

Section I

**Demographic Changes in
Europe and the United States:
What Impact on Foreign Policy?**

Chapter 1

How Do Demographic Changes in the United States Affect American Views on U.S. Foreign Policy?

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Donald Trump's 2016 presidential election victory has created mounting uncertainty about U.S. relations with the rest of the world. His transactional "America First" approach to international politics and trade brings into question the benefits of U.S. alliances and trade agreements in Europe and Asia, and calls for partner countries to increase their contributions. On his first official visit as president to Europe in May 2017, President Trump initially opted not to explicitly acknowledge security obligations under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—although he did acknowledge them later—further calling into question the U.S. commitment to Europe. In addition, President Trump has withdrawn U.S. participation in the Paris Climate Accord—much to the disappointment of other world leaders. He scrapped negotiations on trade agreements with Asian countries and is renegotiating NAFTA.

It is becoming increasingly important to note that the positions staked out by President Trump have not been taken with American public opinion in mind. The American public remains committed to allies in Europe and Asia, sees many benefits to international trade, and continues to support an active role for the United States in world affairs. In fact, American opinion on NATO, U.S. allies in Asia, and the U.S. role in the world has changed little over the course of the last 40 years, even as the United States has undergone broad demographic change.

Given the potency of identity politics in the 2016 election, however, there is concern that demographic shifts could influence the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. In this chapter, we use demographic and public opinion data to investigate whether the changes wrought by the Trump administration are likely to be a temporary aberration or a harbinger of longer-term shifts in American foreign policy preferences. Increased diversity, an aging population, education, and geography are all factors to consider. Do the views of people who did not live through the Cold War differ

from those who did? Do the geographic voting patterns that emerged from the 2016 presidential election signal a different point of view from the Midwest? With a rising immigrant population, are Americans still oriented toward Europe as a key security partner?

We conclude that there is relatively little to suggest that the ongoing demographic shifts taking place in America foreshadow a shift in American attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy. Likewise, regional divides have little impact on foreign policy attitudes. Instead, partisan rifts continue to act as the most important dividing line when it comes to foreign policy differences.

A Growing, Diversifying, and Aging United States

In terms of population growth, the United States has more in common with many developing countries than it does with developed nations. In nearly all cases, the populations of developed countries are either stagnant or are in serious decline. East Asia is leading the way in this decrease, with serious population drops already taking place in Japan, soon to become a reality in South Korea and China. In Europe, a more prolonged greying is taking place. In contrast, the U.S. Census Bureau predicts that the U.S. population will continue to grow at a steady pace from now through 2060.¹ While the U.S. population was nearly 319 million in 2014, it is projected to reach 417 million by 2060—an increase of roughly 30 percent. This puts the United States among the top 5 fastest growing countries in the world, and the only developed country in the top ten.²

The United States is now more racially and ethnically diverse than ever before, and that trend will continue in the coming decades. The Pew Research Center projects that by 2055 whites will no longer be the majority—largely due to past and future immigration inflows from Latin America and Asia.³ The African-American portion of the population is also expected to increase 42 percent between 2014 and 2060.⁴ While the native-

¹ Sandra L. Colby and Jennifer M. Orton, “Projections of the Size and Composition of the U.S. Population: 2014 to 2060,” U.S. Census Bureau, March 2015, accessed at <https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/demo/p25-1143.pdf>.

² Fox Business, “The Countries with the Fastest Growing Populations,” August 2, 2011.

³ Pew Research Center, “10 demographic trends that are shaping the U.S. and the world,” March 31, 2016.

⁴ Colby and Orton, “Projections of the Size and Composition of the U.S. Population: 2014 to 2060.”

born population will increase by 22 percent, the foreign-born population is estimated to increase by 85 percent. The percentage of the total population that is foreign-born will grow from 13 percent to 19 percent in that time span.^{5,6}

The Diversity Divide in U.S. Political Party Affiliation

Demographic divides and partisan affiliation tend to reinforce one another in the United States. Republican Party supporters are more likely than Democrats to be older and white, while supporters of the Democratic Party tend to be younger and more diverse.⁷

Public opinion data gathered by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs over the past 43 years makes clear just how dramatic the diversity divide has become among supporters of the two major U.S. political parties. Among self-identified Republicans in 1974, 95 percent described themselves as white. More than 40 years later, Republicans were still 87 percent white, a decline of just 8 percentage points. Hispanics now make up roughly six percent and African-Americans make up roughly one percent of Republican Party supporters.

