

Chapter Five

Turkey and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe¹

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The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is a cooperative and comprehensive security organization, and Turkey is one of its founding participants. This chapter analyzes the relations between Turkey and the OSCE, arguing that Turkey's understanding of comprehensive security and multilateralism are compatible with the OSCE's approach to world politics, and the two entities are well-positioned to tackle today's international challenges. The chapter first scrutinizes the OSCE's role in world politics, as a comprehensive cooperative security organization that focuses on political dialogue among its participating states and promotes peace, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Second, the chapter reflects on Turkey-OSCE relations from the point of view of comprehensive security and multilateralism. Third, the chapter looks into the role of Turkey and the OSCE in the process of transition we are currently witnessing in global dynamics. The chapter concludes that Turkey's contributions to cooperative security in Europe within the OSCE framework are part of its multilateral approach to world politics and its comprehensive approach to security.

The OSCE: A Comprehensive and Cooperative Security Framework²

Established as a standing conference with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 (issued after a series of meetings and conferences which started in 1972)—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) acquired a full-fledged institutional framework at the Budapest Summit

¹ The author is thankful to H.E. Ambassador Rauf Engin Soysal, Turkey's Permanent Representative to the OSCE for kindly sharing his valuable and insightful views on Turkey-OSCE relations.

² The historical information provided under this section title mainly builds on a former article of the author: Cebeci, Münevver. "The OSCE: A Cooperative Framework for European Security," *Economic Dialogue Turkey*, Vol. 45-46, 1999, pp. 16-24.

held in 1994 and became the OSCE. Since its inception as the CSCE, it has functioned in three major dimensions (baskets) of security: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human. These baskets refer to a wide range of tasks undertaken by the organization: from conflict prevention, confidence and security building measures, arms control and peacekeeping to promoting respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, and, combating terrorism, corruption, and human and drug trafficking. In its initial years, the CSCE was primarily concerned with the first basket of security issues and the major aim was to preserve the *status quo* and to develop confidence and security building measures between the two blocs of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, with the adoption of the Charter of Paris in November 1990, the major focus of the CSCE shifted towards human aspects of security, with special emphasis on the promotion/protection of democracy, human rights, minority rights, and the rule of law.

The OSCE's comprehensive security approach pertains to a broadened view of security which encompasses economic and environmental governance, and, promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, besides political and military cooperation.³ Such an approach assumes that various aspects of security are interwoven and it is impossible to ignore one aspect of security while trying to deal with another. For example, most of the conflicts in the world emanate from scarcity of resources (e.g., energy and water) or socio-economic deprivation. Therefore, it becomes impossible to solve those conflicts only through a military approach to security. This basic example reveals that a comprehensive approach to security—not only in terms of the issues addressed but also in terms of the tools used—is crucial in avoiding conflict and establishing peace.

On the other hand, the comprehensive approach (which also pertains to the indivisibility of security) requires the involvement of all stakeholders (i.e., states, civil society organizations, etc.) in the processes of tackling the risks and threats and establishing peace. This is the premise on which the OSCE's cooperative approach is built: that the participating states have common stake in European security and that they should therefore cooperate to prevent conflicts, build confidence, tackle economic and

³ OSCE. "The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security - An Overview of Major Milestones," SEC.GAL/100/09, June 17, 2009, OSCE Secretariat Conflict Prevention Centre Operations Service, Vienna, p. 1.

social problems, and promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. In other words, the OSCE's definition of cooperative security is based on the assumption that "co-operation is beneficial to all participating States while the insecurity in and/or of one State can affect the well-being of all" and, thus, "no participating State should enhance its security at the expense of the security of another participating State."⁴ On the other hand, this cooperative approach within the OSCE framework is also built on "non-hegemonic behavior on the part of participating states" as well as "mutual accountability, transparency and confidence at both the domestic and the foreign policy level."⁵ This means that all OSCE states have equal status and they take their decisions on the basis of consensus.⁶

The OSCE defines itself as a "unique"⁷ organization because of its wide geography which encompasses an area from Vancouver to Vladivostok and because of its status as a political organization, rather than a treaty-based one.⁸ This latter point is important in the sense that although the OSCE is not a treaty-organization and its decisions are not legally binding (but only politically binding), it possesses most of the characteristics of a treaty organization; such as standing decision-making bodies, permanent institutions (e.g., a secretariat) and staff, regular financial resources and field offices.⁹ Another crucial point in defining the OSCE is that it is the only security organization in Europe which is considered as a regional arrangement for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation in the sense of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.

