

## CHAPTER III: THE EU AS A SECURITY PROVIDER IN THE TRUMP ERA

KARLIJN JANS

### INTRODUCTION

*“European citizens see security as the number one thing that Europe should provide to them, so it’s time to propose this.”*<sup>83</sup>

– Elżbieta Bienkowska, European Commissioner Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs

One issue European citizens seem to rally behind is the need for common defence and security and the potential of the European Union (EU) as a security provider. A recent survey amongst EU citizens found three-quarters of respondents (75%) in favour of a common defence and security policy among EU Member States.<sup>84</sup> More specifically, the survey showed that more than half of all respondents (55%) are in favour of creating an EU army. A changing security situation in the ‘ring of instability’ forming on Europe’s borders, in conjunction with declining defence budgets across the board in Europe and as a result the lack of (military) capabilities to deal with a plethora of threats and challenges, is leaving many member states of the Union scrambling to deal with a plethora of (new) threats.

2016 and 2017 finally saw a response by European leaders in taking action aimed at the dealing changing security situation. Brexit and Trump’s foreign policy taking cue of ‘America First’,

83 Gabriela Baczynska, Robin Emmott. “Trump and Brexit Give Momentum to EU Defence Push,” June 7, 2017. <http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN18Y057>.

84 European Commission, and Directorate-General for Communication. “Special Eurobarometer 461 Designing Europe’s Future: Security and Defence,” April 2017. <http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/SPECIAL/surveyKy/2173>. P.12. For Sweden 59% and Finland 68% are in favour of CSDP.

also in his approach to his security allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and EU, seemed to have been the needed push to make European leader realise the urgency of the matter. As Juncker stated in his speech in June of this year: “by stepping up [EU member states’] efforts on defence, and by doing so together, the Member States of the Union will strengthen the ties that bind the Allies within NATO.”<sup>85</sup> A large group of EU members have announced increases in their defence budgets in the next years, halting the relentless budget cuts to Europe’s armed forces. A movement in Europe’s political leadership in seriously rethinking defence spending and contributions to Europe’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), in Brussels and the member states capitals, is to be detected. As German Defence Minister stated: “that is what the Americans expect us to do.”<sup>86</sup> Defence has been made a priority in the frequent Brussels meetings, concrete policy proposals and actions dealing with strengthening defence in Europe have been proposed and discussed and the political endorsement of such plans signalled in a shift in Europeans taking defence of their continent seriously.

Did Trump change everything for European defence and security or is it just business as usual? This paper focuses on the efforts that are being made towards European defence cooperation since 2016. In particular, it examines specific initiatives that are being taken at the EU and member state level dealing with capability development, defence reviews and cutting red tape. The changing military posture of the Russia Federation and presence of hybrid threats towards the Baltic States, security in

85 “European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Defence and Security Conference Prague: In Defence of Europe,” June 2017. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-17-1581\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-1581_en.htm).

86 “German Minister, in Lithuania, Backs European ‘Defence Union.’” Accessed October 29, 2017. <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-defence-germany-lithuania/german-minister-in-lithuania-backs-european-defence-union-idUKKCN11E1H0>.

the Baltic Sea area has become more relevant than ever and has affected Sweden's and Finland's latest security policies and politics and its cooperation with its security partners. In this context and as non-NATO member states, Finland and Sweden have both reviewed their security and defence policies. Regarding the EU as a cornerstone of their policies, both countries have an interest in developments on the EU level regarding European defence cooperation. This paper examines both countries interest in the latest developments. Additionally, following the NATO Warsaw Summit and the implementation of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union<sup>87</sup>, EU-NATO cooperation has taken flight, recognising the need for closer co-operation having implications for non-NATO members Sweden and Finland. Given the developments on a wide range of issues, it is imperative to look at the importance and feasibility of the different initiatives. It is important not to lose the momentum for enhancing European defence cooperation, regarding it as a tool for making the continent more agile and strengthens its resolve.

87 "A Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union - EU Global Strategy - European Commission." EU Global Strategy, June 2016. /globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union.

## THE EU AS A SECURITY PROVIDER FOR SWEDEN AND FINLAND?

IT IS FAIR to say that the EU has perhaps become even more important to for the defence of both countries than ever. For both Finland and Sweden, members of the EU, there is no immediate (military) threat but the risk of becoming involved in a regional crisis and the need to act are seen in both countries as the biggest challenges.<sup>88</sup> Both countries possess some (strategically) important areas in the Baltic Sea such as the Gotland Island and the Åland Islands, in this regard both countries have to consider their defence and security strategies and needed capabilities vis-à-vis regional security challenges.