That lack of diversification stands in stark contrast to the transformation that the Democratic constituency has undergone. Among self-identified Democratic Party supporters in 1974, 84 percent described themselves as white—already more diverse than the Republican Party is today. Diversification among Democratic Party supporters has continued apace: in 2016,

⁵ These numbers should not be confused with birthrates. The increase in foreign-born members of the population is driven by immigration. But the increase in the native-born population will include births from native-born citizens as well as foreign-born parents having children in the United States—thus making their children native born.

⁶ In terms of policy impact, an increase in immigrants to the country does not necessarily translate into increases in the voting population—the most obvious way American citizens influence U.S. foreign policy. Theoretically, immigrants to the United States could remain permanent residents, visa holders, or undocumented immigrants for their entire lives. But estimates from the Migration Policy Institute as of 2015 shows that roughly 50 percent of immigrants are naturalized U.S. citizens—thus qualifying to vote in presidential and congressional elections. See <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-immigration-united-states#Naturalization>.

⁷ Of the 2062 respondents in the 2016 Chicago Council Survey, 1337 identified themselves as white, non-Hispanic; 241 as black, non-Hispanic; 319 as Hispanic and 164 as either mixed races or “other.”

survey results show that 61 percent of Democratic Party supporters described themselves as white, 18 percent as black, and 13 percent as Hispanic.

These shifts matter. In every election since 1968, a majority of whites have voted for Republican candidates. Minorities have tended to vote for Democratic candidates. Given this pattern, one would expect that faster growth of minority populations compared with whites would help Democrats in elections. Arguably, a case could be made that this trend could have influenced the election of Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012.

But the 2016 election outcome highlights a core challenge for the Democratic Party. While Hispanics, Asians, and blacks now reliably vote Democratic in presidential elections, these three groups also have traditionally lower voter turnout rates than whites.⁸ In presidential elections since 1988, whites have averaged roughly 65 percent turnout, compared to lower percentages among African Americans (60%) and Hispanics (47%). In only the 2012 elections did black turnout exceed that of white turnout.

The 2016 election was telling in this regard. There was a significant drop in younger black voter turnout compared to 2012;⁹ in fact, black voter turnout rates slipped in 2016 for the first time in 20 years. And even though Donald Trump won a majority of white voters, he lost among every other race and ethnicity by large margins.¹⁰

While election victories may see political leadership alternate between parties, rarely does it bring a complete overhaul in foreign policy. Voters rarely choose a candidate based solely on foreign policy issues, but the candidate that wins generally sets the tone for U.S. international engagement. In the seven decades since the end of World War II, the party in power may have changed the focus of U.S. foreign policy—particularly if an administration launched a military intervention or faced a major threat from abroad. But the general contours of traditional U.S. foreign policy continued, centered on strong alliances and open markets. This was put into question with the dawn of Donald Trump.

⁸ United States Election project, “Voter Turnout Demographics,” accessed May 10, 2017.

⁹ Pew Research Center Fact Tank, “Black Voter Turnout Fell in 2016, even as Record Number of Americans Cast Ballots”, May 12, 2017.

¹⁰ CNN, “Election 2016 Exit Polls,” accessed May 10, 2017.

The Age Factor

Racial and ethnic diversity are not the only demographic factor to influence elections—and thus American foreign policy. Age is another key factor.

At roughly 87 million strong, Millennials—those born between 1980 and 1997—are now the largest living generation of Americans, and many expect them, to have the same massive impact on culture, society, and elections as the Baby Boomers. Robert Gates, former Secretary of Defense under Barack Obama, voiced concern about the impact this cohort might have on transatlantic relations. In a speech delivered in Brussels in 2011, Gates worried that “if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders—those for whom the Cold War was *not* the formative experience that it was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.”¹¹

Despite Millennials’ overall numbers and expected future influence, Baby Boomers will retain their clout for now in terms of the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Seniors represented 17.5 percent of all eligible voters in 2000, and this group is expected to rise to more than 25 percent by 2032.¹² The increase of those 65 years old and older is a marked shift in the projected age profile of the United States.

Not only do older Americans have higher voting turnout rates, Chicago Council Survey findings show that they pay closer attention to U.S. foreign policy. Nearly half of those over the age of 65 say they closely follow news about U.S. relations with other countries versus just two in ten between the ages of 18 and 44. Because age and diversity are occurring at faster rates than the other demographic factors included in this analysis, we also look at longer-term trends on certain questions to detect any shifts within these subgroups.

