Section II

Populist Currents and European and U.S. Foreign Policies
Chapter 3
Behind America’s New Nationalism

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A great beast of resentment has been rising in the publics of Western nations. To the shocked surprise of the cognitive elites, it roared in the summer of 2016 in Britain’s referendum to leave the European Union; it then roared yet louder in the election of Donald Trump. The phenomenon is world-wide, traversing every time zone, but there is something especially unsettling about its resurgence in the Anglosphere. That Venezuela or the Philippines should be swept up in the maws of populist frenzy occasions no great disquiet; that was the sort of thing that not infrequently happened to “less developed countries.” When it happens to the two countries that always considered themselves the most developed, it strikes with volcanic force. The chattering classes suddenly realize that they are chattering among themselves, their role as leaders of opinion cast to the four winds. Their prized possessions—clever argument, reasoned deliberation—no longer seem prized. What good is an essay lamenting the decline of expertise if only experts read it?¹

The populist resurgence is essentially equivalent to nationalism in many of its guises. Today, all populists are nationalists, but not all nationalists are populists. Trump melded the two themes in his campaign, portraying himself as a representative of America First and a carrier of populist fury against globalism. In doing so, Trump threw riotously into question basic elements of the security consensus, one held tenaciously by the leadership hitherto dominant in both U.S. political parties. He also repudiated on the campaign trail central parts of the neo-liberal economic order, privileging the free movement of goods and capital. He took a draconian and indubitably ugly approach to immigration.

How far these revolutionary sentiments will be translated into policy remains unclear. On security questions, Trump has seemed to trace a trajectory in which the bold challenger to the establishment ends up being

swallowed by it, but no one can be quite sure where he’ll end up. On key issues, Trump has been defined by his erraticism.

Though unique in manifold respects, and of vastly uncertain significance, Trump’s rise was weirdly symbolic of a world-wide trend. In Poland and Hungary, in China and Russia, in India and the Philippines, in little ‘ole England and the U.S. of A.—just about everywhere, in fact—nationalism rekindles its old appeal, breathing fire against a malign outside world. Europeans used to believe that it was impossible for Americans, first among internationalists, to turn in this direction. Americans, in turn, liked to think that Europe had transcended its nationalist past. But today, old verities about what was possible have been shaken. The 2017 election of Emmanuel Macron in France, in which he defeated Marine le Pen by a 66 to 34 percent margin, suggests that strong countervailing tendencies exist to the populist and nationalist resurgence within the West, but 2016’s big surprises—Brexit and Trump—have made for a profoundly altered moral and geopolitical prospect.

The problem for this chapter is to assess the origin and strength of these populist and anti-establishment trends in the United States, and to explore how far they have mattered and will matter for U.S. foreign policy, especially the U.S.-Europe relationship. To investigate that question, we need to examine Trump and Trumpism in relation to the domestic determinant of foreign policy more broadly—that is, the political, institutional, and cultural milieu in which domestic trends play out. These include: 1) the stark polarization of opinion between Republicans and Democrats, the two main U.S. political parties, on a host of issues of intense concern to Europe, especially climate change, immigration and multilateralism; 2) the growth of disenchantment among activists in both parties with neoliberalism, accompanied by a broader anti-establishment sentiment and a greater receptivity to protectionism in trade; 3) a public mood that insists upon the primacy of domestic over foreign policy and that constitutes a sometime restraint on military adventurism; 4) a national security state that, in the matters committed to its care, exercises profound influence over the U.S. world role; 5) a deep institutional paralysis in Congress, contributing to a larger breakdown of faith in the efficacy of America’s political institutions; and 6) the uncharted waters that lie in wait for a political system that has vested the power of initiating war in one man.
Change and Continuity

Donald Trump has been a revolutionary figure in many respects. His rhetoric recalled the character traits that observers have imputed to demagogues since ancient Greece, with Trump outdoing even Cleon in unscrupulousness, though not in eloquence. His raw, unfiltered Twitter feed, often at cross purposes with policies enunciated elsewhere in the government, provokes even dyed-in-the-wool cynics to affirm that there are some things absolutely new under the sun. In the midst of head-scratching provocations and uncouth comments, it is easy to forget the many continuities with the preceding Republican administration and with the larger Republican consensus. Trump, of course, campaigned against Republican Party elites, but he must govern as a Republican, if he is to govern at all. The most fruitful way to understand the Trump administration is to see it as a Republican administration; its ideological center of gravity lies in certain long-standing beliefs of the Republican Party.

One element of the Trump program that stands faithful to Republican traditions is his proposal to boost defense spending and cut taxes. In this he follows President Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, Congressional leader Newt Gingrich in the 1990s, and President George W. Bush in the 2000s, all of whom embraced defense buildups and tax cuts while touting, nominally, fiscal rectitude. Even without changes to the baseline budget, cumulative deficits over the next ten years were projected in 2016 to increase the national debt by $8.6 trillion, rising from 75 percent of GDP in 2016 to 86 percent of GDP in 2026; Reagan and Bush II, by contrast, faced far less exacting constraints when they set forth their budget-busting programs. Trump went beyond them in proposing a hard power budget that ruthlessly excised programs suggestive of a humanitarian purpose or that sought preparedness against non-military dangers. Trump’s view of the bureaucracy is also vastly different from previous Republican administrations; Reagan and the two Bushes sought to command and utilize, not dismantle and marginalize, the State Department. Despite certain novelties, indubitably his and his alone, there remain basic continuities between the Trump program and previous Republican administrations in their approach to the national budget, the locus point for setting national priorities.