The changing security situation in the region and in the world has made Finland and Sweden rethink their security strategies, and both countries have renewed or updated their defence and security strategies. The EU is the central frame of reference of Finland's and Sweden's foreign and security policy strategy documents and is regarded as an important security community to both.<sup>89,90</sup> Sweden's implementation of its security strategy of 2009, has become more relevant and speaks of the importance of international cooperation in order to be able to cope with the security challenges. Considering its position of non-alignment

88 Government Offices of Sweden, the Prime Minister's Office. "National Security Strategy," January 2017. <http://www.government.se/4aa5de/contentassets/0e04164d7eed462aa511ab03c890372e/national-security-strategy.pdf>. P.17 and "Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy," June 17, 2016. /public/default.aspx?contentid=348060&contentlan=2&culture=en-US

89 Government Offices of Sweden, the Prime Minister's Office. "National Security Strategy," January 2017. <http://www.government.se/4aa5de/contentassets/0e04164d7eed462aa511ab03c890372e/national-security-strategy.pdf>. P. 16

90 "Government Report on Finnish Foreign and Security Policy," June 17, 2016. /public/default.aspx?contentid=348060&contentlan=2&culture=en-US. P. 12

towards NATO, the doctrine “builds on a delicate balancing act between deepened international defence cooperation while staying outside NATO.”<sup>91</sup> Earlier this year, a new National Security Strategy was published elaborating on the wide spectrum of security interests and risks and, while being a broad and abstract document, it is clear on Sweden’s strong security interest in the EU’s role as a security provider and plans to further strengthen the EU as a foreign and security policy actor. Sweden recognises the reality that in defence and security (or in a time of crisis) there is not a single EU member, especially the smaller ones that can afford to maintain a full-spectrum of military capabilities on their own: “only through cooperation with others is it possible to educate, train and exercise high-quality military capabilities.”<sup>92 93</sup>

Finland expects the EU to add concrete value to the management of its multiple threats.<sup>94</sup> For example, 80% of products coming to Finland travel through the Baltic Sea, it is with that dependent on its access to the Baltic Sea and therefore also from an economic perspective dependent on international cooperation through international (security) fora, such as the EU.<sup>95</sup> The Finnish government and political leadership have repeatedly

91 Wieslander, Anna, A Brusque Swedish Awakening: Adopting Security Policy to Baltic Sea Challenges. In: Andris Sprūds, Māris Andžāns. “Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Realities and Prospects: The Riga Conference Papers 2017.” Accessed October 27, 2017. <http://liia.lv/en/publications/security-in-the-baltic-sea-region-realities-and-prospects-the-riga-conference-papers-2017-643>. P. 92

92 Karlijn Jans. “The Netherlands and Germany as European Defense Pioneers.” *Huffington Post* (blog), February 20, 2016. [https://www.huffingtonpost.com/young-professionals-in-foreign-policy/the-netherlands-and-germa\\_b\\_9283072.html](https://www.huffingtonpost.com/young-professionals-in-foreign-policy/the-netherlands-and-germa_b_9283072.html).

93 the Inquiry on Sweden’s International, and Defence Cooperation. “International Defence Cooperation Efficiency, Solidarity, Sovereignty,” 2014. <https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Bertelman2014.pdf>.

94 Teija Tiilikainen. “United We Stand | Friends of Europe,” September 27, 2017. <http://www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/united-we-stand>.

95 “Itämeri 2017 Strategia.” Satamaliitto, February 17, 2017. <https://www.satamaliitto.fi/fin/ajankohtaista/lausunnot/2017/02/ita-meri-2017-strategia/>.

stated the importance it gives to the EU as a security provider. Finnish President Niinistö recently stated:

*“The EU is hardly a true union if it does not play its part in ensuring the security of its own citizens [...] We need to strike the right balance, be ambitious but also see the value of inclusiveness. We are a Union and this should be reflected also in the field of security.”*<sup>96</sup>

In its recently published Defence Policy Report, the Finnish government reinstated the importance of EU defence cooperation and its support of the EU’s initiatives on enhancing this cooperation: “Finland purposefully promotes the development of defence cooperation within the European Union and the development of its defence policy. This will strengthen the foundation of the European defence capability and the Union as a security community and a global actor.”<sup>97</sup> It is fair to say that any development or initiative taken on the EU level regarding European defence cooperation in strengthening European defence, will be monitored in Stockholm and Helsinki with a large degree of interest. Both countries have pledged political support for current initiatives and it is expected that new initiatives, serving national security interests, can count on support from these northern EU members.

96 “Speech by President of the Republic of Finland Sauli Niinistö at the Lennart Meri Conference in Tallinn on 13 May 2017 - The President of the Republic of Finland: Speeches.” Accessed October 28, 2017. <http://tpk.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=361865&nodeid=44810&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>.