¹¹ Robert M. Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO),” Speech delivered as Secretary of Defense in Brussels, Belgium, June 10, 2011.

¹² William H. Frey, Ruy Teixeira, and Robert Griffin, “America’s Electoral Future,” February 2016, Center for American Progress, accessed at <https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/25000130/SOC2016-report2.pdf>.

Educational Attainment & Geography as Factors

Educational Attainment

Educational attainment is another demographic factor that has played a role in past elections, and this was an especially potent factor in 2016. According to CNN exit polls, Hillary Clinton won voters with a college degree (52 percent) and Trump carried voters without a college degree (51 percent).¹³ This factor is particularly important among white voters. Among whites, Trump won an overwhelming share of those without a college degree; and among white college graduates—a group that many identified as key for a potential Clinton victory—Trump still outperformed Clinton, but by a 4-point margin.¹⁴ According to CNN exit poll analyses, this was the largest gap in support among college-educated and non-college educated whites in exit polls dating back to 1980.

Geography

At a post-election event for the National Lawyers' Convention at the Federalist Society, Senator Ted Cruz framed the outcome of the 2016 vote as the “revenge of flyover country,” a reference to the crucial votes in the upper Midwest that helped to swing the election to Donald Trump. Some of these states—Pennsylvania and Michigan, specifically—had not voted for a Republican president since 1988. Wisconsin had not voted Republican since 1984. Ohio and Iowa usually vote Republican but went for Obama in 2008 and 2012.¹⁵ These shifts put the Midwest under the magnifying glass in post-election analyses, and we also include region as a potential influence in foreign policy attitudes.

The Foreign Policy Consensus


While deep ideological cleavage between the Democratic and Republican parties is a core feature of contemporary politics, there is a broad consensus on foreign policy among the political elite. Less recognized, this consensus largely extends to the American public, and data from the

¹³ See <http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls>.

¹⁴ Clara Hendrickson & William A. Galston, “The education rift in the 2016 election,” November 18, 2016.

¹⁵ Time Meko, Denise Lu, & Lazaro Gamio, “How Trump won the presidency with razor-thin margins in swing states,” *Washington Post*, November 11, 2016, accessed at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/swing-state-margins/>.

Figure 1. Active Part in World Affairs



Source: 2016 Chicago Council Survey, Chicago Council On Global Affairs

Council’s surveys suggests that this consensus extends across age, education, region, and ethnic and racial groups.

Attitudes on the role of the United States in the world offer an illustrative point. In 2016, 64 percent of the American public favored an active role for the United States in world affairs—down just 3 percentage points from 1974 when the question was first asked. Moreover, majorities across all ethnicities and races agreed.

While younger age groups have been consistently less likely than older generations to favor an activist American role, the long-term trends on age seem to suggest that support for active American engagement tends to increase as people age. The Millennial generation may be no different than young people at previous points in history.

Over time, there have not been significant changes among these various demographic groupings. The only exception was in 2002, just after the September 11 attacks. Support for an active American role increased across the board, followed by a return to average levels. In addition, the preference for an active part in world affairs has increased among African Americans since 1998, when fewer than half (46%) supported an active role in world affairs for the United States. In every survey since, roughly six in ten African Americans have stated the same. Roughly six in ten Hispanics have consistently supported an active role.

There is also broad agreement across all demographic groupings that the United States should share international leadership (rather than try to dominate). (See Appendix for full results.)

These numbers help to illustrate that support for U.S. international engagement cuts across age, ethnicity, education, region, and partisanship, with majorities of each group consistently in support. The longstanding nature of this trend makes it seem unlikely that there will be a reversal in the near future.

Consensus on NATO

Americans are in close agreement on issues that directly tie the United States to Europe. Given the special relationship that the United States and Europe have shared for the past 60 years, perhaps this is no surprise. In fact, Americans have positive feelings for Europe, rate European countries in highly favorable terms, and express majority confidence in the EU's ability to deal responsibly with world problems.¹⁶ They are less likely to express the same degree of confidence in Asian allies or other countries in the world (with the exception of Canada).¹⁷

Despite concern that the American public may eventually begin to favor involvement in the Asia-Pacific over Europe, the data does not bear this out. While Chicago Council Surveys show that confidence in Asian allies has increased, this has not been at the expense of positive views of Europe. For example, confidence in Japan to deal responsibly with world affairs increased from 58 percent in 2015 to 64 percent in 2017. During that same time, confidence in South Korea grew from 36 percent to 42 percent. Confidence in the European Union remained steady at roughly 65 percent. The American public continues to value European partnerships at previous levels even as the Asia-Pacific has grown in importance.

