Our analysis confirms that more practical work needs to be done in the pursuit of forward resilience in the Euro-Atlantic Community, namely in each of the three key building blocks.

- ☑ ***Shared interests:*** Shared ‘sense-making,’ with a clear sense of the goals at play, and a convincing narrative regarding the cost-benefit of cooperation, will enhance cooperation capacities. In an enlarged EU and NATO, this is a huge challenge, but think tanks play a major role. More intra-Alliance work is required on forming a shared and enduring threat assessment that can be the basis for strategic direction and settling resource priorities.
- ☑ ***Shared institutions:*** While there is no shortage of transatlantic discussion structures relevant to building resilience, many seem tired and unresponsive. A better approach might be to focus on sector-based trans-governmental institutions; specifically, on early warning and alert systems that benefit both sides of the Atlantic and are key for forward resilience. Expert-level working groups are crucial. Agreement on a set of guidelines or a media-grabbing ‘action plan’ is not the same as ensuring the execution of such a hallowed document. The most difficult step for NATO ahead lies at the operational level—when busy officials and experts are expected to transform the baseline requirements into actionable improvements at home and in the near abroad. Much follow-through and implementation work will be required after the Warsaw Summit if novel concepts and the baseline requirements are to set roots in the community. Scholars and practitioners working on EU processes have considerable experience and many insights into this part of the work ahead. This is another good reason for strengthening the cooperation among EU experts and those working on security and resilience in a NATO context. Merging NATO and U.S.-EU summits would carry some symbolic weight toward

facilitating such mutual learning among sector-based officials and experts engaged in both organizations. In July 2016 in Warsaw, a first step for such a joint meeting was taken.

- ☑ ***Shared ideas:*** ‘Forward resilience’ could play a role in forging a set of shared ideas. This approach involves many practical steps to enhance security inside and around the Alliance. In the aftermath of the July 2016 NATO summit, considerable staff work is now underway to operationalize concrete, baseline requirements for resilience in seven vital areas of concern. Several closed expert workshops are taking place. Yet we must not lose sight of the cohering concepts that offer signposts for the way forward. The necessary mindsets and cognitive frames that guide actions must be developed in collaboration with political, policy, and analyst communities, and defined in a way that makes their benefits crystal-clear to all parties.

The previous point reminds us that shared interests, institutions and ideas are mutually constitutive and interactive: the presence of one provides a facilitating condition for the others. In this regard, attention should be placed on the two factors that can be most easily influenced: institutions and ideas. Enhanced working group interaction at the operational level (baseline requirements) should be pursued hand-in-hand with the elaboration and embedding of an acceptance of the shared notion and of the necessity of moving toward ‘forward resilience’ as a guiding frame for action.