97 Prime Minister’s Office Finland. “Government’s Defence Report,” July 2017. [http://www.defmin.fi/files/3688/J07\\_2017\\_Governments\\_Defence\\_Report\\_Eng\\_PLM\\_160217.pdf](http://www.defmin.fi/files/3688/J07_2017_Governments_Defence_Report_Eng_PLM_160217.pdf). P. 6

## MOVING AHEAD ON EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION AND A COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

ALTHOUGH MANY EUROPEAN member states have decided to, at minimum, halt further cuts in their national defence budgets, the long track record of uncoordinated, diminishing defence budgets (including to national defence R&D (Research and Development) and R&T (Research and Technology) budgets) have left their mark, and the consequent shortfalls in European military capabilities (and duplication of efforts) are an uncomfortable reality, still in 2017. As a result, not a single EU member state, not even the larger ones, can afford or maintain a full spectrum of defence capabilities that can deal with the plethora of (global) challenges. A recent RAND Corporation study found that in case of a crisis in the Baltics, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and France would have to make a serious effort to muster and sustain heavy brigades, straining their armed forces significantly.<sup>98</sup>

Apart from Greece, Estonia and the UK, none of the EU members have reached (or maintained) the 2% defence spending target set by NATO, as a metric to measure sufficient defence spending to deal with the challenges (which has also been accepted by other EU member states that are not members of NATO, such as Sweden and Finland).<sup>99</sup>

98 Shurkin, Michael. "The Abilities of the British, French, and German Armies to Generate and Sustain Armored Brigades in the Baltics." Product Page, 2017. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1629.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1629.html).

99 NATO. "Wales Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales." NATO, September 5, 2014. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_112964.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm).




Figure 1. European defence 2016<sup>100</sup>

The figures on defence spending illustrate that ‘meaner and leaner’ actually means only leaner, and the leaner the defence, the more dependent it is on cooperation with others.<sup>101</sup> In comparison, the EU member states combined spend €227 billion on defence per year, with an average of 1.34% of its GDP.<sup>102</sup> The U.S. on the other hand spends €545 billion on defence per year, with an average of 3.3% of its GDP, 1.3% above the NATO spending pledge. This spending pledge, however, is just a metric and does not necessarily indicate the value of output, meaning on what military capabilities and capacities the money is spent.

To illustrate the point of combating capability (development) duplication and the need to work in a coordinated manner towards increasing interoperability between member states’ capabilities, one can look at the number of weapon systems maintained by EU members to see what that money is spent on. Currently, EU member states combined maintain 17 types of main battle tanks, compared to one main battle tank maintained by

100 Zoe Stanley-Lockman. “European Defence 2016 - EUISS,” March 1, 2017. [https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/SMS\\_1\\_European\\_Defence.pdf](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/SMS_1_European_Defence.pdf).

101 the Inquiry on Sweden’s International, and Defence Cooperation. “International Defence Cooperation Efficiency, Solidarity, Sovereignty,” 2014. <https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Bertelman2014.pdf>. P. 22

102 European Commission. “Factsheet. Defending Europe. The Case for Greater EU Cooperation on Security and Defence,” 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/defending-europe-factsheet\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/defending-europe-factsheet_en.pdf).



the U.S.<sup>103</sup> EU member states maintain 20 types of fighter planes, compared to six types of fighter planes by the U.S. Maintaining such a large number of weapon systems is in itself a costly matter. The issue at hand, however, is the lack of interoperability, which means member states' armed forces ability to jointly deploy their forces and weapon systems and communicate with each other in times of crisis (and on the battlefield).

The member states of the EU have increasingly started to develop common capabilities, still mostly driven by budget cuts, and are trying to increase efficiency in spending. Nevertheless, the potential to effectuate European defence cooperation has not been fully reached. It is paramount to European defence cooperation to achieve the needed coordinated output, to build or maintain credible, deployable, interoperable forces that are as efficient as possible, and to be able to deal with current and future security challenges.

European defence cooperation has to be regarded as a tool for enhancing European defence as such and not as a goal in itself. Previous initiatives of European defence cooperation that lacked a clear rationale or motivation on an operational level and the political support were unsuccessful. Defence cooperation initiatives in which the cooperation aspect. In contextualising such measures, it is therefore important to distinguish between two types of European defence cooperation:

103 European Commission. "Factsheet. Defending Europe. The Case for Greater EU Cooperation on Security and Defence," 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/defending-europe-factsheet\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/defending-europe-factsheet_en.pdf).

1. **Bilateral (or multilateral), often bottom-up initiatives between EU member states.** Sweden and Finland are no strangers to European defence cooperation (including cooperation on equipment) on bilateral or multilateral level, mostly with other Nordic countries, but also with other European countries and the U.S.<sup>104</sup> For Sweden and Finland, multilateral cooperation (on political and military levels) in the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFECO) format, with its five members Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, has proven to be fruitful and is seen as an example of successful European defence cooperation.<sup>105</sup>
2. **European defence cooperation initiatives taken by the EU** within the competences of the Treaties, or, within the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Many (recent) developments in these two strands of European defence cooperation have been initiated in times of austerity for all member states.

Both types of defence cooperation aim at building and maintaining credible, deployable, interoperable forces that can provide for the defence of EU member states, and neither of the types are mutually exclusive.