The CSCE process was launched during the Cold War, at a time when the two blocs entered a period of *détente*. The Helsinki process was initiated by the Soviet Union, which was seeking an opportunity to legitimize the division of Europe. With the signing of the Helsinki Final Act at the Helsinki Summit of July 30- August 1, 1975, the CSCE began to function as a platform for meeting and exchanging views between the Eastern and

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ OSCE. The OSCE Handbook - 25 Year (1975-2000), (Vienna: Secretariat of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2000): p. 3.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ The author of this chapter is against defining actors as "unique" for reasons of theoretical orientation.

⁸ OSCE. The OSCE Handbook - 25 Year (1975-2000): p. 3.

⁹ Ibid.

Western blocs (the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, and all other European countries except for Albania). This means that the CSCE was launched as a transatlantic cooperative security framework and aimed at confidence and security-building between the two blocs. Nevertheless, this was not an easy task, and the entire Helsinki process was politicized by the two sides because they had different interpretations of its purpose. The Western European and transatlantic participants regarded the process as one which would tackle military security issues and help achieve free flow of individuals, information and ideas between the East and the West, whereas the Eastern Bloc expected that it would attain legitimacy, ensure non-intervention in internal affairs, and receive economic aid.¹⁰ Contrary to Soviet expectations, the organization triggered transformation in the East towards democracy and human rights, and, it transgressed the divisions of Europe. This was mainly due to dialogue and enhanced relations between the two blocs, as the CSCE “offered participating States a permanent channel of communication and a long-term program of co-operation” and the series of follow-up meetings that took place after the Helsinki Summit (e.g., in Madrid in November 1980 and in Vienna in November 1986) were significant in the thawing of the Cold War.¹¹ Increased economic cooperation (capital and technology transfers, and business contacts), as well as free movement of people, ideas, and information became a catalyst for change in Eastern Europe.

Reflecting the nature of the Cold War and the fine balance between the Western and Eastern expectations of the cooperation, the major focus of the CSCE at its inception (in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975) was the first basket which was guided by ten principles. These included sovereign equality, refraining from the threat and use of force, inviolability of frontiers, non-intervention internal affairs, respect for fundamental freedoms (freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, etc.), among others. The Helsinki Final Act also incorporated a document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament and the mechanisms that it brought developed into a system of measures concerning prior notification and observation of military maneuvers/activities,

¹⁰ Bloed, Arie. *From Helsinki to Vienna: Basic Documents of the Helsinki Process - Vol. 2*, (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990): p. 2; and K.M. Fierke and Antje Wiener “Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement,” in *The Social Construction of Europe*, edited by Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen and Antje Wiener (eds.), (London: SAGE, 2001): p. 126.

¹¹ OSCE. *The OSCE Handbook*, (Vienna: OSCE Press and Public Information Section, 2007): pp. 4-5.

defense planning, information on armed forces, risk-reduction, and constraints on activities of armed forces.¹²

The Helsinki Final Act also laid down principles concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms, including free movement of persons, free access to information, and freedom of expression which were new for the Eastern Bloc at the time. The acceptance of these principles paved the way for future provisions that would give the CSCE the right to intervene in the internal affairs of its participants in cases of serious violations of its principles. Despite this emphasis, the focus of the Helsinki process remained as the first basket of security until the end of the Cold War.

It was only with the Paris Summit of November 19-21, 1990 that the CSCE's focus shifted to the third basket. The Paris Summit (and the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" accepted at the Summit) marked the formal end of the Cold War and started the institutionalization process of the CSCE, deciding that heads of state and government would meet on a regular basis, beginning with a follow-up meeting in Helsinki in 1992.¹³ The CSCE was also entrusted with the task of taking part in the construction of the post-Cold War order in Europe. On the other hand, the Paris Summit also welcomed the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) by 22 participating states, aimed at maintaining a military balance among them. The CFE Treaty was especially important for Turkey because it involved provisions on the fate of the Soviet conventional weapons deployed close to Turkey's eastern borders.

