Chapter Three

Turkey and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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While Turkey opted for neutrality during World War II, it was faced with choosing a side during the Cold War. Siding with Western countries was not a difficult choice for Turkey due to the imminent Soviet threat it was facing itself. Turkey's choice was also historically consistent, as it chose to side with the West ever since the late periods of the Ottoman Empire, and NATO membership clearly demonstrated Turkey's alignment with the Western world.

Turkey had already been reaping financial and political benefits from the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan, as the West considered Turkey a natural barrier against the Soviet threat in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. In those years, Turkey adopted a multi-party system in order to strengthen its democracy and be one step closer to NATO membership. This was an important decision, even though certain European countries opposed Turkey's NATO membership because of a perceived lack of fulfilling the Alliance's democratic criteria. Yet, Turkey's military support for the Korean War with nearly 25,000 soldiers made it easier to gain legitimacy in the eyes of its Western allies. Turkey formally joined NATO in February 1952, a mere three years after the organization's establishment.

Relations between Turkey and NATO changed over time according to shifting global strategies, policies, and interests. While NATO's first aim was the protection against war, as time went on, the Alliance included the securing of daily life from any threat in the post-Cold War era as well as borderless humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping methods. Furthermore, it aimed to protect against terror threats following the 9/11 ter-

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rorist attacks in the United States. NATO’s changing agenda was pointed out by then-Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who stated, “After the Cold War ended, and when some felt NATO had lost its reason to exist, the Alliance turned into an engine for change. It reached out to countries all over Europe and Central Asia, helped former foes become friends, opened its door to new members, and took on a significant role in managing security crises.” Humanitarian intervention, “borderless defense” and “security ideals” became the new missions of NATO.5

In this chapter, we will attempt to explain NATO’s long history by using a three-phase model, providing an overview of Turkey’s priorities, interests, concerns, and contributions to NATO.

First Phase of NATO

In the early years of the Cold War, hard power, military, and economic means of countries were considered as the only media of international rivalry. A legacy of WWII, countries focused primarily on “defense” strategies against potential threats. The armaments race between the Soviet Union and the United States (i.e., a bipolar world order) were at the center of the world’s attention. Western countries needed a collective defense mechanism against the Soviet Union, and NATO satisfied that need.

While NATO’s first goal was to create a collective defense of hard power in preparation for a possible war, it also offered political values and strategies. NATO’s policy to combine military and non-military elements such as national resources, diplomacy, and political culture to improve nations’ interests in peace and in war, was not limited to a military or defense mechanism for security threats, but also included the formation of a common identity and shared norms that could shape states’ policies and economies: Firstly, for increased democratization, and later for a liberal free market in the long-term.6

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Turkey’s army was significant for NATO due to its geographically proximity to the Soviet Union. In the first phase, Turkey’s contribution to the Alliance was described according to its real estate value which depended on its geographical position. As the Soviet regime became a nuclear power threat, the U.S. attempted to collect security intelligence and form structured air bases in Turkey, for example in Incirlik. Nearly 16 intelligence bases were established in Turkey after the second half of the 1950s. Moreover, Turkey began to stock up on nuclear armaments after 1959 with NATO’s focus on nuclear gun power. In this notion, Turkey first began to stock war planes structured for nuclear air strikes called F-100D/F Super Sabre. Turkey was introduced to Honest John rockets in 1959, Jupiter missiles followed in 1961, and Howitzers in 1965.

The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the military cooperation agreement between Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and the United States, was a major step forward towards Turkey’s nuclear armament. As the number of NATO intelligence bases and nuclear armaments in Turkey increased, Turkey and the Alliance developed a mutual dependency. However, according to Nur Criss, Turkey did not benefit from nuclear gun agreements and took on big risks as a country that shares a border with the Soviet Union.