Americans are similarly convinced about the importance of NATO. Two-thirds of all Americans (65%) say that NATO is still essential—a 12 percentage point increase from when the question was first asked in 2002—

¹⁶ See the 2016 Chicago Council Survey, "America in the Age of Uncertainty," for more analysis, https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/ccgasurvey2016_america_age_uncertainty.pdf.

¹⁷ Region also has little effect on these views. For example, there was virtually no difference between Americans on the East Coast and those on the West Coast in assessing the benefits of alliances in Europe and East Asia.

and more than six in ten across all demographic groups agree. An even greater majority believe the U.S. should maintain (63%) or even increase (12%) the U.S. commitment to NATO, an increase of 13 percentage points since the question was first asked in 1974. Moreover, majorities have also consistently wanted to either maintain or increase the U.S. commitment to NATO.

It is partisanship that creates the widest differences of opinion on the necessity of NATO, with greater differences between Republicans and Democrats than between racial or age groups. Specifically, in 2016, there is a 24-percentage point gap between Democrats (81%) and Republicans (57%) or Independents (58%) who said that NATO is still essential, nearly double the gaps produced among race and age cohorts.

Support for Bases in Germany

One of the key aspects of the transatlantic alliance is maintaining U.S. military bases in Europe, and the 2016 Chicago Council Survey finds continued support for U.S. military bases in Germany. Overall, 61 percent of the American public said the U.S. should have bases there, with majorities across all demographic groupings in favor. And while not specific to Europe, the same survey also found broad support for bases in Japan (60%) and South Korea (70%).

A larger majority of Republicans (70%) than Democrats (58%) or Independents (56%) say the U.S. should continue basing in Germany. This 12-percentage point gap is roughly equal to the gap between African Americans (52%) and whites (63%), but partisan gaps are far more consistent throughout the data. Moreover, in each case the support only differs by degree, with each percentage comprising a majority.

Shared Dislike for Russia

NATO was formed to provide collective security against the Soviet Union, and in the 1990s many questioned whether the alliance was still relevant in the post-cold War period. There are fewer questions about that today, primarily because of Russia's resurgence in the region. Russia is increasingly becoming a focus of concern in Europe and the United States, due to its provocations in eastern Ukraine, annexation of Crimea, and hacking of American political organizations. In the United States,

Figure 2: NATO commitment (%)

	Germany Bases Should Have	NATO Essential Still essential
White, non-Hispanic	62	64
Black, non-Hispanic	52	66
Hispanic	63	68
Other	57	75
18-29	59	63
30-44	57	66
45-59	62	66
60+	63	65
White, non-college	62	61
White, college	61	69
Non-white, non-college	57	67
Non-white, college	61	75
High school diploma or less	59	64
Some college	63	61
College degree	61	71
Northeast	64	65
Midwest	59	73
South	60	61
West	59	65
Republican	70	57
Independent	56	58
Democrat	58	81

Question: Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places? (Germany)

Question: Do you feel we should increase our commitment to NATO, keep our commitment what it is now, decrease our commitment to NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely?

relations with Russia have taken a more political tone given ongoing investigations into the Trump campaign staff's meetings with Russia officials during the 2016 election.

While American attitudes toward Russia initially improved after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, they have recently returned to Cold War levels. Americans across generations, age groups, and education levels are cool toward Russia, rating it below 45 on a 0 to 100 "thermometer" scale that measures broad attitudes toward countries (0 being least favorable and 100 being most favorable; see Appendix). In 2016, there was a broad preference across all demographic groups to undertake friendly cooperation rather than active attempts to limit Russia's power. But preliminary results from the 2017 Chicago Council Survey show that this sentiment has shifted, with a majority preferring instead to limit Russia's power.¹⁸

In terms of partisanship, Democrats were more open to cooperating with Russia than Republicans in 2016. However, recent surveys have found an interesting partisan shift, with Republicans now more positive than Democrats toward Russia.

Contentious Issues: Immigration, Trade, & Climate

It seems unlikely that American attitudes on Euro-specific issues such as NATO's relevance, and basing in Germany will take a sustained negative turn in future years. But the future U.S.-European relationship may hinge on transnational issues of shared interest—immigration, trade, and climate change. On both sides of the Atlantic, borders that are open to flows of people, goods, and capital have long been a common goal. On climate change, there has been close cooperation in an attempt to mitigate the effects of climate change, despite Trump's intention to withdraw the United States from the Paris climate agreement.