Enhancing the humanitarian dimension of security, the Moscow Document of 1991 stated that human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law were issues of international concern and that respect for these rights and freedoms constituted one of the foundations of the international order. This reflected the recognition on the part of the participating states that these issues do not belong exclusively to the realm of internal affairs but that other states and international organizations have a right to interfere if these norms are violated. It was an important step because countries that were keen on preserving their internal sovereignty at the inception of the Helsinki Process (Russia in particular), eventually accepted these principles in 1991. It was also striking that these decisions were taken in Moscow.

¹² H6ynck, Wilhelm. "From the CSCE to the OSCE: the challenges of building new stability," *Helsinki Monitor*, vol. 6, no. 3, 1995, pp. 11-22.

¹³ OSCE. *The OSCE Handbook*, 2007, p. 6.

The Helsinki Summit of July 1992 paved the way for peacekeeping activities that would be conducted by the CSCE. Furthermore, the participating states accepted a document entitled “The Challenges of Change” to deal with the overwhelming effects of change in the international system. They also agreed that the CSCE should become a structured regional arrangement in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter¹⁴, the post of a High Commissioner on National Minorities should be created, the Conflict Prevention Center should be strengthened, and the Forum for Security Cooperation as well as the Economic Forum should be established. The Helsinki Summit of 1992 also created the post of a High Commissioner on National Minorities when the Yugoslav crises were escalating and some states in Central and Eastern Europe were debating the issue of minorities within their borders.

The CSCE acquired organizational characteristics and was renamed the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the Budapest Summit of December 5-6, 1994, thus completing the institutionalization of the Helsinki Process. At the 1996 Lisbon Summit, it was decided that the office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media (RFOM) would be established, and it began functioning in 1997. Another summit was held in Istanbul in 1999, in which the CFE Treaty was modified and the Charter for European Security was adopted.¹⁵ At a summit held in Astana in 2010, on the other hand, the leaders of participating states adopted the “Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community” that reaffirmed their commitment to OSCE principles and reconfirmed the Organization’s comprehensive approach to security, based on trust and transparency.¹⁶ It is the OSCE’s emphasis on comprehensive security and its inclusiveness that makes it especially important for Turkey as well.

¹⁴ Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allows for the creation of regional arrangements for maintaining peace and security on condition that “such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”. UN, Charter of the United Nations, <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html>

¹⁵ Details of this summit can be found in the next section.

¹⁶ OSCE. “Astana declaration adopted at OSCE Summit charts way forward,” December 2, 2010. <http://www.osce.org/cio/74236>

Turkey and the OSCE: Multilateralism and Comprehensive Security

Turkey was among the 35 participating states that signed the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975 and has since then pursued an active role within the CSCE/OSCE. Turkey's participation in the CSCE as a founding state can be read as part of its quest for joining all Western institutions to affirm its Western/European identity, and to pursue its goal of reaching the level of "contemporary civilization" set forth by its founding leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.¹⁷ This quest does not only have a strong identity aspect but it also has a crucial security aspect, and these two aspects are inextricably linked with each other. It can be argued that Turkish foreign policy before the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) era was mainly marked by a tendency to preserve the regional *status quo* in order to avoid a new wave of invasion by European powers after its War of Independence (1919-1922). This can be associated with defensive Westernization¹⁸ that started in the late Ottoman times when the empire entered a period of collapse.¹⁹ It can thus be argued that Turkey's membership in Western institutions (such as NATO, the CoE, and the OECD) has mainly been shaped by a security logic—avoiding foreign intervention through Westernization. Turkey's multilateralism can also be evaluated in light of defensive Westernization, preservation of the regional *status quo*, and becoming part of the European international society.

During the Cold War, Turkey perceived the CSCE as a platform for cooperation and confidence-building with Soviet countries, and especially with the Soviet Union (USSR). This was immediately reflected in the military rapprochement between Turkey and the USSR that took place in 1976 right after the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. In January-February 1976, the USSR invited Turkish military experts to a military exercise ("Caucasia") conducted in Georgia and Armenia, in line with its commitments as outlined in the Document on Confidence-Building Measures

¹⁷ Because Turkey's quest to become a part of the international community is well-documented in Chapter 2 (Ünver Noi) of this volume, it will not be analyzed in further detail here.

¹⁸ See: Cebeci, Münevver. "Turkish and European Security Cultures in Perspective: Why do we need a holistic approach to European Security?", *Marmara Journal of European Studies*, 2014, Vol. 22, No. 2, p. 41; and Pınar Bilgin. "Turkey's changing security discourses: The Challenge of Globalisation," *European Journal of Political Research*, 2005, Vol. 44, p. 175-201.