104 Wieslander, Anna, A Brusque Swedish Awakening: Adopting Security Policy to Baltic Sea Challenges. In: Andris Sprūds, Māris Andžāns. "Security in the Baltic Sea Region: Realities and Prospects: The Riga Conference Papers 2017." Accessed October 27, 2017. <http://liia.lv/en/publications/security-in-the-baltic-sea-region-realities-and-prospects-the-riga-conference-papers-2017-643>. p.98

105 See: "NORDEFECO." Accessed November 2, 2017. <http://www.nordefco.org/>.

## THE EU MOVING AHEAD ON EU DEFENCE COOPERATION

EUROPE'S COMMON SECURITY and Defence Policy is enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty and is led in its overall political direction and priorities by the European Council (the heads of government of the EU member states). Execution, coordination and representation lie with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), currently Federica Mogherini, who is also a member of the European Commission cabinet.

As members of the Union, Sweden and Finland have been active participants in and contributors to the European debate on the implementation of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy and its instruments. Most famous is perhaps Sweden's contribution to the European defence cooperation debate through the German-Sweden initiative on 'Pooling and Sharing'. This food-for-thought paper has also become known as the 'Ghent Initiative', and was published at the height of the economic crisis. It paved the way for a larger debate on military resources and capability efficiency and European defence cooperation in general.<sup>106</sup> As for operational activities, both countries have rotated in EU Battlegroup (EU BG) configurations and have contributed to EU crisis management operations.<sup>107</sup> Both countries have also participated in joint European defence capability development and research activities under the auspices of the European De-

106 "Pooling and Sharing, German-Swedish Initiative. Food for Thought. European Imperative Intensifying Military Cooperation in Europe. 'Ghent Initiative,'" November 2010. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009\\_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260511deseinitiative\\_/sede260511deseinitiative\\_en.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260511deseinitiative_/sede260511deseinitiative_en.pdf).

107 For more information see: "EU Battlegroups - EEAS - European External Action Service - European Commission." EEAS - European External Action Service. Accessed November 1, 2017. [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage\\_en/33557/EUBattlegroups](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/33557/EUBattlegroups)

fence Agency (EDA). Being active members in on going CSDP activities, enhanced and new initiatives on European defence cooperation, which further develop the effectiveness of CSDP, are of interest to Sweden and Finland.

*“In the area of security and defence, more has been achieved in the last ten months than in the last decade.”*<sup>108</sup> – Frederica Mogherini (HR)

The Commission cabinet that took power in 2015 has made great efforts to enhance CSDP by launching several initiatives to increase and effectuate European defence cooperation. President Juncker stressed in his 2016 State of the Union Speech the need for a Europe that protects, empowers and defends.<sup>109</sup> Not long after the UK voted for leaving the EU, High Representative Mogherini presented the EU Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.<sup>110</sup> This strategic document has been a result of a yearlong writing process in Brussels, in consultation the different EU member states. Addressing the changing security environment, the document sets the ambition of strategic autonomy for the EU’s CSDP. The strategy document reads as follows:

*“As Europeans we must take greater responsibility for our security. We must be ready and able to deter, respond to, and protect ourselves against external threats. While NATO exists to defend its members –*

108 European Commission. “From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1,” June 20, 2017. [http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/full\\_brochure\\_year\\_1.pdf](http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/full_brochure_year_1.pdf). P.20

109 The State of the Union 2016: “Towards a Better Europe – A Europe that Protects, Empowers and Defends”, 14 September 2016.

110 “EU Global Strategy Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, June 2016 - EEAS - European External Action Service - European Commission.” EEAS - European External Action Service, 2017. [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage\\_en/15148/EU\\_Global\\_Strategy\\_Implementation\\_Plan\\_on\\_Security\\_and\\_Defence](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/15148/EU_Global_Strategy_Implementation_Plan_on_Security_and_Defence)

*most of which are European – from external attack, Europeans must be better equipped, trained and organised to contribute decisively to such collective efforts, as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond its borders.”<sup>111</sup>*

As a follow-up, the European Commission set forth an Implementation Plan with proposals to implement the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence in November 2016.<sup>112</sup> Consecutive plans for enhancing CSDP capabilities have been focused on creating better conditions for member states to invest in capabilities more effectively, avoid unnecessary duplication and simplify cooperation. The initiatives by the European Commission were endorsed by the member states in the Bratislava Declaration.<sup>113</sup> The same ideas were also echoed by the European Parliament.<sup>114</sup> Momentum has been created since 2016 to move further ahead with concrete ideas and initiatives:

111 “A Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union - EU Global Strategy - European Commission.” EU Global Strategy, June 2016. /globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union. P. 19

112 “EU Global Strategy Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, June 2016 - EEAS - European External Action Service - European Commission.” EEAS - European External Action Service, 2017. [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage\\_en/15148/EU, Global Strategy Implementation Plan on Security and Defence.](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/15148/EU_Global_Strategy_Implementation_Plan_on_Security_and_Defence)

113 Work programme proposed by the President of the European Council, the Presidency of the Council and the President of the Commission at the meeting of the 27 Heads of State or Government on 16 September 2016, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/09/16-bratislava-declaration-androadmap>