The historic debate over U.S. foreign policy between interventionists and isolationists has always been fundamentally informed by the prospect of war and the status of military alliances. But there are other domains
that raise critical problems, have a global character, and were a key part of the agenda for American foreign policy under Barack Obama. Among these are the specter of relentlessly increasing temperatures, making for extreme climate change, rising sea levels, and food insecurity; the danger of widespread pandemics, imperiling public health and world commerce; the alarming state of the world’s oceans, which face an increasingly hazardous future. These challenges, Obama believed, require both national exertion and international cooperation if they are to be addressed. They raise acute problems in which all the world’s nations are vitally interested, but which none can successfully address singly. And yet among Republicans, especially, those most avid for U.S. security commitments across the globe are loath to commit the United States to international treaties or collaborations that address these issues. Internationalist or interventionist in one sphere, they are isolationist in the other.

Trump’s intent to withdraw from the Paris climate accord, announced on June 1, 2017, is thus basically consistent with traditional Republican policy. George H.W. Bush declared that the American way of life—that is, low gas prices and suburbs—was not up for negotiation at the Rio climate conference in 1992; his son George W. Bush withdrew the United States from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001. In the 1990s, to be sure, there were many notable Republican voices who sounded the alarm about climate change, but their weight within the party has steadily diminished over the last generation. Whether climate change is a problem, and how government should respond, divided the two parties even in the 1990s, but the gap in perspective has widened dramatically in the last fifteen years. In 2016, 77 percent of Democrats thought of climate change as an urgent problem, whereas Republicans disagreed by a 50-point margin. Increasingly, Republicans came to see climate change as a hoax perpetrated by a scientific elite in the grip of ideological hostility to free markets. Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris accords, deeply unpopular in Europe, is also unpopular in the United States, with the U.S. public broadly favorable,

2 A dying ember, as it were, of an older Republican statesmanship is the report prepared by James A. Baker III, with other conservative Republicans, arguing for carbon taxes, *The Conservative Case for Carbon Dividends* (Washington, D.C., 2017). Its fate—malign neglect—recalls Bishop Berkeley’s query about the tree that fell in the forest when no one was around to hear. Did it make a noise?

in principle, to national effort and international cooperation in addressing climate change. The Republicans do not agree.4

Though Trump’s break with the Paris accord has great symbolic importance, it simply confirms the previously enunciated Republican opposition to Obama’s Clean Power Plan, blocked in the courts in 2015 before it was abandoned by President Trump in 2017. Obama’s reliance on executive power for his efforts to meet the Paris pledges had as its predicate the unwillingness of congressional Republicans to cooperate with the executive on climate matters. The moment when such cooperation appeared possible—the first two years of Obama’s presidency, when the Democrats controlled both legislative chambers and tried, but failed, to deliver a U.S. cap and trade program—has long since passed. Even had Trump not announced his intent to withdraw from the Paris accord, the ability of the United States to meet its self-proclaimed targets, insofar as that required federal action, was mostly blocked in Congress and the courts (though progress toward those targets had been made by virtue of the widespread substitution of now-plentiful natural gas for coal). Steps such as hefty taxes on gasoline, adopted long ago by America’s closest allies in Europe and Asia, have been anathema to the Republicans since the 1990s, and Democrats, for all their brave talk and profuse pledges, sense their electoral vulnerability to steps that require tangible sacrifices. When they controlled Congress in 2009 and 2010, they did not impose additional petrol taxes (those were last raised at the federal level in 1993, to 18.4 cents per gallon). Opinion polls show the public supports modest increases in the gasoline tax to pay for upgrades to America’s crumbling infrastructure, but no U.S. politician thinks it anything but hazardous to propose the sort of taxes necessary to prompt an energy transition.

The two main political parties are also deeply polarized with regard to a clutch of issues surrounding immigration, and this reflects a change from two decades ago even more dramatic than that which has occurred over climate change. In the early 2000s, Republicans and Democrats didn’t diverge sharply in their attitudes; now there is a chasm of 40 to 50 points between them. Expectations that the browning of America would yield electoral advantage for the Democrats was the main reason for partisan

divergence, reinforced by the budding discovery among Republican leaders that their base responded enthusiastically to a nativist stance.

Debates over immigration have merged with larger contests over voter suppression and gerrymandering, a no-holds-barred effort in the states to shift the political balance of power. According to scholars, the Republicans have been most successful at this effort (though the Republicans, with little to no evidence, also cry foul against the Democrats for vote-tampering). In 2012, the Democrats won the popular vote for the House of Representatives by 1.5 million votes, but gained only eight seats and remained in the minority (in a house of 435 members) by a 33-vote margin—results owing especially to the minute re-drawing of electoral districts that occurred after Republicans won widespread ownership of statehouses and legislatures in 2010.5