¹⁹ See Chapter 2 (Ünver Noi) of this volume for more detail on this topic.

and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament.²⁰ This document was adopted with the Helsinki Final Act and it brought the mechanisms for prior notification and observation of military maneuvers/activities, as part of CSCE's confidence and security building measures. The military cooperation initiated on such lines developed further to the level that Turkey let the Soviet aircraft carrier "Kiev" pass from the Turkish Straits, even though this was not stipulated in the Montreux Convention of 1936, which regulates the Straits.²¹

In the beginning of the post-Cold War era, both Turkey and the CSCE had to define their stance and role in a period of systemic transition. The CSCE began focusing on the third basket of security in its areas of competence and it was also tasked with engaging in peacekeeping activities. On the other hand, Turkey continued to pursue its multilateral approach, especially with regard to the crises/conflicts that erupted in its immediate neighborhood: in the Balkans and the Southern Caucasus. During the Bosnian War, Turkey proposed a plan to the UN, the OSCE, and the CoE, to impose stronger measures to end the Serbian violence, and tried to mobilize them to act more effectively.²² In addition, Turkey was also actively involved in finding a solution to the Kosovo crisis within the auspices of the OSCE, and it contributed militarily to the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission in the period of May-September 1999.

Concerning the Nagorno Karabagh conflict, Turkey attempted to pursue a neutral stance in the beginning and sought for a solution to the conflict through multilateral engagement. Turkey aligned itself with the CSCE's 1992 ministerial decisions to launch conflict resolution efforts and the 1994 Budapest Summit decisions, becoming a member of the Minsk Group (which was established at the same summit) to lead the OSCE's efforts in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict. In the early 1990s, Turkey was even regarded as a possible mediator by the parties to

²⁰ Tellal, Erel. "SSCB'yle İlişkiler [Relations with the USSR]" in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası - Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* [Turkish Foreign Policy—Facts, Documents and Comments from the War of Independence until Today] Vol. I: 1919-1980, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002): p. 780.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Uzel, İlhan. "The Balkans: Turkey's Stabilizing Role", in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, *Turkey in World Politics—An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002): p. 70; and: Uzel, İlhan. "Balkanlarla İlişkiler [Relations with the Balkans]," in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası - Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* [Turkish Foreign Policy—Facts, Documents and Comments from the War of Independence until Today] Vol. II—1980-2001, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002): p. 495.

the conflict, mainly due to its neutral stance and got engaged in diplomatic efforts (including the seeking of CSCE engagement) with the initiative of the then-Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin.²³ These efforts took place despite the Hocalı massacre of 1992 and the invasion of Kelbecer (1993) by the Armenians, which sparked a domestic debate in Turkey. While President Özal asked for a tougher stance on Armenia, the Demirel government continued to pursue a multilateral track.²⁴ Nevertheless, Turkey's efforts became increasingly confined to the Minsk Group framework, especially due to a worsening of relations with Armenia and Turkey left its initial neutral stance, gradually taking on an openly pro-Azerbaijani one. Ongoing intermittent clashes between the parties have made it harder to pursue peaceful resolution, and Turkey has sometimes criticized the Minsk Group for not taking "fair and decisive steps" in Nagorno Karabagh.²⁵ On the other hand, Armenia has been critical of Turkey's position in the Minsk Group, claiming that it overtly supports Azerbaijan.²⁶ The U.S. has been supportive of Turkey's role, as was the case in 2015 when Daniel B. Baer, the U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, stated: "We note recent statements that have called into question Turkey's constructiveness as a Minsk Group member and disagree with that assessment. Turkey has been a valuable member of the Minsk Group and has worked cooperatively with the co-Chairs on finding a way forward in peace talks."²⁷

The Nagorno Karabagh conflict is not the only intractable conflict in the South Caucasus. The Georgian-Abkhaz conflict is also an issue of concern for the OSCE and Turkey. Turkey supported the dialogue process launched by the CSCE in 1994 to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and brought the parties together in June 1999, before the OSCE's Istanbul

²³ Aydın, Mustafa. "Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'yla İlişkiler [Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia]" in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası - Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* [Turkish Foreign Policy—Facts, Documents and Comments from the War of Independence until Today] *Vol. II—1980-2001*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002): p. 402-404.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Sims, Alexandra. "Turkish President backs Azerbaijan in conflict with Armenia," *Independent*, April 3, 2016. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkish-president-backs-azerbaijan-in-conflict-with-armenia-a6966376.html>