Declining Threat Perception from Immigration in the U.S., but Wide Partisan Divide

A longstanding political issue in the United States, the immigration debate took on a more ominous tone in the 2016 presidential election.

¹⁸ Dina Smeltz and Lily Wojtowicz, "Trust Trump To Negotiate with Putin? Americans Say Nyet," Chicago Council on Global Affairs, July 21, 2017.

The deep divides among the American public were on full display, and the issue seems set to continue on as a focal point of divisiveness for the foreseeable future. If U.S. public opinion turns against immigration more broadly—and against accepting refugees more specifically—there could be two consequences of concern for U.S.-Europe relations.

A U.S. public that opposes admitting refugees would create a situation in which European states must carry an increased burden. In 2016, Europe received more than 1 million refugees, primarily originating from Asia and the Middle East.¹⁹ In that same year, the United States accepted 85,000.²⁰ If the United States were to suddenly shut its doors to refugees, a significant portion of these would likely end up in Europe.

More importantly, a United States public that favors closing itself off from the world would put it at odds with Europe on an underlying issue of shared values. Open borders that allow the free movement of people, goods, and capital are time-honored ideals shared by the United States and Europe. This could deal a potentially serious blow to the transatlantic relationship.


The vast public opinion divide on the threat of immigration to the United States is one that is driven by partisanship (Figure 3). In 1998 and 2002, all political party supporters were closely aligned on this issue. Beginning in 2004, Democrats steadily became less concerned, with fewer and fewer viewing it as a critical threat. In 2016, the difference in threat perceptions from immigration among Republicans and Democrats stood at 40 percentage points—a record gap in Chicago Council Surveys.

One reason for this divergence appears to be the increasing racial and ethnic diversity of the Democratic Party over time, as discussed on page 2. In 1998, majorities among all racial groups identified immigration as a critical threat. In 2016, one-half (50%, 53% in 1998) of whites continued to say immigration is a critical threat. But African Americans have become much less likely to view immigration as a critical threat (from 58% in 1998 to 29% in 2016), as have Hispanics (from 64% to 31%). Americans under

¹⁹ Emma Batha, “Europe’s refugee and migrant crisis in 2016. In numbers,” World Economic Forum, December 5, 2016. Accessed at: <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/europes-refugee-and-migrant-crisis-in-2016-in-numbers>.

²⁰ Jens Manuel Krogstad and Jynnah Radford, “Key facts about refugees to the U.S.,” Pew Research Center, January 30, 2017. Accessed at: <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/30/key-facts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s/>.

Figure 3. More Republicans See Immigration as a Critical Threat



Source: 2016 Chicago Council Survey, Chicago Council On Global Affairs

the age of 45 have also become less likely to view immigration as a critical threat versus half or more over 45 and older.

Despite these shifts over time, it is clear that on immigration, too, partisan divides overshadow most demographic differences. There is a 40-percentage point difference between Republicans (67%) and Democrats (27%) who describe increasing refugee and immigration flows as a critical threat, wider than any differences between races or age groups.²¹

The most immediate concern in terms of immigration for the future U.S.-EU relationship is willingness to accept refugees especially from crises created by internal conflicts. While the United States has taken in only a limited number of refugees resulting from the Syrian conflict, this migration temporarily paralyzed certain European countries. Overall, about four in ten (36%) Americans said they favor accepting Syrian refugees into the United States. Americans’ limited willingness to accept refugees is nothing new. Majorities disapproved of admitting Hungarian refugees in 1958, refugees from Indochina in 1979, Cubans in 1980, and Haitians in 1994.²²

²¹ A similar pattern emerges when examining attitudes on controlling and reducing illegal immigration, with partisanship driving divides on the issue more than demographic variables. See Appendix, Table 4.

²² Drew Desilver, “U.S. public seldom has welcomed refugees into the country,” Pew Research Center, Nov. 19, 2015, accessed June 6, 2017 at <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/19/u-s-public-seldom-has-welcomed-refugees-into-country/>.