114 European Parliament report on “the European Defence Union” (2016/2052(INI)) adopted on 22 November 2016.

1. **Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)**, enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty (Articles 42(6) and 46 TEU, and Protocol No 10), PESCO provides a legal framework for the EU to help member states to enhance their defence cooperation. The initiative helps member states that have the necessary military capabilities and ‘have made more binding commitments to one another’, to increase their defence cooperation. Member States wishing to establish PESCO have to notify their intentions to the Council and the HR, provided they meet the capabilities and operational criteria set out in Protocol No 10<sup>115, 116</sup>. The conclusions in June this year saw the European Council asking its members to come up with “a common list of criteria and binding commitments with a precise timetable and specific assessment mechanisms”, before the European Council meeting in October 2017.<sup>117</sup> Discussed and endorsed (also regarding PESCO governance) in the European Council meeting of October<sup>118</sup>, PESCO is set to be launched at the end of 2017.<sup>119</sup> It has been supported, most notably, by the Franco-German axis in order to enhance and facilitate cooperation between a group

115 See Article 1 of Protocol 10, Eur-Lex, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12008M%2FPRO%2F10>

116 “European Council Briefing. Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty Provisions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP);” February 2016. [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573285/EPRS\\_BRI\(2016\)573285\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573285/EPRS_BRI(2016)573285_EN.pdf).

117 “European Council Conclusions, 22-23/06/2017 - Consilium.” Accessed November 2, 2017. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/06/23/euco-conclusions/>.

118 “European Council, 19-20/10/2017 - Consilium.” Accessed November 2, 2017. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2017/10/19-20/>.

119 The list of common commitments in in the main areas of Protocol 10 to the Treaty had not yet been made available to the public at the time of writing.

of member states.<sup>120</sup> The potential of this ‘new’ mechanism has been widely discussed, and success will lie in the hands of member states who are in the lead and responsible for the implementation.<sup>121</sup>

2. **Military Planning Conduct and Capability (MPCC)** endorsed by the European Council of June of 2017. The EU is in the process of implementing measures to increase efficiency in CSDP operations and missions. Until the decision, the EU has been relying on NATO’s command and control structure in operationalising and executing its different CSDP missions (abroad). The MPCC will oversee the EU’s non-executive military CSDP missions: at present the three EU Training Missions. The director of the MPCC has already assumed the functions of mission commander for the current missions respectively deployed in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia. The Council also agreed to establish a Joint Support Coordination Cell to strengthen synergies between EU civilian and military missions.<sup>122</sup>

120 The French, German, Spanish and Italian “Proposals on the necessary commitments and elements for an inclusive and ambitious PESCO” was also supported by Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, and the Netherlands, see for more details: Alice Billon-Galland and Martin Quencez, “Can France and Germany Make PESCO Work as a Process Toward EU Defense?” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, October 6, 2017. <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/can-france-and-germany-make-pesco-work-process-toward-eu-defense> and Dr. Nicole Koenig and Marie Walter-Franke, “France and Germany: Spearheading a European Security and Defense Union?” Jacques Delors Institut Policy Paper, July 19, 2017

121 For literature on discussions on PESCO, see: Jo Coelmont, “With PESCO Brought to Life, Will European Defense Live Happily Ever After?” Egmont, July 2017; and Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer and Martin Quencez, “Will Europe’s Defense Momentum Lead to Anything?” The German Marshall Fund of the United States, June 26, 2017

122 European Commission. “From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1,” June 20, 2017. [http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/full\\_brochure\\_year\\_1.pdf](http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/full_brochure_year_1.pdf).

3. **European Defence Fund (EDF)** member states are not new to the pooling and sharing of defence capability initiatives, whether under the auspices of the EDA or on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Examples are the NH-90 helicopter development, an initiative between France, (then) West Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and the UK, or the Multinational Multi-Role Tanker Transport Fleet, an initiative by the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal and Norway. Nevertheless, the scale and success rate of such initiatives have been sparse. The EDF potentially gives a new boost to further European cooperation on capability developments. The EDF consists of a research (R&T) and capability (R&D) window. While details of the fund need to be spelled out and implemented to be ready to start in 2020, the research part of the EDF has already commenced with some pilot projects (with a total budget of €1.4 million) financed by the European Parliament. At this moment the Preparatory Action, a testing phase, is ongoing, running up to 2019 with projects with an overall budget of €90 million. The full implementation of the EDF will take place in 2020 with a European Defence Research Programme budgeted at €500 million per year for research projects. The Capability window is expected run with €5 billion of pooled resources for joint projects. As a result of the EDF, through (partial) funding of capability initiatives, but also through financial support from the EU, there could very well be a stronger incentive for member states to work together through EU frameworks. As a positive side-effect, more commonality and interoperability of systems in the various member states could potentially be achieved.<sup>123</sup>

123 Daniel Fiott. "Funding EU Defence Cooperation," April 27, 2017. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert%2011%20Defence%20cooperation.pdf>.