²⁶ See, for example: Permanent Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the OSCE. "Statement in response to the Co-Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, and the Head of the High-Level Planning Group," November 10, 2016. <http://www.osce.mfa.am/en/news/item/2016/11/10/2016/>

²⁷ U.S. Mission to the OSCE. "On the Minsk Group Co-Chairs: Statement to the PC," December 17, 2015. https://osce.usmission.gov/dec_17_15_minsk_group/

Summit.²⁸ Today, the dialogue process continues within the framework of the Geneva International Discussions launched in 2008 by the OSCE, the UN, and the EU, to address the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts. Turkey continues to actively support the process. Turkey also contributed to the Monitoring Operation conducted by the OSCE in Georgia in February 2000 to December 2004 and between 2006–2009.

Conflict resolution and mediation are important aspects of Turkey's multilateralism and this is also reflected in its approach to the Ukraine crisis within the OSCE framework. The appointment of Turkey's Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan as the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine on April 2, 2014 is significant in this regard. The aim of the mission is "to contribute to reducing tensions and to help foster peace, stability, and security" in Ukraine and it was initially designed "as a classic instrument of preventive diplomacy, whilst pursuing the OSCE's approach to comprehensive and co-operative security"²⁹. This is also the point where the OSCE's and Turkey's approaches match each other as Turkey's multilateralism is based on a comprehensive view of security that prioritizes cooperation. This was reflected in the following statement of Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu:

We are obliged to rise to these challenges simultaneously, through a holistic, comprehensive, and coherent strategy. Addressing the root causes of all problems is also necessary. We believe that the OSCE, with its comprehensive and indivisible security concept and operational flexibility, is an important asset at our disposal.³⁰

Turkey's promotion of comprehensive security is not new and can be traced back to the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, particularly with regard to the CSCE's new role in the European security architecture. At

²⁸ Aydın, Mustafa. "Kafkasya ve Orta Asya'yla İlişkiler [Relations with the Caucasus and Central Asia]," in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası - Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* [Turkish Foreign Policy—Facts, Documents and Comments from the War of Independence until Today] *Vol. II—1980-2001*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002): p. 419.

²⁹ Apakan, Ertuğrul and Sporrer, Wolfgang. "The Ukrainian Crisis: The OSCE's Special Monitoring Mission," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* (Vol. 15, No. 4, 2017): p. 18.

³⁰ Republic of Turkey-Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Speech by H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, at the 22nd OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting, December 3, Belgrade," (2015), http://www.mfa.gov.tr/speech-by-h_e_-mr_-mevlut-cavusoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey_-at-the-22nd-osce-ministerial-council-meeting_-3-dece.en.mfa

NATO's Rome Summit of 1991, Turkey underlined the indivisibility of security and the need for a holistic approach to European security, arguing that the CSCE, NATO, the European Community (EC), and the CoE should act together to maintain regional stability—a stance which was similar to the U.S. approach at the time³¹. At the 1992 Oslo Ministerial of NATO, the CSCE asked for NATO's help in pursuing its peacekeeping activities (a newly defined task for the CSCE after the Cold War) and Turkey was among the supporters of this idea³².

On the other hand, Turkey's role within the OSCE is not only confined to active support for conflict resolution. It has actively participated in the OSCE's initiatives and it also hosted the Istanbul Summit at which crucial decisions were taken about the future policies of the organization. The Charter for European Security, the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the revised Vienna Document (VD 99) were signed and adopted at this Summit. The Charter for European Security was especially significant as it provided "the strengthening of the OSCEs operational capacities in conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation."³³ Nevertheless, the significance of the Summit was not limited to these documents alone. The Istanbul Summit became an issue of contention between the Clinton Administration and the U.S. Congress in 1998, when some members of the U.S. Congress asked President Clinton not to hold the OSCE Summit in Istanbul and to relocate it, on the grounds that Turkey was violating human rights and its obligations under international law.³⁴ Nevertheless, President Bill Clinton rejected this request, and instead made a crucial visit to Turkey in November 1999, signaling a new and positive relationship between the two countries.

The Clinton Administration also lent its support to the signing of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline agreement during the Istanbul Summit. President Clinton signed the document as an observer, showing the U.S.