This disjunction between popular opinion and political result is also reflected in the composition of the Senate, with the more thinly populated states in flyover country, which are mostly dominated by the Republicans, having by the Constitution the same number of Senate seats as California and New York, the two most populous (and heavily Democratic) states. The Electoral College rules for the election of the president, an ungainly inheritance from the eighteenth century, reinforce the same tendency: Hillary Clinton won the popular vote by 2.9 million (66 million to 63 million), but lost the Electoral College by a vote of 304 to 232. Of course, immigration touches a range of other concerns besides future electoral advantage, including fear of competition for jobs and America’s larger struggles over identity, but partisan opinion on the question has become deeply polarized in a way that is new. Long gone are the days when the Wall Street Journal, closely identified with Republican perspectives and corporate interests, could propose a constitutional amendment declaring “there shall be open borders.” Almost all Republicans now view a dovish stance on that question as a route to oblivion in Republican primaries, which they must win in order to have a chance of competing for the favor of the broader public. Trump’s victory made that calculation more apparent than ever, but the Republicans had basically come to that conclusion before Trump announced his presidential bid. A common diagnosis among the Republican leadership after Mitt Romney’s 2012 defeat

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was that the Republicans needed to shed their anti-immigrant (and anti-Hispanic) image, a perception that formed the basis for congressional efforts to fashion a compromise bill on immigration. That effort, under the leadership of the “gang of eight,” fell apart amidst growing appreciation of the political danger from primary challengers from the Republican right. (This was especially signaled by Dave Brat’s defeat of House majority leader Eric Cantor in the June 2014 Republican primary in Virginia).

Public opinion on the immigration issue is not easy to characterize. A majority of 58 percent oppose new spending on a border wall, but a seven-point plurality supported Trump’s initial executive order (since ruled unconstitutional by a federal district court, then withdrawn and serially resubmitted) temporarily banning admissions from seven majority Muslim nations. Surprisingly, two thirds of Americans support a path to citizenship for undocumented people long resident, a sentiment diluted by the intensity of the opposing feeling in electorally vital states. The Democrats are willing to trade tougher border enforcement for a path to citizenship, but legislative majorities for a compromise are elusive. That America would participate in refugee resettlement programs was for Obama and Clinton a hard sell to the public, which is seldom swayed by humanitarian appeals in foreign policy if they are seen to impose serious costs. 69 percent of Clinton supporters said the United States had a responsibility to accept refugees from Syria, whereas 87 percent of Trump supporters said it didn’t, with the broader public siding with the Trump view by a 54 to 41 percent margin.

Beyond the vagaries of public opinion, it is evident that the Republicans have staked their fortunes on the issue and are unlikely to change their mind. Many Democratic intellectuals, sensitive to the emergence of anti-immigrant feeling, urge the Democrats to revert to their posture in the 1980s and 1990s, when they focused more on the national interests of American workers than the rights of immigrants. The United States has admitted some 47 million migrants since 1990, of which about 10-12 mil-

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lion were illegals, far more than any other country. While America will not shut its gate entirely to further immigration or refugee admittances, the aggregate numbers are likely to go down in the future. Arbitrary treatment of visitors, and the prospect of indignities at the hands of the authorities, will cause collateral damage for domestic industries like tourism, education, construction, and agriculture; yet further collateral damage seems certain to arise from Trump’s ill-treatment of Mexico. Nevertheless, Trump seems determined to deliver on his promises, and his success with the Republican base has made a compromising disposition on this question electorally hazardous for Republican incumbents.

**Trade, Multilateralism, Russia, and Iran**

Whereas partisan differences have become deeply polarized on climate change and immigration, they are more evenly balanced with regard to questions of international trade and protectionism. The elites in both parties long regarded America’s trade agenda, for NAFTA and the WTO in the 1990s, and for the TPP and TTIP more recently, as a sort of no-brainer, raising all boats, but the 2016 campaign showed that a protectionist message resonated deeply with the bases of both parties. Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump at certain moments sounded almost alike in their condemnation of the neoliberal nostrums once closely identified with America’s world posture, and their electoral competitors took notice. Hillary Clinton, originally an enthusiast, came out against the TPP, as did Ted Cruz, who ran second place to Trump in the Republican primaries. Neo-liberal trade policies of the last generation buoyed the stock market but also, as Edward Alden explains in this volume, left 80 percent of Americans “treading water.”¹⁰ One of the unbidden consequences was the vulnerability of a pained electorate to Trump’s demagoguery.

Trump’s nationalist instincts on the trade issue do represent a big break from post-1980s Republican orthodoxy, but the financial interests that make up the Republican coalition remain more in the free trade than protectionist camp, so his political space to accomplish legislative change is probably very limited. On the other hand, the president enjoys very considerable discretion in trade policy, so he might be able to wreck without re-making such symbols of the neoliberal order as NAFTA. The public has for a long time split from the elite on the greater priority they place

¹⁰ See Edward Alden’s chapter in this volume.
on “protecting jobs” versus creating a cheaper consumer cornucopia, and Trump capitalized on that sentiment in the states that put him over the top in 2016 (Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, North Carolina). Buoyed by this experience, Trump undoubtedly sees a tough line on trade as a winning issue, but the politics of it are messy.

The free trade vs. protection argument is a hardy perennial in American politics; James Madison, in 1820, noted that the tariff divided the nation in a checkered manner, crossing other lines of division, and that is also the case today, as differences over trade protection do not generally align with the broader cleavages in identity politics that are now so important. EU officials and Mexican politicians, drawing up potential targets of retaliation against an expected bout of protectionist measures from Trump, see agricultural free traders in Trump’s constituency as a logical point of pressure; there will be many such calculations—and many points of pressure—if the trade war heats up and costs once hidden begin to mount.