4. **Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)** In the March 2017 Council conclusions, member states recognised the importance of developing through CARD a more structured way to deliver the key capabilities needed in Europe, based on greater transparency, political visibility and commitment from Member States, while avoiding any unnecessary additional administrative effort by Member States and EU institutions'.<sup>124</sup> The European Defence Agency (EDA) has been working towards these objectives since 2004 with different results. The EU Global Strategy has given new impetus to an initiative such as CARD in facilitating a coordinated effort of EU member states on this part of EU defence cooperation. In this regard, CARD serves as a European level mechanism to coordinate member states' efforts in defence spending and investments, thus offering a tool to effectuate more efficient and coordinated defence spending by member states. The first CARD is expected at the end of this year.<sup>125</sup>

As Mogherini reported in her first review of the EU Global Strategy: "it is increasingly clear that [these initiatives] can mutually reinforce each other".<sup>126</sup> Nevertheless, there is a real risk that there are too many programmes, which can result in (political) confusion, duplication and lack of effectiveness and with that the collapse of the entire EU agenda on defence. For all these and new initiatives, it is imperative that the different

124 Consilium. "Council Conclusions on Progress in Implementing the EU Global Strategy in the Area of Security and Defence - Consilium," March 6, 2017. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/06/conclusions-security-defence/>.

125 For a further iteration on CARD, see Daniel Fiott. "The CARD on the EU Defence Table," April 27, 2017. [https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert\\_10\\_CARD\\_0.pdf](https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_10_CARD_0.pdf).

126 European Commission. "From Shared Vision to Common Action: Implementing the EU Global Strategy Year 1," June 20, 2017. [http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/full\\_brochure\\_year\\_1.pdf](http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/full_brochure_year_1.pdf). P. 23.

actions are synchronised and a constant reflection takes place in Brussels and between member states towards possible links between the different initiatives.

## FURTHER EUROPEAN DEFENCE COOPERATION IN THE WORKS

BRUSSELS IS NOT the only place busy setting forth and implementing initiatives to further enhance and provide for European defence cooperation through the EU. Waiting for the German coalition talks to finalise, France is set to take the lead on the Franco-German axis that earlier pushed to make use of all the possibilities in the EU Treaty to make CSDP more effective, and endorsing PESCO is one of them. Elected earlier in this year, French President Macron is the only European political leader to have set forth a vision specifically endorsing far-reaching EU defence cooperation. For example, he has endorsed the idea of a European defence budget, to be deployed in making the burden-sharing of CSDP missions fairer.<sup>127</sup> This idea has also been proposed by the EU's in-house think tank, the European Political Strategy Centre, calling for an EU Security and Defence Union budget: a swift review of EU-budgeted programmes and funds across the full range of defence- and security-related activities should be conducted, with the main aim of identifying potential economies of scale and determining the merits of the joined-up financing of defence and security, possibly already in the next Multiannual Financial Framework.<sup>128</sup>

127 "Sorbonne Speech of Emmanuel Macron - Full Text / English Version," September 26, 2017. <http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html>.

128 European Political Strategy Centre. "The Defence-Security Nexus. Towards an EU Collective Security," October 18, 2017. [https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/epsc\\_strategic\\_note\\_28\\_-\\_the\\_defence-security\\_nexus\\_-\\_towards\\_an\\_eu\\_collective\\_security.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/epsc_strategic_note_28_-_the_defence-security_nexus_-_towards_an_eu_collective_security.pdf).

Another initiative that is in the works is a plan to create a ‘military Schengen zone’, reforming the rules and procedures applying to moving troops and military equipment inside the EU.<sup>129</sup> Such an initiative would liberate the movement of troops and materiel between EU member states. In case of crisis or emergency, military transport, for example, would priority on national railway tracks. Nevertheless, credibility, interoperability and readiness are only achieved through exercises and training during peacetime.<sup>130</sup> Providing for cooperation and cutting red tape on this matter would serve both NATO and the EU in increasing their defence capabilities and making use of efficiency through cooperation.

These are just a few of the ideas that are currently being floated in Brussels and in the different member states’ capitals. It is imperative for the momentum for European defence (cooperation) to keep the discussion going and give room to deliberations and discussions on different aspects of making European defence, whether that being in ‘just’ cutting red tape or agreeing on far-reaching military integration plans.

## BRINGING TWO SECURITY ORGANISATIONS TOGETHER: INCREASED EU-NATO COOPERATION

2016 WAS ALSO paramount to EU-NATO cooperation. Within a month of the Brexit vote and the presentation of the EU Global Strategy, the Warsaw NATO Summit took place. This summit saw a milestone in EU-NATO cooperation. While cooperation between the organisations has been longstanding, they both acknowledged

129 European Defence Agency. “Europe Needs a Military Schengen,” Issue 2017. <https://www.eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue12/cover-story/europe-needs-a-military-schengen>.