After the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, a period of détente followed between the United States and the Soviet Union, and NATO adopted a “flexible response” strategy to the Soviet Union. As the United States’ and NATO’s attitude towards the Soviet Union changed, the composition of United States funds to Turkey also changed from military to economic

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aid. Therefore, Turkey did not receive the expected strategic arms from the United States.14

Another important problem in this period was the Cyprus crisis. Turkey had sent war planes to Cyprus after Greeks attacked Turkish settlements in 1963. The Johnson Letter had urged Turkey not to use weapons supplied by the United States’ military aid without NATO’s consent.15 After the U.S. and NATO criticized Turkey’s Cyprus intervention, Turkey suspended the use of its air bases, intelligence, and listening services, and prohibited its Western allies to stock their nuclear arms in Turkey.16 For instance, Turkey denied permission to American U-2 spy flights from the Incirlik airbase.17 The Cyprus issue limited Turkey’s contribution to transatlantic security in two ways: First, competition between the two NATO allies harmed NATO’s general mechanism as Greece and Turkey were on opposing sides of the issue, and secondly, Turkey’s usage of its military power for its national priorities rather than those of NATO.18

In this phase, Turkey experienced three military coups and struggled with the rising Kurdish issue, especially the establishment of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1978. Increased political, economic, and social problems were perceived as the reasons for these military coups, in addition to the growing PKK threat and leftist terror. Turkish military’s foreign policy priority in the 1960, 1971, and 1980 coups d’état was to declare its loyalty to the Alliance. For example, Commander Samiş Küçüks, who read the coup declaration of 1960 on the radio, highlighted Turkey’s loyalty to NATO and CENTO.19 The 1980 military coup in Turkey has a particular place in Turkey-NATO relations, as relations with NATO—which had been problematic for a while because of the Cyprus intervention—began strengthening again following this coup d’état. For example, before the coup, Turkey had an embargo in place against Greece for the latter’s return to the NATO’s military wing. Although diplomatic negotiations started earlier, Turkey’s lifting of the embargo was enacted after the 1980 military coup.

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The tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War meant the birth of new security concerns and strategies, and a new phase of NATO.

Second Phase of NATO

With end of the Cold War, NATO focused on the widening of its domain and going beyond “regional borders.” Conflicts in the Balkans and the Middle East also gave NATO the opportunity to create a cross-border influence. In this sense, the Gulf War was a turning point for NATO’s strategies. With a shift in focus from collective defense to collective security, Turkey also gained a new role as a NATO member. In the post-Cold War era, “Turkey transformed in strategic importance for the West, from being a flank country to a frontline country during the first Gulf War in 1991.”20 With a new strategy of collective security, NATO undertook the responsibility of securing “other” countries. Turkey, among others, was the closest country to the Gulf States, and as a NATO ally, Turkey occupied a crucial role securing the Gulf region.21 Turkey became the only effective NATO ally in the region after the Shah of Iran was overthrown in 1979. Turkey’s role in the 1990s was crucial not only because of its geographic and strategic importance, but also for its strong military contribution to conflicts such as those in the Western Balkans.

The Bosnia and Kosovo interventions, also known as the European Union Force Althea and Kosovo Force, respectively, can be seen as the primary examples of how NATO’s general strategy changed after the Cold War around the idea of “collective security.” These interventions were the first peacebuilding policies of NATO. In 1993, Dieter Mahncke highlighted that conflicts such as the break-up of Yugoslavia “may simply serve as bad examples, gradually undermining the rules of conduct of the (West) European security community.”22 So in NATO’s second phase, its aim was not just seen as defense mechanism for national security or for the preservation of “a way of life,” instead, NATO aimed to “absorb” “the

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Pursuing this ideal, the goal was to create a secure community of common values rather than establish a common defense. The Second Strategic Concept was announced at the Washington Summit in 1999 and according to this concept, “the ‘Western security community’ not only expanded its norms to the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, but by now it had also been militarily intervening to ‘put things right’ whenever there was a humanitarian catastrophe.”

Although NATO’s “grand strategy” had changed in the second phase, Turkey’s geographic location continued to be its primary asset in its relations with NATO. Turkey’s active monitoring and pro-active role in Gulf War, KFOR in Kosovo, and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina were fundamentally depended on its geographical proximity to the conflict regions. The Kosovo intervention was contentious because it happened without the approval of the UN Security Council. Yet, Turkey once again showed its regional and military power to the world, while also setting an example of how the European and American perspectives can differ from one other according to their interests, and that Turkey may feel obligated to choose a side.