European opinion has been alarmed by the Trump administration’s larger skepticism toward multilateral engagement, but this too is not without precedent. The George W. Bush administration became renowned for its unilateralism and its impatience under multilateral restraint. In basic posture, Nikki Haley, Trump’s ambassador at the United Nations, is a throwback to John Bolton, nominated by Bush as UN ambassador (but never confirmed by the Senate). As scholar David Kaye noted in 2013, there are dozens of multilateral treaties “pending before the Senate, pertaining to such subjects as labor, economic and cultural rights, endangered species, pollution, armed conflict, peacekeeping, nuclear weapons, the law of the sea, and discrimination against women.” Requiring a vote of two-thirds in the Senate for passage, these have been blocked by a coalition of Republican senators for over two decades. Of course, it surely matters when the executive comes into the possession of people with a profound distrust of multilateral engagement and commitment. The United States never ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), for instance, but the executive branch historically agreed to abide by its terms; in general, a willing president has opportunities for international cooperation that do not depend on Congress. Trump’s evident hostility to such enterprises could therefore be very consequential,

but in a manner not too dissimilar from the stance Europeans confronted during Bush II’s presidency.

One dramatic change, with far-reaching ramifications, is the big shift that has taken place in regard to partisan views on Russia. In 2012, Democratic critics widely ridiculed Mitt Romney’s assertion that Russia was the greatest geopolitical threat to the United States; almost none of them believed that at the time. In the spring of 2017, 39 percent of Democrats regarded Russia in that vein. That is partly owing to the Ukraine crisis, but most especially of late to accusations of Russian meddling in the 2016 elections and the widespread Democratic suspicion that Trump colluded with the Russians in their activities. Whatever the outcome of “Russiagate,” it has sealed Democratic enmity toward Putin and Russia for a long time to come. Trump’s desire to “get along with the Russians” was one of the most surprising gambits of his campaign, as the two previous Republican nominees, Mitt Romney and John McCain, were invariably more hawkish than the Democrats, as was and is his vice-President, Mike Pence. Now the parties compete with one another in showing the depth of their hostility toward Russia. Given Trump’s political isolation on Russia, his only room for maneuver would seem to lie in adopting hawkish policies toward Russia as a way of forcing his domestic enemies to applaud him. Anything suggestive of a new détente with Russia has had the political air withdrawn from it and would probably be blocked by congressional action were Trump to proceed in this way.

The foreign policy views that Republican leaders most detested in Trump’s campaign were his statements favoring a better relationship with Russia. The foreign policy stance they most approved was his condemnation of the Iran nuclear agreement, in Trump’s estimation “the worst deal ever.” Any agreement that offers Iran reciprocal advantages—a necessary condition of agreement—has long been held by Republican opinion to be objectionable for that very reason. No Republican in Congress supported Obama’s 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran. Trump’s October 2017 decision to terminate the agreement, barring an unlikely Iranian capitulation, points toward a more bellicose posture, and there is even talk within the administration and the Congress of making regime change in Iran the

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explicit objective of U.S. foreign policy. Surprisingly, given Trump’s heated denunciation of Saudi Arabia during the campaign, the emerging thrust of his policy as president has displayed a close alignment with the Saudi and Israeli view demonizing Iran.

A collision between European and American perspectives is almost certain to arise over the treatment of Iran, with U.S. authorities greatly tempted to use the long arm of U.S. financial sanctions to enforce their view. In objecting to such measures, Europeans may struggle to find much of a hearing from Democratic legislators. To be sure, the Democrats are attached to the agreement Obama and the powers negotiated with Iran, but many of them (including the leader of the Democrats in the Senate, Charles Schumer, who opposed the JCPOA initially) are not backward in regarding Iran as an existential threat to Israel and the United States. Domestically, the anti-Russia and anti-Iran caucuses are ascendant in both parties, a fact shown by the overwhelming votes in Congress in 2017 (98-2 in the Senate, 419 to 3 in the House of Representatives) imposing sanctions against Russia and Iran. Any policy initiative seeking minimally decent relations with either country would face a stout barrier in Congress, even were the president to desire such.

The congressional sanctions bill, nominally against Russia and Iran, also authorized extraterritorial sanctions against German companies involved in the financing and construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline with Russia, a threat that elicited strong objections from the Merkel government. Such measures do have precedents: President Reagan, to the surprise of most observers, slapped sanctions on the Russian pipeline back in the early 1980s, provoking the objection from France’s foreign minister that the decision “could well go down as the beginning of the end of the Atlantic alliance.” But there was not then, as there is now, also in play a U.S. bid to displace Russian gas with LNG exports from the United States. The U.S. sanctions against Russia in 1982 were taken as part of a larger Cold War struggle and actually hurt U.S. companies like GE, whereas the

2017 U.S. initiative on gas has a selfish tenor, explicable either as a naked bid to increase U.S. market share or simply one of the ways of European payment for U.S. protection in NATO. Trump likely thinks of it in both those ways.

European opinion during the Cold War was typically riven by two opposing fears: first, that the Americans would abandon them; second, that the Americans would enmesh Europe in a conflict brought on by excessive U.S. belligerence to world communism. Something like that old dynamic may yet arise again. In seeking from Trump the reaffirmation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Europeans may get in return more than they bargained for—U.S. pressure for sanctions against Russia that go beyond Europe’s declared preferences and call into question its right to independent decision-making in foreign affairs. The more likely confrontation will come over Iran and the U.S. temptation to threaten war and extraterritorial sanctions in the contest with that country, but it could come over Russia as well. In early 2017, Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina declared 2017 “a year of kicking Russia in the ass in Congress.”18 As in all such righteous undertakings, the possibility of collateral damage to allies should not be discounted.