130 Karlijn Jans, Rachel Rizzo. “Why Europe Needs a ‘Military Schengen Zone,’” August 22, 2017. <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/22991/why-europe-needs-a-military-schengen-zone>.

there and then the need to further enhance cooperation in order to face and deal with the multitude of threats in which the organisations have a mutual need for each other, NATO as an alliance with full military capabilities and the EU as a ‘soft power’ organisation with a range of political-economic capabilities at its disposal. The ambitions and depth of the initiatives announced in Warsaw were unprecedented. The final communiqué includes references to enhanced EU-NATO cooperation and contains the joint declaration between the EU and NATO:

“In fulfilling the objectives [...], we [EU and NATO] believe there is an urgent need to:

- Boost our ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response. The development of coordinated procedures through our respective playbooks will substantially contribute to implementing our efforts.
- Broaden and adapt our operational cooperation including at sea, and on migration, through increased sharing of maritime situational awareness as well as better coordination and mutual reinforcement of our activities in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.
- Expand our coordination on cyber security and defence including in the context of our missions and operations, exercises and on education and training.
- Develop coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities of EU Member States and NATO Allies, as well as multilateral projects.

- Facilitate a stronger defence industry and greater defence research and industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic.
- Step up our coordination on exercises, including on hybrid, by developing as the first step parallel and coordinated exercises for 2017 and 2018.
- Build the defence and security capacity and foster the resilience of our partners in the East and South in a complementary way through specific projects in a variety of areas for individual recipient countries, including by strengthening maritime capacity.”<sup>131</sup>

The declaration thus set out a roadmap to intensify and increase cooperation between the two institutions.<sup>132</sup> In addition to endorsement from NATO, the other partner to the declaration also acknowledged the need for further cooperation. The EU Global Strategy references the need for closer cooperation between the two institutions and reads:

“When it comes to collective defence, NATO remains the primary framework for most Member States. At the same time, EU-NATO relations shall not prejudice the security and defence policy of those Members which are not in NATO. The EU will therefore deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance in complementarity, synergy, and full respect for the institutional framework, inclusiveness and decision-making

131 NATO. “Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” NATO, July 8, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133163.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm).

132 NATO. “Warsaw Summit Communiqué - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016.” NATO, July 9, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm). Paragraphs 121–126.

autonomy of the two.”<sup>133</sup>

Later that same year and as a follow up, both institutions jointly announced 42 Implementation Action Points, in the areas of countering hybrid threats, operational cooperation including maritime issues, cyber security and defence, defence capabilities, parallel and coordinated exercises and defence, defence industry and research and security capacity-building.<sup>134</sup> An example of this joint implementation plan is the new European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats based in Helsinki.<sup>135</sup> Further developments and initiatives in institutional and operational cooperation are expected in the coming period.

Sweden and Finland are not allies but close partners. As illustrated at the NATO summit in Warsaw, both countries have a special relationship with the alliance. Sweden and Finland were in fact mentioned separately in the final summit communiqué.<sup>136</sup> The Finnish government has underscored the importance of the two institutions’ convergence: “Finland must be active in advancing any opportunities for cooperation in the EU and NATO”.<sup>137</sup> To either country, NATO membership discussions are sensitive, cooperation with NATO however is longstanding and operational in a high degree. From the side of both countries, it is

133 “A Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union - EU Global Strategy - European Commission.” EU Global Strategy, June 2016. /globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union. P. 20

134 “EU and NATO Start New Era of Cooperation - EEAS - European External Action Service - European Commission.” EEAS - European External Action Service. Accessed October 27, 2017. [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage\\_en/16643/EU](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/16643/EU)

135 For further information see: “Hybrid CoE – The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats.” <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/>.

136 Paragraph 23 (and 101 for Sweden specifically) NATO. “Warsaw Summit Communiqué - Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016.” NATO, July 9, 2016. [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official\\_texts\\_133169.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm).

137 Prime Minister’s Office Finland. “Government’s Defence Report,” July 2017. [http://www.defmin.fi/files/3688/J07\\_2017\\_Governments\\_Defence\\_Report\\_Eng\\_PLM\\_160217.pdf](http://www.defmin.fi/files/3688/J07_2017_Governments_Defence_Report_Eng_PLM_160217.pdf). P. 17.

imperative, as EU members, to stay close to the developments on the convergence of the EU and NATO on the above-mentioned action points and policy areas. Increased cooperation between the EU and NATO would allow both Finland and Sweden get into the loop of NATO developments, perhaps even more so than now, below the threshold of membership.

On the one hand, with the changing nature of NATO tasks and focus, also the relationship with Sweden and Finland is set to change. From partnering in international missions in Afghanistan to NATO's activities within the Enhanced Forward Presence deployment close to Swedish and Finnish border, making the link between Sweden and Finland and the NATO alliance in the future perhaps more complicated and the same time more important.<sup>138</sup> On the other hand, with a renewed focus on (hybrid) security issues in the Baltic region, the role of Sweden and Finland as security providers in that region has become more prominent. Although only members of the EU, this role remains significant for NATO too. Therefore, as EU members and close partners to NATO, Sweden and Finland could assume leadership in developing security and defence cooperation between the organisations.<sup>139</sup> Areas in which EU-NATO agreed to cooperate and in which both countries could make a real difference. As referred to earlier, Finland has already partially taken up this task by hosting the European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats, making informally a link to a specific threat in the region itself, and making a contribution to enhancing EU-NATO cooperation.