³¹ Uzgel, İlhan. "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler [Relations with the USA and NATO]," in Baskın Oran (ed), *Türk Dış Politikası - Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar* [Turkish Foreign Policy—Facts, Documents and Comments from the War of Independence until Today] *Vol. II—1980-2001*, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002): p. 308.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 307.

³³ Ghebalı, Victor-Yves. "The OSCE's Istanbul Charter for European Security," *NATO Review*, (No 1, 2000): p.23.

³⁴ Kirişçi, Kemal. "U.S.-Turkish Relations: New Uncertainties in a Renewed Partnership," Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, *Turkey in World Politics—An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002): pp.170, 188.

support at the highest level. Then-U.S. Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson, named the agreement a political victory and a strategic document that would further the strategic interests of the U.S.³⁵ This support was part of the U.S. policy to support various pipeline projects in the region in order to curb Russia's energy dominance.

On the other hand, Turkey's relations with the OSCE were very much affected by its relationship with Russia right after the Cold War, mainly due to Russia's denouncement of its Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty commitments on its North Caucasian flank. Until the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, Russia exceeded the numbers set in the Treaty limits on this flank and violated the CFE Treaty several times. The Istanbul Summit was also significant in this regard because a text revising the CFE Treaty commitments was also adopted at the summit.³⁶

Turkey-OSCE relations have not always been without problems. The major problem that the two entities encountered in their relationship was Turkey's performance with regard to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. For example, in 1992, Austria tried to invoke the CSCE's humanitarian dimension mechanism (according to the Moscow Document) against Turkey, claiming that the country was violating its commitments with regard to human rights especially towards its Kurdish minority³⁷. Nevertheless, Austria's request was refused. On the other hand, the OSCE sent election/referendum assessment/observation missions to Turkey seven times since 2002 upon invitation from the Turkish government (in 2002, 2007, 2011, 2014, twice in 2015, and 2017). Some of these missions have been significant mainly because of the political climate in which they were deployed. A full election observation mission was sent to monitor the 2011 parliamentary elections, following growing concerns about a deterioration in Turkey's democratic standards.³⁸ The OSCE's

³⁵ Uzgel, "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler [Relations with the USA and NATO]," p. 281.

³⁶ Bazoğlu Sezer, Duygu. "Russia: The Challenges of Reconciling Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership," in Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi, *Turkey in World Politics—An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002): pp. 204, 212-213.

³⁷ Bloed, Arie. "Monitoring the CSCE Human Dimension: In Search of its Effectiveness," in Arie Bloed, Liselotte Leicht, Manfred Nowak, and Allan Rosas (ed.s), *Monitoring Human Rights in Europe: Comparing International Procedures and Mechanisms*, (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) pp. 80-81.

³⁸ Spencer, Oliver R. "To be a model: Turkey's time is now." *Op-Eds*, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, June 2, 2011. <https://www.oscepa.org/news-a-media/op-eds/636-to-be-a-model-turkeys-time-is-now>.

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) reported in October 2011 that although the June 12 elections in Turkey “demonstrated a broad commitment to holding democratic elections” there were still limitations “on freedom of expression, freedom of association, and electoral rights.”³⁹

The Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions as well as the Final Report of the Limited Referendum Observation Mission that the OSCE-ODIHR sent to Turkey to assess the Constitutional Referendum of April 16, 2017 are especially significant in Turkey-OSCE relations. They were rather critical of the conduct of the referendum process (from the start of the campaigning period until the official declaration of results). The ODIHR Mission asserted in the Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions document that the referendum did not take place under equal conditions (it stated: “the two sides of the campaign did not have equal opportunities”⁴⁰). It further stated that voters were not impartially informed about key aspects of the constitutional reform, that civil society organizations were excluded, and, “under the state of emergency put in place after the July 2016 failed coup attempt, fundamental freedoms essential to a genuinely democratic process were curtailed.”⁴¹ The Mission especially underlined that restrictions on the media “reduced voters’ access to a plurality of views,” and that “late changes in counting procedures removed an important safeguard and were contested by the opposition.”⁴² This Preliminary Findings and Conclusions statement of the OSCE-ODIHR Mission was also one of the factors which made the CoE’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) decide to restart the monitoring of Turkey “over ‘serious concerns’ about democracy and human rights.”⁴³ This process was suspended in 2004 because of positive developments in Turkey’s democracy and human rights record.