**Court and Country**

In some of the issues areas we have surveyed, such as climate change and immigration, fractures in public opinion are perfectly reflected in partisan differences. On larger questions of foreign policy and military commitment, however, there are serious cleavages in public opinion that are hardly registered at all in partisan squabbling between Democrats and Republicans.

Congressional leadership in both parties, the U.S. military, and the mainstream media are deeply committed to the maintenance of the national security state and to America’s worldwide system of alliances. A substantial portion of the public, on the other hand, is uneasy with those commitments. In 2014, 50 percent of adults described themselves as dovish (“someone who believes the U.S. should rarely or never use force”), 45 percent as hawkish (“someone who believes that military force should be used frequently to promote U.S. policy”), with 59 percent of Democrats,

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57 percent of Independents, but only 25 percent of Republicans identifying as doves.\(^{19}\)

The percentage of Americans who believe that the United States “should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own” reached all-time levels in 2013: 52 percent. Only 20 percent of Americans thought that way in 1964. The percentage of nay-sayers had risen to a high of 43 percent in 1976, when disenchantment with the Vietnam War took its toll, and had fallen as low as 30 percent in 2002, after the 9/11 attacks, but shot up to majority status as frustration with Iraq and Afghanistan deepened. In Pew’s 2016 survey, it fell back again to 41 percent, probably reflecting the rise of ISIS and the renewal of the cold war with Russia, but it is still within the range of post-Vietnam disaffection. By a two to one margin (61 to 32 percent) American voters believe the Iraq War was a mistake. (The veterans of that war feel the same way.) If given a choice between doing more abroad or fixing America, substantial majorities agree that the United States “is doing too much around the world and it is time to do less internationally and focus more on domestic problems.”\(^{20}\)

The various polls measuring public opinion on foreign policy suggest a fundamental contradiction between the aspirations of the foreign policy elite and those of the public, pitting the court against the country. Each takes profoundly different views of the primacy of domestic vs. foreign policy, recalling George Kennan’s distinction between those who conduct foreign policy in order to live, and those who live in order to conduct foreign policy.

This is shown even in the polls regarding NATO, which retains a large well of sympathy from the public (from 55 to 70 percent), but where the willingness to use force in accordance with Article 5 on occasion seems wanting. In a 2016 Pew Poll, 56 percent of Americans said the United States should use military force to defend a NATO country under Russian attack (37 percent said it should not),\(^{21}\) but when specific countries, like

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Estonia, are mentioned, support has sometimes only registered at the 20 to 30 percent level. In polling done by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the report of which generally argues against a big gap in public and elite perceptions in foreign policy, 71 percent of Republican elites and 64 percent of Democratic elites saw defending U.S. allies as “very important,” whereas only 35 percent of the public did so.

While the American public will not abide large U.S. casualties, especially in a cause that fails to achieve its declared aims, it shows little evidence of opposing U.S. airpower throughout the Greater Middle East. The military tools chosen from obeisance to domestic constraints are not necessarily capable of achieving a strategic aim, but airpower and drone strikes have faced little public backlash thus far. In Trump’s first months in office, he escalated airstrikes across the Greater Middle Eastern map, often to general applause from the commentariat (as in Syria), giving him a modest bump upward in the public opinion polls.

Even if one insists on the existence of a gap between court and country in their respective approaches to foreign policy, the significance of the gap may be doubted. Trevor Thrall, whose research has identified a “restraint constituency” of significant heft, has noted its less than adamantine character:

Though a majority of the public defaults toward caution under most circumstances, a persistent susceptibility to elite rhetoric provides regular challenges to the maintenance of restrained opinions. The balance between restraint and interventionist views, moreover, ebbs and flows with international events and recent experiences. As a result, the public’s predispositions do indeed provide an opening

22 Smeltz, et. al, in America First, note that in 2017, for the first time, a majority of Americans (52 percent) “support the use of US troops if Russia invades a NATO ally like Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia.” Op. cit.

23 Smeltz, Foreign Policy Establishment or Donald Trump, op. cit. U.S. public opinion, note Smeltz and her co-authors, is more aligned with the foreign policy establishment than with Trump. The latest report of the Chicago Council (Smeltz et. al, America First, p. 2) argues that Americans have “doubled down” on these beliefs. 55 percent of Democrats, for instance, say that maintaining existing alliances is a “very effective” way of achieving foreign policy goals, in contrast with 45 percent in 2016, with movement among Independents from 34 percent in 2016 to 47 percent in 2017. Stressing the gap between elite and public perspectives are Benjamin Page and Marshall M. Bouton, The Foreign Policy Disconnect: What Americans Want from Our Leaders but Don’t Get (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), and Eric Alterman, Who Speaks for America?: Why Democracy Matters in Foreign Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
for presidents to adopt restrained foreign policies, but they also
make it possible for them to do the opposite with some frequency.”

In key respects, it would seem, the “national mood” is something of a
fiction. It often stands in contradiction with itself and cannot generate
anything approaching a consensus. The nation does not want war, but it
recoils at the thought of accommodation to rival centers of power. The
public readily imbibes the ideology of the national security state, even as
it bridles at the costs. The public does not in the main approve the elite’s
understanding of internationalism—“the belief that, to be secure, the
United States must exert the full panoply of its power—military, economic,
and ideological—on the international system in order to shape its external
environment”—but the public has proven willing to back up the state if
it is challenged in this quest by other powers, throwing the fuel of Jacks-
sonian nationalism on the fires lit up by America’s strategic ambitions.