138 Wieslander, Anna. "Can They Get Any Closer? The Case for Deepening the Partnerships Between Sweden and Finland with NATO." Atlantic Council. Accessed October 27, 2017. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/can-they-get-any-closer-the-case-for-deepening-the-partnerships-between-sweden-and-finland-with-nato>.

139 Wieslander, Anna. "Sweden and Finland Should Lead EU-NATO Cooperation on Hybrid and Resilience." Atlantic Council, December 5, 2016. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/sweden-and-finland-should-lead-eu-nato-cooperation-on-hybrid-and-resilience>.

## CONCLUSION: THE EU AS A SECURITY PROVIDER IN THE TRUMP ERA?

DID TRUMP CHANGE everything for European defence or is it just business as usual? Despite the U.S. President's comments in the media, the true implementation or impact of an 'America First' policy towards Europe's security is not apparent at this moment. As a matter of fact, the President's comments have diverged from U.S. officials who have travelled to Europe with a message: "do not pay attention to what the President says, instead look at what the administration does."<sup>140</sup> An example is the continued commitment of the U.S. towards Europe's security Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP)<sup>141</sup> and financial commitments towards the European Reassurance Initiative. The frank comments by the U.S. President did shake up Brussels and in a way provided for a push factor, certainly for a political sense of urgency to act on European defence.

The impending Brexit and a range of external security factors have proven to be additional factors pushing the European leadership to think seriously about defence spending, solving the capability gap and attempting to answer the question as to what role the EU should play when strengthening European defence. As Juncker stated in Prague in June 2017:

140 Anna Wieslander. "Beyond the Article 5 Backlash: What Really Happened with Trump and NATO." EURACTIV.com, June 2, 2017. <https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/opinion/beyond-the-article-5-backlash-what-really-happened-with-trump-and-nato/>.

141 NATO. "NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence," May 2017. [https://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2017\\_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf](https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf).



*“Over the past decade it has become crystal clear that our American partners consider that they are shouldering too much of the burden for their wealthy European Allies. We have no other choice than to defend our own interests in the Middle East, in climate change, in our trade agreements.”<sup>142</sup>*

Three years ago, ‘defence’ in the Schuman area, that hosts the main EU institutions, was a ‘dirty word’ and not considered a policy area the EU should act upon. Fast forward to 2016 and the last months of 2017; a range of European initiatives to strengthen the ‘defence pillar’ are being discussed, implemented and endorsed by all member states.

For Finland and Sweden, despite several bilateral and multi-lateral defence cooperation issues, the EU remains a cornerstone in their defence and security policy; as a security provider and as a platform for European defence cooperation. Currently, Sweden and Finland, like other European countries, would be dependent and rely on outside support to maintain its sovereignty in an evolving military crisis in, for example, the Baltic Sea region. In updating their security and defence strategies as well as through their political endorsements for these new EU initiatives, the EU is being recognised as a serious security provider.

Progress of its own ambition set out in the EU Global Strategy is being made and defence is being taken seriously on a political level. Nevertheless, many of these plans are not entirely new. For example, PESCO was discussed shortly after the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, but urgency and political will were lacking and most of the initiatives died a quick death. For many of the recent initiatives taken on the EU-level, ‘the proof of the

142 “European Commission - PRESS RELEASES - Press Release - Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Defence and Security Conference Prague: In Defence of Europe,” June 2017. [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-17-1581\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-1581_en.htm).

eating is in the pudding'. Should the initiatives that are currently on the table fail to be successfully implemented by member states or prove to be otherwise inadequate, Europe risks losing the momentum to achieve major progress on European defence cooperation. "Only if European capitals translate their recent declarations of political will into a real and sustainable increase in defence spending can the new CSDP proposals succeed."<sup>143</sup> Whether these initiatives will solve the challenges for European defence, and with that its military posture and deterrence, therefore remains to be seen.

It is, however, important to point out that it is the member states who will decide how effective and fruitful the initiatives on further advancing the European defence cooperation agenda, proposed by Mogherini, will be. Member states should look critically at the proposed plans, but the proposals should help tackle the capability gap that member states and, as a consequence, the EU suffer from.<sup>144</sup> It should be borne in mind that the European Commission can only shape the framework and create the necessary conditions for increasing the effectiveness of defence spending and cooperation. The success factor lays with the member states. Only through their political and strategic convergence or alignment, the EU can have a Common Security and Defence Policy with the right tools that can set the ambition for what kind of European defence is needed.

143 Sophia Besch. "EU Defence, Brexit and Trump," December 2016. [http://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pb\\_defence\\_14dec16.pdf](http://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pb_defence_14dec16.pdf).

144 Karlijn Jans. "Will Mogherini's Plans Transform European Defence? | Friends of Europe," December 2016. <http://www.friendsofeurope.org/publication/will-mogherinis-plans-transform-european-defence>.