Even though Turkey had been part of NATO operations more often than any other European country, it still could not gain full membership to the European Union. Even though being geographically close to Europe became increasingly important after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey was still closer to the U.S. because of bilateral military ties. Different reasons can be listed to explain Turkey’s changing strategic, institutional, and political balances and interests between Europe and the U.S. “One area of division within the West is over a host of multilateral agreements on human rights, arms control, and the environment. On these, Turkey’s initial position has been similar to the American [position], but over time it [Turkey] has changed its policies to move [them] closer to European standards.”

Turkey’s convergence policy toward Europe continued with the AK Party governing after 2002. Yet before this, the 9/11 attacks were a clear turning point for NATO.

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Third Phase of NATO

September 11, 2001 opened a new tab for NATO’s security concerns and defense mechanism. After the traumatic terrorist attack, it was understood that security threats are not solely the function of the size and capacity of “arms” or “guns” of a country: the enemy can be a small and mobile terrorist group. Because the threat could result from a terror groups rather than a single country, security should be multi-functional and it should have sustainability even under changing conditions. During NATO’s third phase, the Alliance widened its approach to provide security under peace keeping and peace building strategies. While before 9/11 stability was NATO’s primary aim, after 9/11 it began to focus on maintaining peace with additional methods. The establishment of the NATO Center of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism that stresses importance of state’s diplomatic and soft power in fight against terror, is one of the main indicator of the changes in NATO’s approach.26

While NATO has changed its perspective and scope, Turkey’s role in NATO has also transformed. Turkey’s soft power gained prominence as much as its hard power did,27 especially after the AK Party took power. NATO established the Component Command Air and the Land Command in Izmir in line with its goal of 2002 Strategic Concept transformation focused on modernizing the Alliance’s military capacities to turn it as a force that can move quickly to wherever it is needed.28 After the AK Party came to power, Turkey’s military strategies also began to change, and its foreign policy was no longer solely based on its hard power capacity. Turkey’s soft power gained more importance in this period, especially with the AK Party “zero problem with neighbors” strategy.29 While its policies were found to be close to Europe because of Turkey’s accelerated EU membership process and legal reforms in order to achieve membership, Turkey maintained strategic relations with the U.S., to the point that the AK Party’s reforms were interpreted as “Americanization”, reforms by some authors.30 The AK Party defined its policies based on a rule of law,

free market economy, strong civil society, and universal human rights. Yet, the party did not ignore regional relations, and after the second election victory in 2007, Turkey developed closer ties with the Middle East.

Although changing strategies have brought new necessities and roles for Turkey, Turkey’s military power has always been important for its role in NATO. When NATO started a war in Afghanistan, it needed Turkey’s military power and demanded Turkish soldiers. Although there were rumors that some 25,000 Turkish soldiers would be sent to Afghanistan under British command, in reality only 1,400 Turkish soldiers were sent there and the U.K. was not in command.

Compared to Afghanistan, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was more controversial because many European countries opposed intervention. George Robertson, then-NATO Secretary-General demanded the deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq, but Germany and France opposed it. The diverging opinions on the two sides of the Atlantic resulted once again in insecurity for Turkey; Turkey was more Europe-oriented as a result of the EU membership process, yet it was not ready for a division with its traditional ally, the U.S.

The Turkish Parliament’s veto against the deployment of American soldiers in Turkey for the Iraq operation was a large defeat for Turkey-U.S. relations, especially for the United States. For the first time in history, Turkey rejected to be a part of the U.S.’ plans for the region. After only one year, the NATO Istanbul Summit opened a new chapter for Turkey’s relations with both the U.S. and Europe. The meeting of the NATO heads of state and government, held in Istanbul in June 2004, resulted in a decision to broaden the Alliance’s presence in Afghanistan, accept to support Iraq with military training, introduce a new Alliance initiative, and adopt measures to develop NATO’s operational capabilities. The meeting broadened operational capacities and partnerships between


Turkey and the U.S. Following this meeting, negotiations for Turkey’s full membership to the EU began in 2005.