Figure 4: Attitudes toward Immigration (%)


	Large numbers of immigrants and refugees are a critical threat to the US	Controlling and reducing illegal immigration a very important foreign policy goal for the US	Support accepting Syrian refugees into the US
White, non-Hispanic	50	51	32
Black, non-Hispanic	29	36	40
Hispanic	31	33	44
Other	37	34	56
18-29	31	34	46
30-44	37	35	38
45-59	51	51	27
60+	51	57	36
White, non-college	53	55	24
White, college	42	43	47
Non-white, non-college	32	36	44
Non-white, college	30	31	48
Northeast	46	40	35.5
Midwest	45	48.5	37.5
South	42	44	36
West	42	47	37
Republican	67	68	18
Independent	40	40	32
Democrat	27	31	56

Question: Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all: (large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming to the US)

Question: Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all: (controlling and reducing illegal immigration)

Question: Do you support or oppose the United States taking each of the following actions with respect to Syria? (Accepting Syrian refugees into the United States)

Figure 5. Republicans and Democrats are Divided on the Importance of Controlling and Reducing Illegal Immigrants



Source: 2016 Chicago Council Survey, Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Demographically speaking, whites (32% favor), particularly those without a college degree (24%), were least likely to support accepting Syrian refugees into the United States. But college-educated whites (47%), blacks (40%), and Hispanics (44%) were similarly light in their support, reflecting a consensus of sorts. There is a gulf of distance, however, between Republican (18%) and Democratic (56%) party supporters.²³ These partisan differences help to explain why immigration policies often vacillate depending on the party in power in the United States.

Trade

While the EU-U.S. economic relationship's share of the overall global economy has declined in overall size in recent years, it remains vitally important for both partners. Trade in goods was roughly \$700 billion in 2015, and both countries are significant destinations for and sources of

²³ Similarly, there was a more gaping partisan than racial divide when asked about specific immigrant groups. For example, while 58 percent of Democrats expressed favorable views of immigrants from the Middle East, just 29 percent of Republicans stated the same. Favorable opinion of Mexican immigrants in the United States was 74 percent among Democrats to 46 percent among Republicans. Differences were much narrower between age, education, and racial groups.

foreign direct investment.²⁴ The transatlantic trade relationship is the world's largest, with highly integrated economies.

As a candidate, and then as president, Donald Trump has consistently criticized globalization and trade agreements for hurting the U.S. jobs. But Americans overall are quite positive toward globalization. Majorities of all demographic categories say that globalization is mostly good for the United States. Hispanic Americans, younger voters, and the college-educated are especially supportive. A majority of whites (62%) also said globalization is good in 2016, a marginal increase from 55 percent in 1998. The largest gains have been among African Americans who moved from 44 percent saying globalization is good for the U.S. economy in 1998 to 64 percent in 2016. Hispanics have also increased their support from 56 percent in 1998 to 69 percent in 2016. And most age groups have also grown more positive over time.

Partisan gaps have also grown. When this question was first asked in 1998, similar percentages of Republicans (57%) and Democrats (53%) said globalization is mostly good for the United States. By 2016, Democrats' support for globalization had increased to 74 percent while Republicans remained at 59 percent.

When asked to assess trade's impact on the United States, relatively few across all demographic groupings positively evaluated free trade's impact on U.S. jobs and job security. But majorities among the public at large saw positive benefits from trade for consumers (70%) and for American companies (57%).

Demographic factors such as race, age, and education also play a role in public attitudes toward the benefits of free trade. Younger Americans, the college-educated, and non-whites are generally more likely than other groups to say that free trade is good for the U.S. economy, U.S. companies, consumers, and standards of living (see Appendix, Table 3).

Climate

One issue at the forefront of U.S.-European relations is that of climate change. This issue is a truly global problem that requires global cooperation, and has provided an area where Europe and the United States have

²⁴ "European Union," *Office of the United States Trade Representative*, accessed Oct. 2017, accessed at <https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/europe/european-union>.

the opportunity to lead. But President Trump's decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Paris Agreement has created worry that the United States no longer shares believes in tackling the issue jointly. A U.S. public turning away from action on climate change may signal trouble ahead in the U.S.-European relationship.

In the 2016 Chicago Council Survey, support for U.S. participation in the Paris Agreement was generally high. Majorities across all demographic variables, and 71 percent overall, supported the agreement "that calls for countries to collectively reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases." That included 57 percent of Republicans.

However, while support was high for that specific agreement, concern about climate change more generally is relatively low. Minorities of all Americans—except self-identified Democrats (57%) and non-white college educated (50%)—say that climate change is a critical threat to the United States. At the same time, only majorities of Democrats, non-whites who are college- educated, and Hispanics²⁵ say that limiting climate change is a very important goal for the United States. Partisan differences are larger than demographic differences on these questions as well.

This lack of acute concern about climate change across the U.S. public may mean that U.S.-European tensions on this issue in particular will continue, at least at the federal level. Democratic presidents will have more leeway to push the agenda on climate change than Republicans, but support may not be broad.