On the one hand, nothing so reliably produces neo-isolationists as imperial
overstretch; on the other hand, Americans are easily hornswoggled and,
once committed, have difficulty leaving. In matters of war and peace, they
seem always to come late to their repentance.

Institutional Order and Disorder

Despite significant disenchantment in public opinion, America’s global
military role remains intact. This arises from rooted enmities in Europe,
the Greater Middle East, and East Asia, especially. America’s role is sus-
tained both by ideological propensities in American political culture and
the vested interests of the national security establishment. Ideologically,
proponents stress America’s global role in support of the liberal rule-based
order. Buttressed by expressions of American exceptionalism, this role
features an America that defends itself by defending others, upholding

24 A. Trevor Thrall, “Beyond Hawks and Doves: Identifying the Restraint Constituency,” in
A. Trevor Thrall and Benjamin H. Friedman, eds., The Case for Restraint: U.S. Grand
25 Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present
26 On “Jacksonian nationalism,” see Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign
Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Routledge, 2001). The term refers to the
bellicose nationalism, highly conscious of honor and fair play, but tough as nails, which the
Scotch-Irish especially brought to the land of the free. World order doesn’t concern them.
But they have often been willing to fight for some idea of it.
fundamental principles like territorial integrity and freedom of navigation, but defining itself also in opposition to a range of hostile enemies. For the establishment, there seems basic agreement on the point that it is impossible to have a liberal world order without having hostile relations with Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China (together with a shifting cast of lesser states and terrorist groups). This cultural understanding is supplemented and given expression by an entrenched military-industrial complex and national security state that enjoys tremendous power in relation to the issues that are committed to its care.

Trump’s relation to the national security state is curious in many respects—he faces independent fiefdoms in the FBI and NSA, with which he seems to be at war. He has wanted to decimate the civilian personnel of the State Department, which he sees as part of the “swamp,” even while imbibing their geopolitical enmities—an attitude toward the experts that seems to stem more from crude anti-intellectualism, of the pitchfork-waving populist variety, than reasoned objection. In ideological complex-ion, Trump seems the least convincing spokesman imaginable for a rules-based order, and has thrown the talk of that into profound disarray. Evidently, however, Trump shares the consensus view that it is vital to maintain and extend U.S. military supremacy. He clearly wants to make the military-industrial complex a big part of his base.

At the core of the national security state are the armed forces of the United States, but it embraces as well many police and regulatory agencies. Included within it are an impressive array of foreign bases, its panoply of external sanctions, its global military commands, its vast spying and surveillance apparatus (estimated alone to cost $75 billion a year). Nick Turse describes a “geared-up, high-tech Complex” nothing like the “olive-drab” military-industrial complex of Eisenhower’s day. What it is—“this new military-industrial-technological-entertainment-academic-scientific-media-intelligence-homeland-security-surveillance-national-security-corporate complex”—defies normal description. Turse just calls it “the complex” but emphasizes the dependencies cultivated by the national security state in the broader economy and culture. Stretching beyond the military et al. complex are the prison-industrial complex, the Homeland

27 $75 billion was the estimated cost of 15 US intelligence agencies in the 2012 budget, according to Steve Aftergood of the Federation of American Scientists. See Jeanne Sahadi, “What the NSA Costs Taxpayers,” CNNMoney, June 7, 2013.

Security complex, the multi-faceted array of U.S. institutions dedicated to the proposition that coercive powers to destroy or incapacitate are indispensable remedies for the maladies of the human condition.

The entrenchment of this vast special interest within the national government has many supports. The weapons contractors, the bases, the supporting network of corporations and unions, the role of money in political campaigns, public propaganda touting the apparatus as a global force for good—all this adds up to a formidable domestic interest. These well-organized interests devote keen attention to the issues and make financial support conditional on political compliance. They have attached to them the interests of foreign allies and their domestic sympathizers, who often care very deeply about the issues at stake. The military-industrial complex has been far-sighted and judicious in distributing dependencies in all fifty states and nearly every congressional district, generating a politically potent multiplier effect. In such a situation, neither major party can or will speak against it. Even representatives in Congress skeptical of the national security complex enthusiastically support spending in their own states and districts, because it might make the difference between victory and defeat in the next election. What Robert Dahl once called “the intensity problem” is seen brightly in this example: a distinct minority that feels passionately about its cause is going to carry a lot more whack than a larger but less passionate group.

Of all the institutions of American government and society, the military stands tallest with the public. While Congress subsists like a mud-crawler in the nether regions of public sentiment, registering only 8 to 10 percent approval, the military soars like an eagle into regions of widespread adulation. It is not only the public opinion polls showing approval ratings in the seventies, but also the ubiquitous rhetoric— from politicians and sportscasters—seeing the military as a generation of heroes on which America’s

31 That America’s most honest politician—Bernie Sanders—should be a shill for the F-35, tells the dispassionate observer all she needs to know on that score.
security, prosperity, and liberty depends. Anyone who challenges this interest is likely to be denounced as unpatriotic and anti-American.