³⁹ OSCE-ODIHR. “Republic of Turkey—Parliamentary Elections 12 June 2011, ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Report,” October 31, 2011. <http://www.osce.org/odihr/84588>

⁴⁰ OSCE-ODIHR. “International Referendum Observation Mission - Republic of Turkey—Constitutional Referendum, 16 April 2017, The Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions.” <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/311721>

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Rankin, Jennifer. “Council of Europe vote puts pressure on Turkey over human rights.” *The Guardian*, April 26, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/26/council-of-europe-turkey-human-rights-pace>.

Changing Agendas, Redefining Roles, and Achieving Continuity: Turkey and the OSCE in Transition

Because this chapter is designed in such a way to understand the nature of Turkey-OSCE relations and to reflect on their history as well as on current developments, it has not entered into a discussion on the systemic transition that we are currently witnessing; nor does it reflect on the new geostrategic balancing acts of international actors. However, there is also a need to understand these dynamics in order to reach a satisfying conclusion about Turkey-OSCE relations. Thus, this section evaluates the debates on the future of the OSCE and attempts to reflect on Turkey's possible place in it.

Multilateralism forms one of the conceptual bases of this chapter. However, multilateralism itself is in transition.⁴⁴ A holistic approach to security, a comprehensive understanding of issue areas, and an emphasis on the indivisibility of security, which makes the participation of all stakeholders in security arrangements a necessary precondition for effective multilateralism, remain vital. Both Turkey and the OSCE are well-positioned to pursue such an approach. Nevertheless, effectiveness can only be reached through increased transparency and enhanced ownership of all the stakeholders.⁴⁵ The new multilateralism to take place should be based on more effective cooperation between international actors, especially international organizations. The OSCE has an important role to play in this regard with its wide range of responsibilities, and the organization is well-placed to support "positive overlap"⁴⁶ between international organizations.⁴⁷

However, the OSCE itself is also in transition, trying to establish its new role in the world, as it is no longer possible for the organization to function successfully on the basis of the concepts, structures, and tools that were created to address the challenges of the 1990s. Today, threats such as cyber-attacks and global terrorism are more diverse, complex, and ubiquitous. The civil war in Syria and the massive refugee flows that it caused have shown that crises should be tackled more effectively and

⁴⁴ Interview with H.E. Ambassador Rauf Engin Soysal, Turkey's Permanent Representative to the OSCE.

⁴⁵ Interview with H.E. Ambassador Rauf Engin Soysal, Turkey's Permanent Representative to the OSCE.

⁴⁶ Galbreath, David J. and Gebhard, Carmen. *Cooperation or Conflict? Problematizing Organizational Overlap in Europe*, (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2010).

⁴⁷ Interview with H.E. Ambassador Rauf Engin Soysal.

proactively. Protection and maintenance of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law no longer suffice alone to tackle today's problems, and, fighting xenophobia, racism, and discrimination should be given more emphasis⁴⁸ at a time when a dangerous form of right-wing populism is on the rise in Europe and across the Atlantic. The OSCE (along with the UN) is well-suited to take up the task. This pertains to a new agenda and the OSCE must overcome the disadvantages of decision-making by consensus, tackle the functionality of its field missions, increase the effectiveness of its instruments, and reform its structures according to these new challenges; putting more emphasis on ownership.⁴⁹ The organization also needs to redefine its conception of confidence-building. After Russia's invasion of Crimea and its unilateral policies on Ukraine that violated international law, it has become all the more pressing to make the Helsinki principles relevant again through a new approach. On the other hand, amid debates over trust among the participating states of the OSCE that were sparked after the Russian invasion of Crimea and the crisis in Ukraine, at the Informal Ministerial Meeting held in Mauerbach, Austria, on July 11, 2017, the OSCE agreed to make new appointments to the most important posts of the Secretary General, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the ODIHR Director, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media. These appointments were made official on July 18, 2017. These appointments were crucial because there were concerns that the participating states would not be able to achieve consensus on who would be appointed to these posts and that the posts would be left vacant.⁵⁰ The Mauerbach Informal Ministerial Meeting addressed the issue of "Building Trust through Dialogue and Co-operation," and it also tackled the question of the OSCE's *raison d'être*,⁵¹ focusing mainly on "Structured Dialogue

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Interview with H.E. Ambassador Rauf Engin Soysal. Note that the posts of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the ODIHR Director, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media were vacant for almost a year. Reflecting the disagreement over the related posts and the post of the Secretary General, in an interview at the Mauerbach meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, "We regret that a number of our Western partners are strongly against ensuring balance in this leading element of the organization." Politics News, "Lavrov's Press Statement Following OSCE Informal Ministerial Meeting," July 11, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZXUO0wtbz20>.