Soon after, in 2007, Turkey and the U.S. were faced with another crisis. As PKK attacks intensified, Turkey requested U.S. support in the fight with the PKK in Iraq. However, the U.S. did not accept this proposal, and instead the Turkish Parliament authorized a military operation in northern Iraq against the PKK. Despite the rise of tensions between Turkey and the United States, matters did not get out of hand because of mutual interests and dependence.

The Lisbon Summit in November 2010 was marked with an important agreement. The allies decided to structure a strong ballistic missile defense system against possible ballistic attacks from countries such as Iran. Another significant decision of the Summit was the Phased Adaptive Approach, aimed at structuring ballistic missile defense consultation, command, and control arrangements in Europe. Yet, accepting to develop and settle Ballistic Missile Defense System was a difficult decision for Turkey because it could potentially damage Turkey’s relations with Iran and Russia. It is argued that this system could not contribute to Turkey’s defense against ballistic missiles as it would cause Turkey to face new security threats from Iran and Russia. On the other hand, the Lisbon Summit fostered closer NATO-Turkey ties because it showed that they share common concerns in trade, energy, and environmental issues.

Turkey’s increasing role and power within NATO became clear during its support for the Libya Operation in 2011, as NATO needed Turkey’s support for Libya’s democratization process. Even though Turkey was not ready to take an active role at the beginning of the operation, (after France and the U.K. joined the intervention) Turkey also became part of Operation Unified Protector, even though it did not end up using its air force.

Turkey’s NATO membership does not merely arrange Turkey’s relations with NATO members. It ensures that Turkey acts in line with these countries’ common interests; the various agreements signed to regulate relations with non-NATO European countries should be considered an extension of Turkey’s NATO membership. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and Berlin Plus arrangements are important agreements in this regard. The PfP program was established in 1994 to allow partner countries to

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establish an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. On December 16, 2002, after the announcement of the ESDP and Berlin Plus, arrangements were made to provide the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities in order to regulate and institutionalize relations between NATO and the EU. With the implementation of the Nice provisions, arrangements were made regarding the participation of non-EU members to the ESDP. Even though task-sharing was established between the two organizations through these arrangements, actual collaboration could not be achieved. These agreements targeted the building of strong relations between non-NATO and NATO members by offering diplomatic interactions, but even though NATO and the EU attempted to establish common ground among these countries, diplomatic crises and political imbalances have more power to dictate relations.

Recent tensions with EU countries are assessed through Turkey’s NATO membership and PfP agreements. For instance, relations between Turkey and Austria became strained after Austria called on the EU to freeze the negotiation process with Turkey and decided to prohibit Turkish politicians to join political activities for the April 16 Referendum. After Turkey reacted to Austria by rejecting cooperation agreements with non-NATO member countries such as the Berlin Plus and PfP, NATO warned both countries not to close the door for the negotiation process.

A Brief History of Relations between Turkey and “Junior” NATO

As Turkey had balancing policies between the European and U.S. side of NATO, it systematized relations with the European Union as a member of the Western European Union, also known as “junior” NATO. Before the establishment of NATO, in March 1948, the Western European Union (the WEU) was created through the Treaty on Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense, signed by the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. To provide security against the Soviet threat, the WEU embraced a multidimensional collaboration in military, economic, and social terms. However,

37 On April 16, 2017, Turkey held a referendum on the amendment of the Constitution which envisaged the transition towards a presidential form of governing. It was approved with a 51.41 percent majority.
with the establishment of NATO in 1949, the WEU lost its significance in terms of its military partnership and security defense. The Rome Declaration of October 27, 1984 emphasized the importance of reactivating the WEU and the necessity of intervening in crisis areas outside Europe. For the first time, the European Defense and Security Identity (ESDP) was brought to NATO’s agenda during the 1994 Brussels summit. After the meetings that the WEU and NATO held in Birmingham, Berlin, and Brussels in 1996, it was decided to develop the ESDP within NATO. Because of the changing political geography of Europe after the Cold War, Europe gave much more importance to its security. Conflicting interests between Europe and the U.S. led to the establishment of the European Defense and Security Identity.38