That so many Americans should glorify the military, while standing in contempt of Congress, is a depressing commentary on the state of American political institutions. The system of checks and balances, once so simply and beautifully arrayed, works to frustrate prompt and effective legislative action, making the United States a vetocracy. Bipartisanship in legislation has shriveled, so that each party, when it does command a slender majority, has a huge challenge in marshalling unanimity within its ranks. Hallowed congressional procedures, like the scheduling of hearings on important bills (e.g., health care in 2017), have been abandoned, and the sense of Congress as a deliberative body has been greatly attenuated by hyper partisanship. Money plays an enormous role in elections, creating the suspicion that every politician is, at some level, on the take.

This anti-establishment sentiment played a vital role in the 2016 elections; one of Trump’s basic sources of appeal for his supporters was that he was too rich to be beholden to all the special interests. But anti-establishment appeals are not wanting on the Democratic side as well, as Sanders’ insurgent candidacy showed. Large swaths of the country, among party partisans and independents, believe that the system no longer works for them. Capitalizing on such discontent to win elections, however, is much different from mobilizing it as part of a governing program; the sheer inertial quality of U.S. political institutions makes a stout barrier to fundamental transformation.

Partisanship and Foreign Policy

Trump’s appeal to raw, savage populism and racialism is just one aspect of a larger clash of identities in the United States. His commanding support among white men (63 percent for Trump, 31 percent for Clinton) is notable. Many Trump supporters are aggrieved not so much with Amer-

ica’s world position as with radical feminism, racial preferences, cultural marginalization as “deplorables,” and college campus Red Guardism, always featured on right-wing sites like Breitbart and Fox News, and revulsion to which played an important role in the culture wars preceding the election. Overall, these angry white men hated Clinton more than they loved Trump, with foreign policy not an especially important driving force in their opposition (They were teed off about it, of course, but didn’t have a common diagnosis.) The cultural divide, centered on identity politics and ethnic cleavage, intersects with the nationalist/globalist divide in various ways, but they are not the same thing. Whether they will become so, as Michael Lind has forecasted, is a vital question for the future. The convergence between new left and old right in opposition to military intervention, commanding at least half of public sentiment, is severely diluted because of profound ideological differences in the culture wars. They are of like mind, but cannot unite.

Polarization, in public opinion and in the parties, evokes the maniacal passions of the 1790s, the 1850s, and early 1940s, all dreary parallels in American politics that suggest big change is afoot. For the first time in surveys done since 1992, according to Pew, “majorities in both parties express not just unfavorable but very unfavorable views of the other party.” These visceral splits and irrepressible conflicts suggest deadlock and frustration on a host of legislative fronts, but they need not interfere with cooperation on foreign policy, as the overwhelming congressional support for sanctions on Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Germany shows. Actions greatly consequential to other nations may be deeply affected by the absence of bipartisanship in legislation, as deadlock can yield a government shutdown or other forms of paralysis, but on the big questions of foreign policy—maintaining a superior military, reaffirming U.S. alliances, having hostile relations with Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China—there is substantial bipartisan consensus in Washington.

In assessing public opinion on foreign policy, it must always be borne in mind that domestic concerns are usually of far greater moment in determining votes than foreign policy (even as many issues, like climate change, trade, and immigration, are intermestic in character). Intensity of belief,

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of course, also matters greatly. In its domestic culture war, America seems to have resolved itself into its racial and gendered identities, the appeal to “who we are not” becoming primary and casting common purpose and even material interest into the shade. This division into the multicultural left and the nativist right (with an ample middle detesting both extremes) pits the urban centers and university towns, without regard to geographic section, against everybody else. The widespread discontent against the establishment would seem an auspicious condition for the emergence of third parties, but such dissident forces seem barred from providing a hopeful answer: their invariable record in American electoral politics is to give an even greater predominance to their mortal enemies.  

Trump’s job approval rating fell to 34 percent, a new low, in August 2017, suggesting electoral vulnerability, but he must be defeated by someone in particular. This someone, like Clinton in 2016, may garner high unfavorability ratings as well. The Democrats’ problem is that they have to moderate their views on the cultural issues if they are to regain their support among the white working class; it is not clear that they can bring themselves to do that. The Republicans’ problem is that their legislative agenda injures the same white working-class voters who put Trump over the top; but they can’t stop themselves either. Neither the Rainbow Coalition, the Democrats’ motley collection of rights- and grievance-bearing minorities, nor the donor class, in whose trough the Republicans have long fed, are especially appealing to that elusive middle, often inattentive, that decides elections. Neither party can expand its ranks without risking the secession of its parts. The future, it would seem, belongs to the party that can most successfully hide the traits that swing voters find obnoxious.

Empire of Tribute

Inherently unclear are the implications of America’s new nationalism for U.S.-Europe relations. Trump is offensive to European leaders, who have to swallow hard to feign a commonality of purpose. Europe’s political center lies firmly in Obama territory; there are many things in Trump’s

37 In 1844, the abolitionists served to elect James K. Polk; in 1912, Theodore Roosevelt got Woodrow Wilson the presidency; in 2000, Ralph Nader provided the margin of victory to George Bush; in 2016, Jill Stein’s candidacy garnered more votes than the winning margin between Trump and Clinton in several electorally crucial states. The third-party record is not auspicious, even if, especially if, one is attracted to third parties.

style and governing program that are deeply estranging to European opinion. European leaders typically have a vision of an America that plays a constructive role in the world, and they still really want that, but they are also capable of disappointment and frustration, perhaps lasting estrangement. The view arguing for long term stability in the alliance relationship is that Trump will pass; he is an accident. Be that as it may, convulsions in the relationship between the United States and Europe are likely in the interim.