Conclusions

There is some concern in both the United States and Europe that a changing demographic profile in the United States might alter the future of U.S.-European relations. But the polling data show very little cause for alarm. Opinion differences by age, race, education and geography pale in comparison to consistent partisan divides. If anything, the population growth and diversification of the United States bodes positively for the issues that affect the transatlantic relationship. Moreover, attitudes on pure foreign policy issues are less salient to the public than are those that

²⁵ Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, "Latinos Resemble Other Americans in Preferences for US Foreign Policy," The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, February 2015.

Figure 6: Views toward Climate Change (%)

	Climate change a critical threat	Limiting climate change a very important foreign policy goal	Support U.S. participation in Paris climate agreement
White, non-Hispanic	36	36	69
Black, non-Hispanic	42	48	79
Hispanic	48	51	71
Other	41	41	79
18-29	35	37	76
30-44	41	44	70
45-59	39	38	68
60+	39	40	72
White, non-college	32	32	68
White, college	45	46	72
Non-white, non-college	42	44	73
Non-white, college	50	54	83
Northeast	38	36	80
Midwest	43	41	70
South	38	41	70
West	35	39.5	69
Republican	18	19	57
Independent	35	37.5	68
Democrat	57	59	87

Question: Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all: (climate change)

Question: Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all: (limiting climate change)

Question: Based on what you know, do you think the US should or should not participate in the following international agreements? (The Paris Agreement that calls for countries to collectively reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases)

also have a domestic component such as immigration and jobs in the context of globalization.

Younger Americans are more open to shared—rather than dominant—U.S. leadership, reflecting perhaps a more communitarian approach to solving problems.²⁶ Although they have not lived through the experience of the Cold War, they tend to support the U.S. commitment to NATO and the U.S. military presence abroad at a level equal to older generations. But the positive impact of a young, diverse population on policy may take time to exert its influence. The Millennial generation's full influence will likely manifest at later life stages when they increase their political participation and voting rates.

Similarly, there is little evidence that the shifting racial composition of the United States will change the direction of U.S. foreign policy toward Europe. Racial minorities are just as supportive of NATO as whites, and non-whites are more inclined than whites to be positive toward free trade and globalization.

Education is a key factor differentiating opinions among white Americans. In terms of foreign policy, college educated Americans are more supportive of an active international role for the United States, shared leadership, and U.S. commitment to NATO. The more educated Americans are, the more likely they are to support globalization, free trade, and to cooperate with both Russia and China. (And most demographic groups are favorably inclined to these policies regardless of educational attainment.) But the fact remains that a majority of Americans will continue to lack a college degree.

Despite the focus on the upper Midwest and Rust Belt in helping to decide the 2016 election, the survey data show that geography has very little, if any, impact on American attitudes on foreign policy. At least in terms of the topics covered in this survey, region does not play a significant role in differentiating attitudes. Previous Chicago Council Survey research has shown that there is more distinction between urban and rural areas.²⁷

²⁶ John Zogby, "How Millennials Are Changing the Political Debate," *Forbes*, September 10, 2015. Accessed at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnzogby/2015/09/10/millennials-transform-the-political-debate/#7066a09b4a9c>.

²⁷ Sam Tabory and Dina Smeltz, "The Urban-Suburban-Rural 'Divide' in American Views on Foreign Policy," The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, May 2017.

Of all the issues examined in this chapter, those that stand out as potential sources of friction between the United States and Europe are climate change and immigration. While there are only marginal differences between American demographic groups on these issues, the partisan differences attached to them are sharp and have increased over time.

Taken together, the data suggest that the increasing diversity in the United States will not necessarily drive a re-think on transatlantic policy issues. In fact, they suggest that diversity will drive an increase in support for immigration and addressing climate change. But that might not mean all is well. Political polarization is a growing problem in the United States, with partisan divisions dominating the conversation. The partisan differences that affect American views toward international engagement could be more difficult to reconcile over time.

Appendix

Table 1. Active Part & Shared Leadership (%)

	Active Part	Shared Leadership
White, non- Hispanic	63	61
Black, non- Hispanic	58	63
Hispanic	66	62
Other	72	71
18-29	56	67
30-44	56	65
45-59	67	60
60+	75	58
White, non-college	59	59
White, college	72	67
Non-white, non-college	61	61
Non-white, college	75	72
Northeast	64	59.5
Midwest	59	67
South	63	60
West	69	64
Republican	64	53
Independent	57.5	63
Democrat	70	70

Question: Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?