⁵¹ On the regional and organizational challenges facing the OSCE, see: Simonet, Loïc and Lüber, Hans Georg. "The OSCE and Its Legal Status: Revisiting the Myth of Sisyphus" in Pal Dunay, P. Trencé Hopmann, Adam Daniel Rotfeld, and Andrei Zagorski (ed.s), *Yearbook on the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)*, (Hamburg: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, 2017): pp. 277-316.

on current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area” which was launched in February 2017 (following the Hamburg Ministerial Council Declaration of December 2016), and, on “the fight against violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism.”⁵²

The challenge for Turkey, on the other hand, is to decide how it will situate itself within all these debates on the OSCE’s transformation, as one of the most active participants of the organization. However, it needs to quickly adapt to the challenges of this transitional period. The multilateralist policies that it has pursued so far have helped Turkey maintain its identity as a respected member of the international society and an indispensable actor in European security. The latest shift in Turkish foreign policy towards more activism in the Middle East and the developments in its domestic politics (that have been documented in various OSCE reports) require urgent reconsideration as Turkey is faced with multiple challenges in its various neighborhoods. Turkey needs to pursue a more balanced foreign policy in order to achieve a fine-tuned continuity of its basic principles of multilateralism and international cooperation, and, an effective readjustment that would keep the country out of the crises in its neighborhood, providing a fresh impetus to its neutral mediator⁵³ capacity. Being an influential and respected international actor depends first and foremost on stable internal structures and a strong commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Turkey is well-positioned to advocate and pioneer higher standards in this respect, carrying the problems of xenophobia, discrimination, and racism to the agenda of Western-dom-

⁵² Interview with H.E. Ambassador Rauf Engin Soysal, and OSCE, “OSCE Informal Ministerial Meeting,” July 11, 2017. <http://www.osce.org/event/informal-ministerial-meeting>; also see: OSCE, “Dialogue crucial for addressing Europe’s security challenges, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Sebastian Kurz emphasizes at Informal Ministerial Meeting,” July 11, 2017. <http://www.osce.org/chairmanship/328656>.

⁵³ Note that in cooperation with Finland, Turkey launched the Group of Friends of Mediation initiative under the auspices of the UN in September 2010 (Finland and Turkey are currently the co-chairs of this initiative), aiming “to promote and advance the use of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution, as well as to generate support for the development of mediation.” United Nations Peacemaker, “The Group of Friends of Mediation.” <http://peacemaker.un.org/friendsofmediation>. The OSCE is also a member of the Group as an international organization and the Group was replicated under the auspices of the OSCE (as the OSCE Group of Friends of Mediation) in 2014; with Turkey, Finland, and Switzerland as its co-chairs. OSCE, “Regional Organizations in Conflict Mediation: Lessons of Experience and Cooperation with the United Nations,” Report, 2016. <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/230526?download=true>.

inated institutions, including the OSCE.⁵⁴ However, it can only do so once it achieves those higher standards itself.

Conclusion

This chapter has scrutinized Turkey-OSCE relations from the perspective of multilateralism and comprehensive security, arguing that Turkey and the OSCE share similar approaches and that they are well-situated to respond to today's challenges in world politics. The OSCE attempts to redefine its role in an emerging multipolar world where the liberal democratic ideals of peace, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are severely challenged, and where confidence-building among states becomes all the more difficult due to rising populism and right-wing extremism in the form of racism and xenophobia in Europe and across the Atlantic. Turkey, on the other hand, is an influential international actor that can make significant contribution to international security and stability in an era of global transition. With its tradition of multilateralism and a comprehensive approach to security, it has already contributed significantly to European security. Turkey has a lot to offer in this regard, and it can be a crucial actor in bringing the problems of racism and xenophobia to the agenda of international organizations, including the OSCE. In a conflict-ridden region, a stable, democratic Turkey, respectful of human rights and the rule of law, would constitute a significant asset for European and global security.

⁵⁴ It should be noted at this point that Turkey has already achieved significant results in this respect, especially with regard to its humanitarian stance towards the Syrian refugees—an exemplary move against xenophobia and racism.