Perennial complaints over burden-sharing have fueled much of the U.S. public's discontent with America’s world position, though it is seldom noted in the U.S. debate that the most important reason for this disparity over the last fifteen years has been America’s excess, and not Europe's defect. Trump brought the burden-sharing complaint to the center of his campaign as few presidential contenders had done in the post-World War II period. Sharply breaking from the security consensus, Trump insisted that America had gotten a rotten deal from its alliances, giving much while getting little in return. He intimated that he would make protection conditional on further allied contributions. Among America Firsters, an expression Trump endorsed, the traditional response to unequal burden-sharing was to propose a withdrawal from America's alliances, but Trump’s resolution was very different. Notably, he proposed a massive new investment in U.S. armed forces, though such a build-up could only be justified as a way of shoring up America’s global military position, hence the protection of the very allies he excoriated as deadbeats.

What Trump most seemed to want was not the abandonment of the alliances but their explicit reformulation as relationships of avowed U.S. protection to be repaid in tangible benefits—the geopolitical version of the protection racket. The view of America’s allies as deadbeats is a long-standing viewpoint for Trump, held since the 1980s, when he began taking out newspaper ads alleging that America always got the short end of the stick from its alliance relationships. Germany, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia were especially singled out as chiselers-in-chief in Trump’s first months as president. Everybody has taken advantage of America; its leadership stupidly sold it down the river. Everything, therefore, must be re-negotiated, the result of which is that America’s allies pay their dues.

This view, however, is not shared by Trump’s principal national security appointees, nor by the larger national security elite in government, media, and think tanks. Such payments, it is true, are not entirely unprecedented: something like this did happen in the aftermath of the Gulf War against
Iraq in 1991. Moreover, it’s not too different in spirit from the widespread congressional view that the United States can legislate for the world, because the world has a dollar-based financial system. Trump’s version of the empire of tribute is just a more uncouth version of a tendency that is more mainstream than the mainstream wishes to acknowledge.

Trump’s attitude toward alliances is profoundly objectionable to the foreign policy establishment, but it doesn’t really respond to popular disaffection either. Public opinion of a populist or nationalist tenor wants to withdraw from certain controversies and commitments, not dominate the scene and put America in charge of fully-paid-up sycophants. The old Jacksonian faith was that you fought for honor or safety, but never for cash, out of patriotic devotion, not mercenary gain. Weirdly, Trump’s view seems contrary to both the court and the country—offensive to the establishment vision of America’s world role, but alien to the inward-looking (and honor-seeking) ethos of the people. His view is also utterly different from the isolationists and America Firsters of yore, none of whom wanted an empire of tribute.

Trump’s desire to extracts rents in exchange for protection may jangle nerves and create exasperation among allies, but it is difficult to see how it can possibly make serious headway. For one thing, the threat of withdrawal arouses ferocious opposition within the U.S. national security establishment, Trump’s appointees included. Nor are Europeans likely to respond well to such treatment. Trump seems to believe that you conduct diplomacy by pushing people around and getting under their skin, moving back and forth between the insulting and the oleaginous. This is not how it works. To proceed against the allies as deadbeats will upset their public opinion and will launch in Europe and Asia numerous and protracted inquiries into the quality of the protection America offers. Just as Americans once queried “the price of the union,” so would allied opinion, if faced with such demands, query the price of the alliance. Demands for subordination from hegemonic leaders have more than once in the past produced movements for independence; such an outcome cannot be excluded here. The assumption that Europeans or East Asians have no alternative to U.S. protection is widely held, but mistaken. They have a limit, and they have an alternative.
Militarism Returns

The strength of America’s new nationalism, and the reaction it engenders at home and abroad, is inextricably tied to the fate of the Trump presidency. Trump’s erraticism and unfitness, however, make prediction especially hazardous. That he reached the presidency at all continues as a source of amazement. The whole of the commentariat was shocked that Trump’s notorious gaffes and transgressive conduct did not sink him in the election. Equally surprising was the support Trump found in his first year as president among the Republican base, which has thus far remained steadfast in their enthusiasm. Republican elected officials, much to their displeasure, have been forced into public support for a president they secretly detest and fear. This does not augur well for the president’s legislative agenda (not a great loss, as the Republicans may be imperiled as much by the success, as the failure, of their domestic program).

In foreign policy, Trump has deranged the extant moral order within the U.S. alliance system, but has offered no coherent replacement. Rather than isolationism, he has displayed a militant nationalism that augurs wider war. Trump’s menacing language toward North Korea and Iran, the two most glaring examples, point in this direction, as does the president’s infatuation with all things military. It is likely that Trump wants the accolades that may accompany war and believes that war can be made to yield political advantage, for a sufficiently good time. Whether the shadow regency of generals Mattis (Secretary of Defense), McMaster (National Security Adviser), and Kelly (White House Chief of Staff) can control him is the question of the hour, the source of much earnest speculation and existential dread.39

The regency was an institution of European monarchy for the infancy and insanity of kings; it is a strange sort of historical comeuppance that the world’s oldest constitutional republic has gotten the outline of a military regency, now to fulfill the role that the Constitution vested in the Congress, but of uncertain strength and purpose. It may be the most consequential domestic determinant of foreign policy that, by constitutional legerdemain and historical amnesia, and in pursuit of a liberal world order, the United States has come to vest the power of initiating war in one man.