Question: What kind of leadership role should the United States play in the world? Should it be the dominant world leader, or should it play a shared leadership role, or should it not play any leadership role?

Table 2. Russia Influence

	Russia- Thermometer	Russia- Influence	EU-Influence
White, non-Hispanic	40.1	6.4	7.0
Black, non-Hispanic	39.2	5.1	6.8
Hispanic	39.2	6.3	7.2
Other	41.4	6.4	7.0
18-29	41.4	5.9	7.1
30-44	42.5	6.2	7.1
45-59	39.0	6.2	6.9
60+	37.2	6.5	7.1
White, non-college	39.4	6.2	6.9
White, college	41.5	6.7	7.3
Nonwhite, non-college	41.4	5.8	6.9
Non-white, college	34.5	6.2	7.3
High school diploma or less	37.9	6.0	6.9
Some college	43.3	6.2	7.0
College degree	39.4	6.5	7.3
Northeast	41.0	6.6	7.3
Midwest	42.1	6.2	7.1
South	37.4	6.1	6.9
West	40.9	6.2	7.0
Republican	38.1	6.3	6.8
Independent	41.5	6.3	7.0
Democrat	40.2	6.1	7.3

Question: Please rate your feelings toward some countries and peoples, with one hundred meaning a very warm, favorable feeling, zero meaning a very cold, unfavorable feeling, and fifty meaning not particularly warm or cold. You can use any number from zero to one hundred, the higher the number the more favorable your feelings are toward that country or those people.

Question: I would like to know how much influence you think each of the following countries has in the world. Please answer on a 0 to 10 scale; with 0 meaning they are not at all influential and 10 meaning they are extremely influential.

Table 3. Overall, do you think international trade is good or bad for: (% good)

	The U.S. economy	American companies	Consumers like you	Creating jobs in the U.S.	Job security for American workers	Your own standard of living
White, non-Hispanic	54	55	68	33	30	61
Black, non-Hispanic	66	67	64	55	44	63
Hispanic	66	60	79	54	47	73
Other	68	61	80	44	40	78
18-29	65	62	75	45	37	71
30-44	61	56	74	41	34	65
45-59	54	56	67	36	35	59
60+	56	57	66	38	34	63
White, non- college	50	51	62	32	29	55
White, college	64	63	81	35	30	72
Non-white, non-college	64	60	71	54	45	69
Non-white, college	73	68	83	48	42	76
Northeast	58	60	69	37.5	32	62
Midwest	54.5	52	69.5	34	31	62
South	60	59	67.5	43	36	64
West	60	59	76	41	38	67
Republican	38.5	50	66.5	34	30	60
Independent	51	57	75	37	33	60
Democrat	68	65	69	47	41.5	72

Table 4. Attitudes toward Immigration (%)

	Favor expanding wall with Mexico	Support deporting illegal immigrants	Support pathway to citizenship for illegal immigrants
White, non-Hispanic	54	33	52
Black, non-Hispanic	41	24	66
Hispanic	25	13	71
Other	53	23	64
18-29	39	20	66
30-44	45	28	57
45-59	53	34	54
60+	53	29	56
White, non-college	58	38	49
White, college	46	22	57
Non-white, non-college	36	18	71
Non-white, college	36	23	60
Northeast	45	23	61
Midwest	52	32	57
South	49	29	56.5
West	45	26	58
Republican	79	42	44
Independent	42	30.5	56
Democrat	28	14	71

Question: Do you favor or oppose a wall expanding the 700 miles of border wall and fencing with Mexico to reduce illegal immigration into the United States?

Question: When it comes to immigration, which comes closest to your view about illegal immigrants who are currently working in the U.S.?

Table 5. NATO Commitment (%)

	Increase	Maintain	Decrease	Withdraw
White, non-Hispanic	11	63	16	7
Black, non-Hispanic	13	63	9	9
Hispanic	15	61	11	7
Other	10	66	17	2
18-29	9	66	12	7
30-44	11	65	12	9
45-59	14	60	15	4
60+	12	60	18	7
White, non-college	9	61	18	8
White, college	14	68	12	4
Non-white, non-college	13	63	10	8
Non-white, college	14	64	16	3
High school diploma or less	9	62	13	9
Some college	13	60	17	7
College degree	14	67	13	4

Question: Do you feel we should increase our commitment to NATO, keep our commitment what it is now, decrease our commitment to NATO, or withdraw from NATO entirely?