Most of the involved countries in the European Defense and Security Identity were also NATO members, including non-EU member countries such as Turkey, Canada, the United States, and Norway. The main concern of these countries was to enforce the Alliance’s resources to be in line with EU decisions, and to prevent non-EU countries to object to this.39 That situation meant great risks for Turkey as well, as 14 of the 16 countries that were in the EU could intervene close to Turkey, either geographically or historically, or both.40 In this respect, it was reasonable for Turkey to want to become involved in the planning process as a non-EU member country, yet, EU member countries did not approve of this. Although Turkey wanted to have a say in any intervention in which its national interests could be affected, EU countries objected and preferred to pressure Turkey instead of the U.S.41 With a failed attempt at resolving this conflict with the Ankara Treaty signed in 2000, this issue remains unresolved.

The Future of NATO and Turkey Relations?

As mentioned before, the perception of security threats changed in recent decades, shifting from large-scale state-to-state wars to threats from small, but effective and mobile terrorist groups against a state or an ideology. While NATO has attempted to change its strategies according to this new framework of global threats, Turkey’s security threats and its

41 Ibid.
fight against different terror groups such as ISIS, PKK, PYD, or FETÖ, have not received direct support from NATO.

While Turkey fights with ISIS and Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria, it also struggles with PKK and FETÖ within its national borders. Each terrorist group poses a different type of security threat for Turkey. In addition to a coup attempt organized by FETÖ, Turkey has suffered from multiple terror attacks in recent years planned by the PKK or ISIS. Even though ISIS is a common enemy of the entire world, Turkey has taken responsibility to fight against ISIS because of its geographical proximity. Turkey also took initiative in Syria and became part of the issue with the aim of ending the war. Yet, while Turkey struggles with these multidimensional security threats, it is difficult to say whether it received enough support from NATO.

It seems that the problem is not one of Turkey-NATO relations but rather of NATO itself. During the long course of the Syrian civil war, with acts of terrorism and crimes against humanity, neither NATO as an institution nor its member states took initiative for peace building, stability, or humanitarian intervention. Even though it is an existential question for NATO, its ineffectiveness in the Syrian civil war also meant a need for different partners. For instance, while the Geneva Peace Talks headed by the United Nations could not reach a solution for the Syrian civil war, the Astana Talks governed by Russia, Iran, and Turkey, resulted in positive consequences in terms of building a peacemaking process in Syria. Such new partnerships are far from strategic, and pose a risk for the future of Turkey and transatlantic relations.

Turkey and NATO have shared common interests and have feared common threats for many years. Considering recent regional security problems, cooperation between NATO and Turkey is inevitable. Aside from the fight against international terrorism, regional peacekeeping operations, and a civil war in Syria, NATO and Turkey have mutual opportunities and areas for cooperation in cyber security, immigration and refugee issues, climate change, and the prevention and managing of natural disasters. At the same time, Turkey’s tensions with European countries may

42 The Geneva Peace Talks were formally announced on February 1, 2016 by the United Nations in order to find a solution for Syrian Civil War. The United States joined the Geneva Peace Talks.

43 The Astana Talks were started on January 23, 2017 under the leadership of Russia, Turkey, and Iran to create a peacemaking process in Syria.
lead to Turkey’s shift to the U.S. side of NATO, especially following Trump’s election. However, Turkey’s connection with both sides of the NATO Alliance, and the principle of “equal load sharing” could be useful in this regard. Discussing Turkey’s relations with European countries in a NATO context, and abandoning the threatening of Turkey within the EU membership process will likely repair relationships. An increase in the frequency of high-level NATO visits, the development of communication between allied countries, and the clarification of article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty\(^{44}\) as a defense burden if Turkey encounters an armed threat, will increase confidence in NATO.

\(^{44}\)“The principle of collective defense is at the very heart of NATO’s founding treaty. It remains a unique and enduring principle that binds its members together, committing them to protect each other and setting a spirit of solidarity within the Alliance.” (NATO OTAN, Collective Defense-Article 5, March 22, 2017, http://www.nato.int/cps/cn/natohq/topics_110496.htm).